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ABSTRACT 
 
 This dissertation examines the representation of ascetic renunciation in early 
modern drama, focusing in particular on the way asceticism functions as a tool of 
political agency. This study argues that the act of renunciation is essentially 
performative and public, directed outward to an audience whose responses the 
performer hopes to shape or direct. The specific political significance of ascetic acts 
varies according to the status and social position of those who perform and receive 
them, potentially functioning as a discourse both of resistance and of control. In early 
modern England, traditional asceticism’s association with heterodox catholicism lent it 
an extra-normative and subversive quality that found utility in acts of resistance. 
However, ascetic or renunciatory discourse could also be utilized in the exercise of 
power by monarchs, both as a discourse of legitimation and as an act of public image 
construction. To help explain this flexibility, this study utilizes the sociolinguistic theories 
of M.M. Bakhtin, V.N. Voloshinov, and Pierre Bourdieu, all of whom offer models for 
interpreting language in shifting contexts and across discursive fields.  
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  The introduction defines asceticism as performative and potentially political, 
before tracing some of the relevant historical developments of asceticism from the 
Middle Ages to the sixteenth century. Chapter One analyzes the representation of 
asceticism in Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure, focusing in particular on the 
character of Isabella, whose celibate vows place her in conflict with mechanisms of 
power. Chapter Two examines the literary representation of asceticism in both medieval 
and early modern contexts by reading Shakespeare and Fletcher’s The Two Noble 
Kinsmen in relation to its Chaucerian source material, The Knight’s Tale. Chapter Three 
shifts to an examination of ascetic postures and discourse by monarchs, considering first 
The Escorial, Philip II’s monastic palace, and then moving to a reading of Elizabeth I’s 
translation of the renunciatory Consolation of Philosophy by Boethius. Chapter Four 
further pursues this intersection of kingship and asceticism with an analysis of ascetic 
discourse in Shakespeare’s Henry V. The conclusion considers areas for further analysis 
of asceticism in early modern literature, including revenge tragedy and Milton’s 
Paradise Lost.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 Renunciation takes many guises and serves many purposes. The impulse to turn 
away from the material or the worldly is not limited to a particular culture or geographic 
region nor to a particular moment in history. And though renunciation does not belong 
alone to the sphere of either the religious or the secular, ascetic acts are recognized as 
powerful by most of the world’s major religions, past and present. Because self-denial is 
invariably at odds with our fundamental biological impulses towards self-fulfillment, 
ascetic or renunciatory acts have always been most easily understood through the lens 
of the spiritual rather than the material. The appeal of ascetic behavior despite its 
antagonistic relationship to the genetic programming of self-preservation is universal 
enough that understanding its origins is a project for anthropologists as much as 
historians or theologians. The Lakota inipi ceremony, in which an individual withdraws 
into darkness to endure extremes of heat for the purposes of spiritual purification, is of 
a kind with the legendary fasting of the Buddha; they both speak to a shared belief that 
extremes of physical discomfort or pain presage spiritual exaltation. However, the 
symbolic power of asceticism need not be limited to purely religious contexts, for it can, 
and very often does, find utility as political action. 
This dissertation will examine the nature of ascetic renunciation in the religious 
discourse of early modern England. As a literature thesis, its primary focus is literary: 
particularly, the way ascetic acts and attitudes are dramatized on the Shakespearean 
stage. However, toward this end I will also examine how ascetic acts, attitudes, 
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language, or renunciation found expression in the world beyond the theater, especially 
in political or subversive contexts. My aim, ultimately, is to dislodge asceticism from the 
sphere of the purely religious, and in doing so my study gradually moves away from the 
depictions of monastic clergy to the appropriation of ascetic language and attitudes in 
the secular contexts of kingship.   
   Before proceeding to the analysis of asceticism in early modern drama, however, 
it is necessary to define more specifically how the terms asceticism and renunciation will 
be used in this study.  
  
Asceticism in Theory and Practice 
On June 11, 1963, Thích Quảng Đức, a Malaysian Buddhist Monk, set himself on 
fire in the middle of a busy Saigon street to protest the persecution of Buddhists by the 
South Vietnamese government. A photograph depicting Đức stoically meditating as the 
flames consumed his flesh circulated around the world, drawing commentary from 
world leaders and the international media. To this day, it remains one of the most 
famous acts of political protest in modern history. Self-immolation, without question 
the most extreme and spectacular act on the ascetic spectrum, was in this case carried 
out as an act of political resistance rather than (or as well as) spiritual transcendence. 
These political ends explain the public context of the act. As Gavin Flood writes, 
asceticism at a fundamental level is always an act of performance, looking outward 
towards culture and tradition as much as inward to the soul:  
  
3 
Asceticism is always performed, which is to say always in the public 
domain (even when performed in privacy). One of the key features of 
performance is that it is public and can be observed. Asceticism is 
therefore performance because the reversal of the flow of the body is 
enacted within a community and tradition….Ascetic performance only 
makes sense in [that] context.…Through performing asceticism the 
ascetic is performing tradition, and the performance of tradition is a 
public affair. But not only is ascetic performance public, it is also 
subjective or the subjective appropriation of tradition. (7) 
Self-immolation draws power not only from its intersection with (in this case Buddhist) 
tradition, but through a transgressive radicalization of that tradition. Đức’s act was also 
public and performative not merely in Flood’s sense of responding to tradition and 
culture, but in its exploitation of a new and limitless audience; material reality limits 
self-immolation to a single performance, but the reproductive and regenerative power 
of mass media allows for perpetual encores. And while we might recoil from this horrific 
act, judged against what Đức himself hoped to achieve it can be judged as effective 
political speech: it brought the plight of Buddhists in Vietnam to global attention and 
directly led to international pressure on the Vietnamese government to institute 
reforms (Fierke 173).      
 One of the most common Chinese euphemisms for self-immolation, sheshen 
(“abandon the body”), is particularly telling, as it frames self-immolation not only as an 
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extreme example of mortification in which the body is made to suffer for the benefit of 
the spirit, but also as an act of renunciation in which the flesh is turned away from or 
rejected (Ben 9). The word sheshen is also used as an equivalent for the word chuijan, 
“to leave one’s household”: that is, to become a monk or nun (Ben 10). This terminology 
links self-immolation not only with an extreme ascetic ethos, but also with 
institutionalized monasticism. Renouncing the world and renouncing the flesh form two 
pillars of a larger ascetic framework, one that can be bent towards political as well as 
religious ends.  
 Self-immolation is merely the most dramatic and violent example of the denial 
of the needs of the flesh; still, even less conflagratory expressions of asceticism can have 
political or social utility beyond spiritual self-fulfillment. Western ascetic traditions, 
while they are historically pervasive, tend to be less extreme than Buddhism and other 
eastern religions, at least in the realm of self-mortification. Christianity, despite its 
powerful injunctions against suicide, has since its earliest days harbored a potent ascetic 
strain, though not one that always embraced mortification of the flesh as orthodox. 
While self-mortification did often find expression in early and medieval Christianity, it 
never took the most radical forms such as the example of Buddhist self-immolation 
above. Hair shirts were common enough in some monastic communities, and various 
kinds of self-flagellation were practiced throughout the middle ages (Newman 96).  
However, extreme forms of self-torment were as likely to be criticized as admired, and 
there was never perfect agreement among various ascetic orders over the role of self-
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inflicted pain in the pursuit of spiritual grace. Enthusiastic self-mortifiers such as the 
eleventh century Italian hermit Peter Damian stressed the need for spiritual atonement 
to be recorded on the flesh both in memory of Christ’s suffering and as a mimetic 
performance of divine judgment (Fulton 91-92). However, other medieval ascetics 
minimized the importance of or even rejected outright this kind of self-imposed bodily 
suffering. The Cistercians of the twelfth century, for example, rarely practiced or even 
wrote about self-flagellation, celebrating instead “patient endurance of sickness and 
pain” (Newman 96). Self-imposed suffering risked the sin of singularity: trusting in 
oneself to achieve salvation. As Martha Newman writes, Cistercian asceticism looked 
inward to the ordering of the will, especially in response to hardship and want:  
[T]he Cistercians were certainly ascetics: they limited their bodies’ needs 
for essentials such as food and sleep as a way of turning their will toward 
their God, and they emphasized the importance of physical labor as a 
penitential practice. But once they had made the decision to enter a 
monastery, their asceticism was no longer self-imposed [on the body]. In 
fact, they viewed…self-flagellation and extreme fasting as risking the sin 
of singularity and as demonstrating pride and willfulness. In their effort to 
transform prideful and aggressive aristocratic men into humble and 
obedient monks, the Cistercians emphasized discipline and humility and 
insisted that this transformation was more a matter for the will than for 
the body. (97) 
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These contrary examples point to two related but distinct strains of ascetic practice in 
early and medieval Christianity. On the one hand, a thread of Christian asceticism from 
late antiquity through the middle ages endorsed, with limits, voluntary mortification of 
the flesh as essential to the renunciant vocation. On the other hand, many monastic 
communities of the high and later middle ages came to see their ascetic discipline as an 
inward matter. Manual labor, fasting, celibacy, and the patient endurance of all manner 
of want remained central to the ascetic life. Limited forms of mortification such as hair 
shirts, sleeping on bare floors, stress positions, and even some self-flagellation might 
supplement the disciplining of the will, but typically remained secondary to the inward 
ordering of the soul in such communities. 
An active example of this debate in action can be seen in a thirteenth century 
biography of the Cistercian lay brother Arnulf, who broke with the common Rule of the 
Cistercian monastery through the vigorous practice of various mortifications. As 
recorded by his biographer, the Cistercian monk Goswin, Arnulf explains his self-
flagellation with everything from thorny branches to hedgehog pelts by demonizing his 
own flesh:   
My flesh is my enemy, and the closer it is to me, the more formidable an 
enemy it is. For my flesh is a beast of burden which needs to be pricked 
with goads and constrained, lest it frolic wantonly and drag me into the 
whirlpool of death; thus I promise to keep inciting wars against it (qtd. in 
Newman 92).  
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This declaration typifies the most radically pain-seeking type of Christian asceticism. 
However, the commentary of Goswin shows how resistant even fellow renunciants 
could be to such self-mortification. As he describes his subject’s self-flagellation, he 
cannot help interrupting his admiration with criticism and calls for restraint:  
What a wonder! Who will not be struck with amazement! We beg you, 
for Christ’s sake, take pity on your flesh, that poor, frail flesh without 
which you cannot live. If you truly wish to afflict it, at least have regard 
for discretion, that mother of the virtues, for from her you can be taught 
how much of a burden you can impose on the beast that is your flesh. 
(qtd. in Newman 91-92)     
Goswin’s fruitless, unheard plea to Arnulf offers a rare instance of critique encroaching 
upon on what is ostensibly hagiography; that Goswin’s wonder could momentarily give 
way to horror demonstrates the hesitance many ascetics felt toward more extreme 
manifestations of self-mortification.  
  I raise this conflict here because, for the most part, this study will not deal with 
examples of active self-harm, or what Giles Constable terms “positive mortifications” 
(7). Rather, my subject is, primarily, ascetic renunciation, those “negative” mortifications 
that mainly involve the mastery of certain bodily and psychological impulses. Giles lists 
among examples of “negative mortifications” celibacy, poverty, obedience, and fasting: 
the renunciation of sex, material wealth, self-will, and food respectively (10). Other 
renunciations include silence, the renunciation of discourse; humility, the renunciation 
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of self-worth and authority; and solitude, the renunciation of companionship (10). These 
specific examples might broadly be categorized as ascetic in that they all require 
subordinating the body’s needs and desires to a project of spiritual exaltation, but they 
do not typically involve the self-violence from which the modern imagination shrinks.1 
Shakespeare’s plays are not without radical self-harm, mostly in the form of suicide as a 
response to misfortune; however, suicide would not fall under the category of 
asceticism in the Christian tradition, and therefore must be and has been analyzed in 
other contexts.2  Beyond suicide, there are few, if any, representations of positive 
mortifications in Shakespeare; where asceticism is located, it invariably takes the 
negative form, as the denial of impulse or the renunciation of worldly enjoyments. 
While this study will occasionally raise examples of active self-mortification in its 
analyses of the ascetic mindset generally, the examples from literature will mostly 
exemplify what Michel Foucault describes as the ascetic’s “mastery…over himself, his 
body, and his own sufferings”; that is, as a question of self-mastery rather than active 
self-harm (Security 206).  
While the place and nature of asceticism in Christian spiritual life has changed 
over time with the rise and fall of churches, denominations, splinter groups, offshoots, 
factions, and reformers, it has never been extinguished, nor has it ever failed to find 
expression in some form. The discipline of the medieval monk and the draconian social 
                                                        
1 Constable describes the “positive mortifications” of whipping, immersion, stress positions, and the like as 
the forms of religious practice “which are most incomprehensible to us” (10).  
2 See, for instance, Langley; Cantor, 38-41. 
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laws of the Puritan protectorate are but two very different examples of an ancient 
Christian gravitation towards the renunciatory in practice. The late sixteenth/early 
seventeenth century is a particularly fruitful historical moment to consider the nature of 
asceticism in both religious and secular life, especially in England where the furnace of 
Reformation still burned hot. Much of the unrest I identify in depictions of ascetic acts 
and attitudes on the early modern stage is derived from their primary association not 
with the mainstream episcopal Calvinism of the day, but with the Roman Catholicism 
mostly purged over the course of a calamitous sixteenth century.3 Historical studies of 
the period have evolved in their thinking on the scope and nature of catholic survivalism 
in England in the Tudor and Stuart period. In the 1940s, A.G. Dickens could write 
confidently that Elizabethan individuals’ attachment to the faith of their forefathers 
declined quickly; what recusant sentiment flourished was a consequence not of the 
residue of old traditions but the aggressiveness of the counter-reformers’ “arduous 
proselytism” (“Romanist Recusancy” 181).4  In the latter part of the twentieth century, 
however, historians have offered a reconsideration of the endurance of medieval 
catholicism, most famously in Christopher Haigh’s direct rebuttal to Dickens, English 
Reformations: Religion, Politics, and Society under the Tudors. Haigh argues convincingly 
that the course of the Reformation was the result of political maneuvering rather than 
any sea change in popular faith, and that even well into the sixteenth century, the 
                                                        
3 I use the term episcopal in this study to refer broadly to the state religion and religious authority in 
England after the Elizabethan Settlement of 1559.  
4See also Dickens, The English Reformation.  
  
10 
church-going but unlettered parishioner was not fully protestant, but simply “de-
catholicized” (43). Eamon Duffy is more thorough than his predecessor in his use of 
documentary and artistic evidence, as he argues that catholicism, far from having 
reached a nadir of superstitious vacuity and venal corruption, was a thriving and popular 
faith on the eve of the Reformation. In Duffy’s view, the success of the Reformation had 
less to do with the degeneracy of catholicism or the triumph of protestant ideas and 
theology than with its sponsorship by those in position of power, most notably Henry 
VIII and Elizabeth I. Duffy narrates the English Reformation as a top down development, 
imposed upon rather championed by the people: a fact attested to by the survival of so 
many aspects of traditional religion in popular practice for decades after the First Act of 
Supremacy.  The Reformation was, to Duffy, more about eliminating dissent and 
consolidating power in an increasingly autocratic political system than addressing the 
degeneracy of the Church. Duffy even goes so far as to view the Marian Counter-
Reformation as a correction, easily accepted by the people, rather than an interruption 
in an inevitable historical course (526).  These studies are useful to me not for their 
“defense” of medieval catholicism, but for their placement of the Reformation within a 
larger narrative of the centripetal consolidation of state power under the Tudors. One 
need not accept the arguments of these studies uncritically to recognize that they 
offered and continue to offer a much needed counterweight to early twentieth century 
scholarship and its faith in an uncomplicated protestant orthodoxy. When considering 
asceticism in its new, broadly protestant context, it does the reader well to be open 
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minded to popular and organic, rather than external and reactionary, catholic 
survivalism and continuity.5 
 
Some three and half centuries before Đức, victims of religious persecution 
imagined similar ways in which their suffering could engender resistance. The stout-
hearted Roman might face torture with grim fortitude, but in Christian martyrology the 
prospect of pain and suffering for religious truth can produce genuine enthusiasm. This 
is particularly true of descriptions of martyrdom in catholic martyrologies. While radical 
protestants had, going back to Foxe’s Actes and Monuments, published accounts of 
protestant martyrdom that borrowed heavily from catholic models, Susana Monta 
argues that protestant martyrology as a whole seems devoted to an idea of “godly 
passive resistance” that downplays any sense of willed suffering (276). The works-based 
theology of catholicism, meanwhile, leaves more room for the positive valuation of 
Christ-like mortifications. In truth, martyrdom itself can take the form of ascetic 
practice, for an active embrace of suffering undergirds both categories; the ascetic 
mindset, in fact, enables martyrdom precisely because it offers a system of praxis in 
which pain can be turned to the exaltation of the self. Martyrdom is, I would argue, the 
most extreme form of negative mortification possible: it is not the ascetic acting against 
                                                        
5 A study that is open minded to catholic survivalism does not necessarily endorse the view that 
Shakespeare himself was a crypto-catholic. This study takes no position on Shakespeare’s personal faith.  
As a personal matter, I side with Beatrice Groves and others in finding such a view intriguing though 
ultimately unconvincing.  
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his or her own flesh, but transforming an external punishment into a type of ascetic 
penance, one which ennobles rather debases the victim. Martyrdom offers the Christian 
ascetic an avenue to carry mortification beyond the liminal space between life and 
death that serves as an impermeable boundary in the voluntary suffering of traditional 
askesis. If the goal of asceticism is imitatio Christi—that is, to model oneself on Christ—
then only in martyrdom can it achieve its full realization.     
This connection helps explain the zeal for suffering can be found in the writings 
of William Alabaster, a poet, scholar, and clergyman who converted to catholicism in 
1596, before eventually converting back to protestantism after being imprisoned by the 
Inquisition in Rome (Sutton).  Alabaster is something of a singular figure in the history of 
the period, vacillating not only between catholicism and protestantism but also dabbling 
in study of Kabbalah and various Christian mysticisms; therefore, his discourse cannot 
necessarily be taken as representative of catholic recusancy as a whole. He nevertheless 
offers an example of how the discourses of martyrdom and asceticism come into 
alignment. In an account of his own conversion, Alabaster concocts a breathless fantasy 
about the protestant trial and the accompanying bodily torments he might face with an 
eagerness that far exceeds the mere patient endurance of suffering more typical of 
catholic asceticism: 
Neither was ther any cogitation so pleasant and sweet unto me as to 
imagin myself to be called before the commission of the Councell, or the 
Queene herself, or to be arrayned for denying of the supremacy; and 
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many a sweet hower I spent both then and after on Imageninge my selfe 
to holde upp my hand at the barre, and to be tried for my life or to be 
thrust into some darke dungeon with as many chaines as I could beare. I 
fedd my self with the comfortes which I conseaved I should find there, 
and I devised what sonnetts and love devises I would make to Christ 
about my chaines and irons, and what woordes I would speake when I 
should be carying to the racke, and how I would carye my countenanc 
uppon the racke, and what I woulde speake all the way that I should be 
dragged uppon the hurdell. But amonge all one thing which I thought of 
oftenes and found exceeding ioye thinking theron, was that I purposed 
with myself when I should stand iuppon the ladder with the halter abowt 
my neck and see the fyer burninge to receave my bowels, and the 
hangman redye to open my breast and pull forth my heart, that then I 
would make an earnest suite to Toplife the preest (whom I conceaved as 
present) to grante me one suite before my death. Which should be this, 
That because I had suffered so little for Christes sake, whoe suffered so 
much for myne, and was now to dye and make an end of all sufferinges, 
that he wold shew me so much favor as not to lett me hange any tyme at 
all, which some tymes they use to do, but to cutt me downe as soone as 
might bee that I might have suffitient vigor of cense both to feele first the 
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paine of the rope and much more afterwarde the smarte of the knyfe 
that should unlace me. (5.1) 
The language here is not that of stoic resistance, but of active, almost erotic, enjoyment, 
culminating in the bravado of the final dramatic request: that he be cut down from the 
gallows while still conscious enough to fully experience his disemboweling. Alabaster 
demonstrates an awareness of the threat this ascetic reversal poses to authority when 
he imagines that Richard Topcliffe, one of Elizabeth’s most notorious torturers, is 
present to witness the inefficacy of his arts. In fact, by asking Topcliffe to amplify his 
suffering, he adumbrates Foucault’s theorization that the suffering of the condemned 
can illuminate the “error of judges” and the misapplied cruelty of state power, rather 
than the sinful nature of the criminal (Discipline 46).    
Alabaster’s imagined martyrdom, although extreme even for the genre, helps 
demonstrate the close link between the traditional tropes of Catholic martyrology and 
asceticism. While in deed Alabaster does not rise to the level of Đức self-immolation, he 
imagines an active pain-seeking that is unmistakably ascetic,  his language evincing a 
radicalized works-based catholic theology born of the violent external pressures of 
reformist oppression in the sixteenth century. It should not necessarily be taken as an 
expression of catholic orthodoxy per se, but rather as a response to a state that sought 
to minimize religious dissent through corporal domination. The full effect of such 
radically ascetic discourse, after all, is the cancellation of the very sovereign power 
normally reinforced by the theatrical forum of state punishment. Instead, the torture 
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becomes a dramatic representation of the opposite: the triumph of individual agency 
and the impotence of the sovereign (particularly as a figure of religious authority).  
Using martyrology as anti-authoritarian political discourse is not unique to 
catholics, as works such as Actes and Monuments or later Puritan examples 
demonstrate. But the works-based theology that underlies catholicism’s ascetic 
discourse and religious orders makes it particularly amenable to this kind of rhetorical 
table-turning. Elsewhere in his account, Alabaster attacks protestant theology itself as 
excessively “light” and “easy,” setting it against the ascetic exempla of the early Church:    
Morever the fastings of the Apostles, and of those who were the first to 
profess the faith of Christ, together with their whippings, sorrowes, 
groanes, teares, punishment of the body, kneelings and similar severe 
and voluntary mortification of their flesh, thes are abundantly displayed 
in their epistles and workes, in so much as one of them durst 
say adimpleo ea quae desunt passionum Christi in carne, I do fyll up in my 
flesh that which waunted of Christes sufferings….And after this againe, all 
they that from that tyme to this were recounted by Ecclesiastical 
histories in all ages have been saintes and frendes of God and to have 
wrought miracles…had a farr different course of life and spirit than the 
spirite whereby our protestants are led today; so either we must 
conclude that spirit was erroneous and false (but if so, how did they work 
so many miracles?), or that God had two spirits, one austere which he 
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communicated to the old saints, the other easy and light, poured out on 
our new Protestants. (2.8) 
Protestantism, a corruption of the true and original spirit of God’s revelation, lacks the 
masculine vigor of catholicism which is based not merely on a state of spiritual salvation 
but on deeds and accomplishments. It is notable that the examples of good works that 
move Alabaster are almost exclusively ascetic self-mortification or renunciations, which 
provide the most visceral and obvious examples of the heroic austerity of the catholic 
faith in comparison to the vicariousness of sola fides protestantism.    
 But a strict critical formula that interprets everything ascetic as catholic or quasi-
catholic is far too simplistic. While the Reformation in England dismantled the 
ceremonial, formalized, and institutional aspects of ascetic practice, it did not destroy 
the ascetic impulse in Christianity or in the culture at large. It did, however, redirect it 
from the exalted category of vocational specialization toward something more 
generalized and diffuse. This is part of Max Weber’s famous thesis about the protestant 
ethic, and Charles Taylor, in commenting on Weber, offers a summation of this diffusion 
of religious life into all vocations:  
To put it in the Reformed variant: if we reject the Catholic idea that there 
are some higher vocations (i.e. the monastic life) and claim that all 
Christians must be 100 percent Christian, regardless of vocation, then 
one must claim that ordinary life, the life of the vast majority, the life of 
production and the family, work, and sex is as hallowed as any other. 
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Indeed it is more sanctified than monastic celibacy, which is based on the 
vain and prideful claim to have found a higher way. (103) 
Taylor, following Weber, connects this rejection of monasticism in favor of the holiness 
of all worldly vocations with the development of capitalism, but also to a kind of 
flattening of the hierarchies natural to a religion that privileges certain degrees of 
holiness. Norman Davies, in a similar register, argues for the egalitarianism of this 
evolution in religious thought:  
Protestantism nevertheless embodied a single religious idea: the direct 
bestowal of divine grace without the mediation of priests, sacraments, 
ecclesiastical systems and institutions. . . .The consequence of this 
conception was both a spiritual egalitarianism, since Christians of all 
ranks found themselves on the same footing vis-à-vis God, and the 
abolition of the two story ethics of the Middle Ages (nature and 
supernature), since love in its New Testament sense (agape) cannot exist 
on two levels and be love. The further consequence was the abolition of 
the monastic system and the release of the monastic spirit into the 
world…with monumental results for western society. (“Tradition” 23). 
This “every day” or intramundane asceticism found its most radical embodiment in 
Puritanism, which in certain situations came to be regarded by the episcopal power in 
England as near to heresy. An examination of ascetic discourse thus provides an 
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opportunity to investigate fractious behavior at both ends of the religious spectrum: 
from recusant catholics to the radically protestant.  
  
 Treating the entire question of Renaissance attitudes toward asceticism is a 
massive scholarly undertaking, and I make no claims to cover the entirety of this subject. 
Rather, I will examine the question of how asceticism and renunciation are dramatized 
on the Renaissance stage with, hopefully, the aim of coming to a greater understanding 
of how such acts resonated in both the orthodox and popular consciousness of the day. 
This dissertation is divided into two sections, the first of which considers ascetic 
renunciation, particularly religious renunciation of sexuality and marriage, as an act of 
resistance, the second of which examines the political utility of asceticism for kings and 
rulers. In the first half, I explore the representation of nuns in Shakespearean comedy 
and romance, with particular emphasis on Isabella in Measure for Measure and Emilia in 
The Two Noble Kinsmen. Both works have their “medievalist” elements: Measure for 
Measure is set in what we might charitably describe as a generic medieval catholic 
court: called Vienna in the play, but strangely peopled by characters with Italian names.  
The Two Noble Kinsmen, despite its nominally ancient Greek setting, clearly evokes the 
world of medieval chivalric romance and self-consciously calls attention to its 
indebtedness to Chaucer, the most famous of all medieval English poets in 
Shakespeare’s age (lauded by Sidney as one of the few “ancient” English poets who 
could rival the old masters of antiquity).   
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More importantly, both plays dramatize institutional asceticism, with Emilia’s 
position as a votaress of Diana only slightly less explicitly catholic than Isabella’s life in 
the Convent of St. Clair. Both nuns are faced with challenges to their vows of chastity, 
and both attempt to use their asceticism to resist the forces patriarchal domination 
seeking to claim them for the world. In their struggle to remain renunciant, both Isabella 
and Emilia demonstrate the subversive potential of asceticism in worlds that demand 
obedience to the state and that assert male familial prerogative and female 
subservience.  Ultimately, however, both women are “liberated” from the restraint of 
the convent and assimilated into a correct protestant conjugal unit that will allow them 
to dispense with their presumptions of female autonomy and bodily perfection and to 
fulfill their Biblical responsibility to marry and of propagate. To borrow a formulation 
from Stephen Greenblatt, the power of ascetic renunciation is exploited for its dramatic 
potential at the same time that it is exposed as a kind of fraud (Negotiations 10). In this 
way, I will argue, both plays can be read partly as assertions of mainstream protestant 
social and religious orthodoxy of the period (this is particularly significant in the case of 
Measure for Measure, given that the play’s composition and staging coincided with the 
Jacobean succession, when the shape of “orthodoxy” itself was in doubt ), for in the 
pursuit of their comic resolutions, both plays must break down ascetic impediments to 
the political and familial harmony demanded by generic convention. Measure for 
Measure and The Two Noble Kinsmen present asceticism as something with intriguingly 
resistant power, capable of frustrating mechanisms of domination; however, the 
  
20 
assimilation of both nuns back into the world from which they sought refuge dramatizes 
the standard protestant antipathy toward traditional catholic postures of renunciation. 
Still, the endings of both plays leave in doubt the seriousness of any dogmatic gesture 
beholden to rigid orthodoxy. Ultimately, the opaque treatment of renunciation in both 
plays—which contain both the power of catholic asceticism and its negation—speaks to 
the fragmented religious consciousness of the early seventeenth century itself.   
 The second part of this study looks at the relationship between asceticism and 
kingship. Chapter Three explores examples of two historical rulers and their (quite 
different) ascetic projects: Philip II’s monastery-palace The Escorial, and Elizabeth I’s 
translation of Boethius. Both Philip and Elizabeth will be considered as examples of the 
(somewhat counterintuitive) legitimizing power of ascetic or renunciatory acts. This 
legitimizing power is drawn only partly from the tendency of orthodoxies, especially 
those seen to be under threat, to form part of a nexus of centrifugal propaganda (this is 
particularly true of Philip); secondarily, however, an association with ascetic or 
renunciatory acts can rebut charges of tyranny or illegitimacy by presenting for public 
consumption a constructed image of a monarch pointed away from the world, and 
therefore heedless of power’s most enticing temptations. I identify such a motive in 
Elizabeth’s Consolation of Philosophy. From the examples of Philip and Elizabeth I will 
return to the stage to consider the examples of legitimizing ascetical discourse in the 
plays Richard III, Richard II, and Henry VI Part 3.  
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 The final chapter considers the example of Henry V, whose renunciation of 
Falstaff in Henry IV Part 2 is laced with ascetic language, as the new king publicly divests 
himself of the sensual excesses that Falstaff embodies. Continuing into Henry V, I will 
demonstrate that the king’s piety is purposefully ascetic, particularly in his claims to 
discipline over his passions and his disdain for the material and ceremonial. In addition, I 
will consider the play, particularly its ending, as an act of renunciation by Shakespeare, 
who in the epilogue demolishes Henry’s fortress of providential rhetoric. In doing so, 
Shakespeare renounces not only providence but, in effect, Henry himself.  
 
 Asceticism and the Reformation 
Whether practiced individually or as part of a monastic community, the ascetic 
life was an accepted, even exalted, part of Christian orthodoxy for close to a thousand 
years.  How this came to be invites questions, for the Bible itself is not a particularly 
ascetic document. Beyond the commandment in Genesis for human beings to be fruitful 
and multiply, scripture repeatedly reinforces the centrality of the human body and 
sexual intercourse. From the polygamy of the patriarchs and the Israelite kings, to the 
eroticism of the Song of Solomon, supporting an ascetic program through scripture is a 
process that requires exegetical as well as rhetorical skill. As Elizabeth A. Clark has 
demonstrated, the foundations of Christian asceticism rest not so much in scripture, but 
in how scripture was read by early church fathers: how early readers of the Bible “made 
meaning” through the act of interpretation (3).  For example, Clark shows, Tertullian 
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argues that St. Paul’s allowance of remarriage for widows in 1 Corinthians should be 
categorized as “a concession,” rather than a “counsel” or “command,” and that this did 
not make it inherently good (143). The word “concession,” in fact, connotes something 
implicitly negative or transgressive about the act being allowed. Tertullian’s careful 
rhetorical agility in shifting between the three terms—counsel, command, and 
concession---allows him to rank permissible acts in a hierarchy of desirability. Ascetic 
renunciation, as it is recommended and not demanded of Christians, belongs to the 
highest category of religious practice.  As Clark writes, “since exhortations to virginity 
and widowhood in Paul’s writings are ‘counsels,’ not commands, they receive a higher 
blessing because of their greater difficulty” (144).   
The interpretive ingenuity of Tertullian, Jerome, and other early church fathers is 
a fundamental part of the rich literary tradition of early Christianity, and their 
hermeneutical strategies helped shaped the way scripture would be read in the 
medieval catholic west. The fact that an ascetic version of Christianity was “created” 
through scriptural exegesis and non-scriptural commentaries, rather than something 
obvious from a literal reading of the Bible, does help to explain how renunciation fell 
out of favor after the Reformation. The break centered on a dispute over the salvational 
efficacy of good works. Sacramental catholicism is a works-based theology in which acts 
external to personal faith can affect spiritual status, a concept rejected by protestants. 
Thomas More complains bitterly in the Dialogue of Comforts Against Tribulation of the 
poverty of Lutheran sola fides and its rejection of ascetic works. He begins by putting 
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into the mouth of one his speakers a catalogue of protestant arguments against 
penitential acts: 
Forsooth, uncle, in this point methinketh you say very well. But then are 
there some again who say on the other hand that we shall need no 
heaviness for our sins at all, but need only change our intent and purpose 
to do better, and for all that is passed take no thought at all. And as for 
fasting and other affliction of the body, they say we should not do it save 
only to tame the flesh when we feel it wax wanton and begin to rebel. 
For fasting, they say, serveth to keep the body in temperance, but to fast 
for penance or to do any other good work, almsdeed or other, toward 
satisfaction for our own sins—this thing they call plain injury to the 
passion of Christ, by which alone our sins are forgiven freely without any 
recompense of our own. And they say that those who would do penance 
for their own sins look to be their own Christs, and pay their own 
ransoms, and save their souls themselves. And with these reasons in 
Saxony many cast fasting off, and all other bodily affliction, save only 
where need requireth to bring the body to temperance. For no other 
good, they say, can it do to ourselves, and then to our neighbour can it do 
none at all. And therefore they condemn it for superstitious folly. (2.6) 
The plaintive nephew in More’s dialogue delineates several protestant affronts to 
theology, including their rejection of penance, their lax attitude toward personal 
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atonement, and their scorn for any bodily mortifications. The wise uncle replies by 
demolishing these protestant ideas:  
They carry the minds of the people from perceiving their craft by the 
continual naming of the name of Christ, and crying his passion so shrill 
into their ears that they forget that the Church hath ever taught them 
that all our penance without Christ's passion would not be worth a pea. 
And they make the people think that we wish to be saved by our own 
deeds, without Christ's death; whereas we confess that his passion alone 
meriteth incomparably more for us than all our own deeds do, but that it 
is his pleasure that we shall also take pain ourselves with him. And 
therefore he biddeth all who will be his disciples to take their crosses on 
their backs as he did, and with their crosses follow him…The scripture is 
full of places that prove fasting to be not the invention of man but the 
institution of God, and to have many more profits than one. And that the 
fasting of one man may do good unto another, our Saviour showeth 
himself where he saith that some kind of devils cannot be cast out of one 
man by another "without prayer and fasting." And therefore I marvel that 
they take this way against fasting and other bodily penance. (2.7) 
Christ, writes More, wants each of us to carry our own crosses, and thereby approach 
his grace by experiencing in a small way his suffering. This expresses the very heart of 
imitatio Christi, the concept foundational to works-based theology and catholic ascetic 
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ritual. It is, ultimately, an aspirational theology, though to protestants it was a 
presumptuous one.  
 Thomas Cranmer, in his Homily on Good Works Annexed to Faith, rebuts More’s 
parable of the little crosses through a rigorous justification of sola fides:    
Faith giveth life to the soul; and they be as much dead to God that lack 
faith, as they be to the world whose bodies lack souls. Without faith all 
that is done of us is but dead before God, although the work seem never 
so gay and glorious before man. Even as a picture graven or painted is but 
a dead representation of the thing itself, and is without life, or any 
manner of moving; so be the works of all unfaithful persons before God. 
They do appear to be lively works, and indeed they be but dead, not 
availing to the eternal life. They be but shadows and shews of lively and 
good things, and not good and lively things indeed; for true faith doth 
give life to the works, and out of such faith come good works, that be 
very good works indeed; and without it no work is good before God. 
(140) 
Cranmer’s contention that good works emerge naturally out of faith speaks directly to 
the catholic charge that sola fides is heedless of morality. By rendering unnecessary and 
misguided rigorous or extraordinary acts of penance or bodily restraint, such a theology 
offered sufficient justification, if any was needed beyond Henry’s absolutist prerogative, 
for the dissolution of the monasteries.  
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 In the sixteenth century, the most evocative symbols of Rome’s long arm in 
Western Europe were the monasteries that dotted the landscape from England to the 
southern coast of Sicily. The great religious houses and those ensconced within, 
dedicated to a life of serving Christ by approaching his grace, could in many cases not be 
reconciled with the emerging statism of those nations that adopted the reformist 
religious agenda, particularly in England where the monasteries often became centers of 
opposition to specific royal policies emerging out of the break from Rome (Bernard 395). 
As G.W. Bernard argues, “[m]onastic houses belonged to international orders, potential 
fifth columns all,” and Henry was thus “determined that monasteries should recognize 
his authority” (396).6  Monasteries thus offered a worthy target for reformists: 
institutions closely associated with Rome and therefore of dubious loyalty that also 
promoted a form of Christianity increasingly under theological scrutiny.   
The tenuous connection between asceticism and scripture left ascetic practice, 
both in its institutional and personal forms, open to attack from the sola scriptura 
literalists of the protestant Reformation, supported in England by a monarch who saw 
practical as well as theological value in bringing an end to institutional asceticism.  
Although the issue is complicated by the usual considerations of anti-papal sentiment 
and economic pragmatism, Henry VIII’s decision to dissolve the monasteries in the 
                                                        
6 Bernard explains the visitation and then dissolution of religious houses in England as a process driven by 
Henry’s own growing paranoia over their impudence. The Pilgrimage of Grace, a popular rebellion carried 
out in part as a response to the dissolution of smaller houses, pushed the king from distrust of the 
religious orders to “outright hostility” (402).  
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1530s invites questions about the reconcilability of Tudor absolutist tendencies and 
entrenched ascetic communities. While many aspects of the secular catholic clerical 
hierarchy survived the transition from catholicism to protestantism, monastic life was all 
but completely wiped out in the span of just a few years. The zeal with which Cromwell 
and his agents pursued the destruction of monastic institutions and the monastic life 
was, on the one hand, a symptom of an authentic religious impulse; Henry’s readiness 
to go along with the surveying and dissolution, however, may have been born from 
other considerations, for the monasteries were, in effect, societies unto themselves, 
free from royal prerogative in a way that even secular clergy were not. Henry’s desire to 
absorb monastic funds and property into the royal treasury speaks not only to his desire 
for land and capital, but his need to assimilate elements of religious society beyond the 
scope of his power. As long as monks and nuns operated at a remove from the secular 
world, they would not be subjects; the need to reappropriate ascetics into the fold of 
the subjected explains the frequent instances in which members of religious orders 
were challenged to swear oaths of loyalty to the king or to endorse his supremacy 
(Knowles 177-178).  Sometimes even an oath of loyalty was not enough. For example, 
Abbot Richard Green of Bittlesden Abbey in Buckinghamshire signed a confession in 
1538 admitting outright to the errors of monastic ritual and the justice of the King’s 
dissolution:  
the manner and trade of lyving which we and others of owre pretensyde 
relygyon haue practysyde and vsyd many dayes, dothe most princypally 
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consyst yn certayne dome [dumb] ceremonyes and yn certayne 
constytutyons of the bysshoppe off Rome and other forynsycall 
potentates as the abbot off Cystuus [Citeaux] . . . and nott towght in the 
trew knowlege off Gods lawe by procuryng allwayes exemptyons off the 
bysshoppes off Rome from owr ordynaries and dyocyesans submyttyng 
owrselffes princypally to forynsycall potentattes and powers which neuer 
came here to reforme suche dysorder of lyvyng and abuses as now haue 
be fownde to haue raynyde amonge vsse And therefore now assuredlye 
knowyng that the most perfytt way of lyving is moste princypally and 
suffycyently declaryde vnto vsse by owre master Criste his evangelistes 
and apostles and that yt is most expedyentt for vsse to be gouernyde and 
orderyde by our supreme hedd vnder godd the kynges moste noble 
grace. (qtd. in Bernard 406-407) 
The letter’s focus not only on the religious error of “dome ceremonyes,” but on the 
deference of the monks to “forynsycall potentattes” gives some evidence of the political 
concerns at the heart of the dissolution. Bernard notes that such letters as survive have 
a formulaic character, suggesting they were drawn up by the surveyors rather than 
written by the monks themselves (406). This explains in part why the letter ends by 
invoking Henry’s “noble grace” as the supreme head of the church under God.   
However, some orders, like the Carthusians, refused to comply with royal 
demands. In 1535, during the early days of the monastic surveying, Cromwell and his 
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agents demanded their sworn acquiescence to the Act of Succession, nullifying the 
king’s marriage to Katherine of Aragon (Knowles 112). The monks, who had been 
seeking either an exemption or a wording of the oath that they could reconcile with 
conscience, ultimately refused, and three prominent members of the order were 
arrested, tried, and sentenced to gruesome deaths (112). Thomas More, watching from 
the window of his own tower cell as the monks were led away, noted the sensible 
enthusiasm with which they walked to the gallows. Having languished in his own cell for 
over a year, the former Chancellor told his visiting daughter that he envied the celerity 
of their liberation:    
Lo, dost thou not see (Meg) that these blessed fathers be now as cheerful 
going to their deaths, as bridegrooms to their marriages? Whereby 
mayest thou see, mine own good daughter, what a difference there is 
between such as have in effect spent all their days in a strait, hard, 
penitential, and painful life religiously, and such as have in the world, like 
worldly wretches, as thy poor father hath done, consumed all the time in 
pleasure and ease licentiously. For God, considering their long-continued 
life in most sore and grievous penance, will not longer suffer them to 
remain here in this vale of misery and iniquity, but speedily hence take 
them to the fruition of his everlasting deity: whereas thy silly father 
(Meg) that, like a most wicked caitiff, hath passed forth the whole course 
of his miserable life most pitifully, God, thinking him not worthy so soon 
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to come to that eternal felicity, leaveth him here yet, still in the world 
further to be plunged and turmoiled with misery. (Roper 54) 
More’s words, as related by Roper, touch on several ascetic tropes, all of which will be 
revisited in the chapters to come. The “cheerful” disposition of the condemned monks 
evinces the paradoxical embrace of suffering, both self-inflicted and external, 
characteristic of ascetical teachings and familiar to members of an order already 
devoted to a “hard,” “penitential,” and “painful” life. In More’s envy of their imminent 
demise while he is left behind “in this vale of misery and iniquity,” meanwhile, we find 
the conventional contempt for the world that undergirds all acts of ascetic renunciation. 
Finally, More’s belief that the swiftness of the Carthusian’s sentence is a divine reward 
for their lifelong devotion to penitential acts offers an elegant example of the doctrine 
of works in practice. The ascetic life has prepared the souls of the monks for the divine 
embrace, while More himself must suffer yet longer in his mundane Purgatory.  
Roper’s account does not describe the execution itself, which was carried out at 
Tyburn, but More perhaps was lucky to have been spared so grisly a scene. The three 
monks were hanged, disemboweled while still alive, and quartered. In a theatrical 
gesture, Henry ordered them executed while wearing their monastic habits, though 
under those habits all three wore the hair shirts common to their order (Knowles 113). 
Both choices—Henry’s to execute them in their habits, the monks to exacerbate their 
own suffering by wearing the cilice to the gallows—exemplify the complex, multivalent, 
and powerful symbolic potential of ascetic signs in the theater of state power and 
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resistance. By dressing the condemned in their habits, Henry, in essence, reenacts their 
crimes of religious error and treason, offering a visual reminder that, to paraphrase 
Foucault, both declares the truth of their guilt and annuls the efficacy of their resistance 
(Discipline 45). By wearing their hair shirts, meanwhile, the monks conflate the pains of 
punishment with those of mortification, blunting in part the propagandistic utility of 
Henry’s bloody pageant. Put another way, the walk to the gallows signals the monks’ 
transition from ascetics to martyrs, from a life of penitential suffering to a violent death 
that will bring to full fruition the imitatio Christi in a way that mere askesis cannot.  John 
Houghton, prior of the London Carthusian monastery and the first monk to be executed 
that day, seems particularly to have understood the performative nature of his 
suffering. Like Đức four centuries later, Houghton remained conscious throughout his 
ordeal, showing an almost extra-human patience in the face of his agony and 
demonstrating to the large crowd of onlookers the power of his Carthusian discipline 
(Knowles 113). This small act of resistance, though it did not stem the tide of the 
Reformation in England, did, if only briefly, offer a riposte to the king’s violent 
exploitation of the monastic body.  
 While Henry’s supremacy proved lasting, the dissolution of monasteries and the 
end of the material reality of monastic life in England did not bring an end to asceticism, 
merely a certain, long standing manifestation of the ascetic impulse. However, the 
triumph of the Reformation in England did alter irrevocably the literary and imaginative 
response to the renunciant life. The resurrection of catholic asceticism on the 
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Renaissance stage provided an opportunity to enunciate meaning in ways both 
culturally normative and potentially transgressive, both polemical and surprisingly 
nostalgic. In addition, the written word itself became one of many new and enduring 
loci for the perpetuation of ascetic attitudes. In this study, I hope to begin to unpack the 
complex relationship between literary production and the rhetorical power of 
renunciation.   
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CHAPTER ONE: ISABELLA’S SILENCE: ASCETICISM AND ORTHODOXY IN MEASURE FOR 
MEASURE 
 Measure for Measure ends with one of Shakespeare’s most notorious 
performative challenges.  The final scene presents to the audience a strange version of 
the comic happy ending required by formula; members of four soon to be married 
couples occupy the stage, yet only one, Juliet and Claudio, is the product of mutual 
desire.  Two others—the forced marriages of Lucio to Kate Keep-down and Angelo to 
Mariana—function as what one critic calls “punishments woven into the penitential 
investigations of the play,” the logical outcome of a plot that began with the Duke’s 
program of general moral correction (Beckwith, Grammar 57). And while these two 
unions do not augur connubial bliss, they may at least be offered up to the audience as 
acts of justice, comeuppance, though strangely guised, for the bawdy slanderer and the 
cruel hypocrite.  The exact nature of the fourth couple, however, remains opaque. 
When the Duke proposes to Isabella, a novice nun who has expressed no desire to 
renounce the ascetic life and, in fact, who has struggled fiercely through the play to 
preserve her virginity, the strangeness of the moment is only heightened by her 
response: a silence that, as Sarah Beckwith writes, many modern actors render as 
“shock or horror” (Grammar 57).  One of the more famous examples of such an 
interpretation came in a Jonathan Miller directed production in the early 1970s in which 
Isabella, thoroughly disgusted, retched off stage (Ioppolo xviii). Almost as striking was a 
1994 RSC production that saw Isabella, played by Stella Gonet, meet the Duke’s 
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proposal with a smack to the face (a thoroughly anachronistic bit of insubordination that 
nevertheless succeeded in establishing an equivalency between the Duke’s proposition 
and Angelo’s) (Aebischer 19).  There is room for other interpretations. Barbara Baines 
points out that many productions opt for Isabella’s “happy compliance” with the Duke’s 
proposal (298). Of these, the most well documented example is a 1983 RSC production 
starring Daniel Massey as the Duke and Juliet Stevenson as Isabella. This production not 
only featured a “little miracle of acceptance” by Stevenson, but prepared the audience 
for the moment by working in numerous flirtatious and potentially romantic non-verbal 
exchanges between the Duke and Isabella throughout (Massey 19). Ultimately, the 
interpretive variety seen in such stagings reinforces Philip McGuire’s observation that 
Isabella’s silence offers directors and actors a stark choice between “"mute, accepting 
wonder," and “a resistance that wordlessly but effectively drives home" the Duke’s 
wholly unerotic autocracy (69). 
The ambiguity is a challenge for scholars as well as actors.  Many critics, including 
Charles Lyons and Amy Lechter-Siegel, have understood Isabella’s silence as a necessary 
part of the play’s reestablishment of patriarchal order with the Duke’s return: in other 
words, a necessary prerequisite for a Jacobean happy ending. Carol Neely sees the 
Duke’s proposal as an instrument of shame necessitated by the play’s gender politics 
(100). Closely related is a strain of feminist criticism that finds Isabella in the play’s final 
moments as a subdued female victim, finally ground down to inarticulate silence by the 
forces of patriarchal domination (Riefer 168). Other critics, however, do not weigh 
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Isabella so lightly. Barbara Baines, for example, sees in Isabella’s silence a resistance 
analogous to Iago’s in the final scene of Othello; Isabella, Baines writes, “is not silenced 
but, instead, chooses silence as a form of resistance to the patriarchal authority” (288). 
More recently, Kimberly Reigle reads Isabella’s silence as the culmination of a pattern of 
passive resistance seen throughout the play, one that potentially augurs a return to the 
convent (513).   
 I share Baines’s and Reigle’s position that Isabella’s ascetic choices function as 
resistance in the play. However, any understanding of Isabella’s silence that views her 
potential marriage as uniquely significant to the play’s conclusion is incomplete, for the 
Duke’s proposal is merely one part of an array of normalizing moves that make up the 
play’s superficially traditional comic conclusion. Isabella’s potential engagement to the 
Duke can be understood as carrying a social purpose analogous to the play’s other three 
marriages, as each allows sexually counter-normative characters to reenter the world of 
lawful social interrelation through marriage. The lecherous Lucio, Kate the whore, 
Claudio and Juliet the violators of social law, Angelo the would-be rapist, and Mariana 
the despairing and jilted maid each leave behind a previously worn mantle of socially 
unharmonious or unlawful sexuality to take a place in the symmetrical construct of state 
sanctioned marriage.7 Isabella, I assert, is yet another sexual rebel whose instincts must 
                                                        
7 My reading of the end of the play follows in part the work of Leo Salinger and Carol Neely on 
Shakespearean comedy. Neely, in particular, demonstrates how early modern comedy is unable to 
conceive of female social functions unrelated to marriage. Following Salinger’s terminology, she describes 
Measure for Measure’s necessary but “painfully negative” marriages as less evocative of comedy than the 
nuptials “broken by social obstacles, sexual anxieties, and, ultimately, by death in the tragedies” (102).  
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be tamed by matrimony, for as surely as Lucio’s philandering subverts social propriety, 
so too does the votaress’s celibacy function as a threat to patriarchal authority.  
Such an assertion perhaps seems strange given the familiar Renaissance 
reverence for female chastity; as one critic argues, Isabella’s values are “representative, 
not eccentric,” and reinforce the fetishization of chastity both in the play’s Vienna and 
Jacobean England (Baines 284). But such a claim ignores the fact that, unlike catholic 
celibacy, protestant chastity is meant to function cooperatively with, rather than as a 
substitution for, marriage. On stage, Isabella’s habit marks her for Shakespeare’s 
audience as a character to be reformed rather than revered, and this interpretation is 
consistent with the general place of nuns in literary and popular consciousness of 
seventeenth century England.  
  
Darryl Gless, in his lengthy study of Measure for Measure, explains the play’s 
implicit criticism of Isabella’s virginity as a consequence of both protestant theology and 
an inherited tradition of anti-monastic satire. Isabella’s virginity, hardly a virtue, is, in 
Gless’s contextualized reading, a “deviant relationship” to Biblical law as it was 
understood in a sola fides protestant theology (98). The strict ceremonialism of 
monastic life is reminiscent, as Luther himself first commented, of “Jewish legalism” and 
betrays a conflation of Old and New Testament law (80). In addition, the “fugitive and 
cloistered virtue” of the convent and monastery stood at odds with the humanistic calls 
for engagement and the betterment of the nation common to Shakespeare’s time, as 
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reflected in writers as varied as Spenser and James I (82). To over value one’s ascetic 
continence is to practice a kind of self-idolatry that inevitably conflicts with a universal 
responsibility to engage, to practice an “active virtue” (83). Theology, however, is only 
part of the equation, as both Shakespeare and his audience would have been quite 
familiar with a medieval legacy of anti-monastic satire that focused on the hypocrisy of 
conventual ascetics who flaunted their vows (66-72). Gless traces a long line of anti-
monastic and anti-fraternal satire from Chaucer to Erasmus, in which time and again 
monasticism is revealed to be a cover for sloth, lust, gluttony, and any number of bodily 
sins. These two avenues of attack against monasticism—theological and satirical—also 
underpin my own reading of the play. But while Gless’s contexualizing is invaluable and 
extensive, his focus on monastic and fraternal orders generally leaves room for a closer 
examination of the specific contexts surrounding nuns in particular.  
The nun has a long and varied history as a literary and dramatic figure. To some 
extent, the way the nun has been depicted in literature has reflected the larger religious 
and social context of its production.8 Depictions of the nun in the Middle Ages range 
from the hagiographic to the scandalous, but they tend to take seriously the office and 
its attendant vows. Satirization of monastic and fraternal figures hinges on criticism of 
hypocrisy or laxity, not a theological critique of monastic orders themselves. Graciela 
Daichman traces the evolution of conventual satire from its origins in the twelfth 
                                                        
8 I draw on several studies of nuns in both medieval literature and history, most directly Graciela S. 
Daichman and Eileen Power.    
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century to its most enduring (and opaque) manifestation in the Prioress of Chaucer’s 
General Prologue. Medieval moralists singled out dishonest or profligate nuns as targets 
of approbation in defense of the sanctity of ascetic vows (Daichman 32). These “faulx 
religeux” wear the habit but fail to subdue the heart; in doing so, they profane the 
exalted purity of monastic life (33). Unsurprisingly, moral excoriation of nuns usually 
centers on sexual transgression. St. Catherine of Siena, for example, expresses her 
disgust with the frequent incidences of nuns giving birth to children:  
It does not long maintain this color of devotion; therefore It is not long 
before their devotions bear fruit. First appear the stinking flowers of 
unhonest thoughts, with the rotten leaves of words; and in miserable 
fashion they fulfill their lusts; and the fruits which appear of such I know 
well you have seen, children to wit. (qtd. in Daichman 33) 
Such lust is often precipitated by a rejection of claustration. The high walls of the 
convent are meant to protect the nun from her own libidinal urges. Should she leave, 
she would quickly find herself defenseless when brought into close proximity with sin, 
as fifteenth century Flemish theologian Dionysus the Carthusian explains: “How many 
sins and scandals have arisen and do constantly arise from the fact that nuns go forth 
from their cloister and visit secular folk, and that they permit men to enter the cloister 
and converse with them?” (qtd. in Daichman 33). The focus on claustration as a 
necessary weapon in the defense of the nun’s continence is emblematic of the broader 
context of the medieval antifeminist tradition. Just as Eve was tempted to transgress by 
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the serpent, bringing about the ruin of mankind, so too were nuns, by the mere fact of 
their sex, helpless beyond the walls of their protected space, or when that space was 
left open to intruders.9  
 While the trope of ascetic failure lies at the heart of such moralistic and 
misogynistic polemic, other medieval voices, particularly in song, seem conscious of the 
practical difficulties of ascetic vows.  The eleventh century Latin song Plangit Nonna 
Fletibus provides a particularly grim example of what life is like for a nun who lacks the 
vocation for the life:  
  Plangit nonna fletibus 
Inenarrabilibus, 
Condolens gemitibus 
Dicens consocialibus 
 Heu misella! 
 
Nihil est deterius 
Tali vita,  
Cum enim sim petulans 
Et lasciva.  
 
                                                        
9 This antifeminist reading of the necessity of claustration is not irrelevant to Isabella, as we shall see.  
  
40 
Pernoctando vigilo 
Cum non vellem 
Invenem aplecterer 
Quam libenter!  
(The nun is weeping indescribable tears. She is crying with groans and 
saying to her sisters: woe is me! “Nothing is worse than such a life, when 
I am wanton and amorous.”) (Power 504-505, translation mine) 
Songs such as these demonstrate that, between exalted hagiography and moralistic 
exposé, there was also a space to acknowledge the challenge asceticism presents to our 
most fundamental urges. This attitude is noted by Eileen Power to be particularly 
common in the medieval vernacular folk song tradition, which approaches the lovesick 
nun’s dilemma with a certain lighthearted sympathy. In such songs nuns are often 
depicted as tormented by a desire for love and sexual fulfillment, but with the smirking 
“common sense” of “those who lived close to nature” rather than the harsh voice of 
clerical criticism (504).  For example, a thirteenth century French song describes a 
suggestive encounter between a friar and a fed-up nun:  
L’autrier un lundi matin 
m’an aloie ambaniant; 
s’antrai an un biau jardin, 
trovai nonette seant. 
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ceste chansonette 
dixoit la nonette 
“longue demoree 
faites, frans moinnes loialz 
Se plus suis nonette, 
ains ke soit li vespres, 
je morai des jolis malz. 
(“Lately on a Monday morn as I went wandering, I entered into a fair 
garden and there I found a nun sitting. This was the song that the nun 
sang: ‘Long dost thou tarry, frank, faithful monk. If I have to be a nun 
longer I shall die of the pains of love before vespers.”) (Power 506-507) 
Here, the idea that the nun could actually die because of the “pains” of lust exemplifies 
the earthy humor of these vernacular folk examples. Countless poems and songs in 
which the nun is depicted as gay, lovelorn, and seemingly bound to her vows against her 
will, place their sympathies with the realities of human nature, rather than the exalted 
ideals of Christian asceticism and hagiography.10 According to Power, the singers of such 
songs knew that nuns had sexual feelings, and this did not automatically make them evil 
or targets for moralization. Power describes this material as representative of “the 
eternal revolt of common sense against asceticism” (504); however, as the convents and 
                                                        
10 Several other examples of this theme in popular song can be found in Power, 502-508.  
  
42 
monasteries were predominantly open only to members of the aristocracy or other 
privileged classes, at least until the fifteenth century, the distinct attitudes of high and 
low voices might also have a social origin: why hold in reverence a vocation to which 
one could not be called? Whatever the explanation, the cloister is often envisioned in 
popular song not as the protected space described in theological writings, but “as a 
prison and a grave” (Power 504).11 
 Chaucer represents in part a more aristocratic and dogmatic literary strain that 
encompasses both moralistic and satirical perspectives on asceticism. Although one 
might think first of the Wife of Bath’s comment that not every vessel in a great lord’s 
house is made of gold (in other words, though virginity is superior to marriage, it is not 
and cannot be expected of all), and her old testament exempla of righteous polygamy, 
Chaucer maintains a degree of religious appreciation for female (particularly female) 
asceticism (III.99-100). The ambiguous example of Madame Eglantyne is perhaps 
Chaucer’s most satirical engagement with nuns, and it is relatively minor compared to 
other material in the Tales.12 Griselda too provokes ambivalent feelings; while she is no 
nun, she is sufficiently devoted to obedience and patience to evoke ascetic discipline, 
and the giving up of her own children can be read as a quite radical, though reluctant, 
                                                        
11 Power quotes the following medieval French lyric:  
  Mariez-vous, les filles 
  Avec ces bons drilles,  
  Et n’allez ja, les filles 
  Pourrir derrier les grilles. (Get married, girls, with good men, and don’t go, girls, to rot behind bars). (502, 
translation mine)   
12 For an overview of competing analyses of the satirical nature of the Prioress, see Alexander, 109-120.  
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renunciation of the living evidence of sex that troubled Catherine of Siena. However, it is 
difficult to reconcile The Clerk’s Tale’s contradictions, paradoxes, and opacities: 
somehow, Chaucer wants the reader to both admire and shrink away from Griselda’s 
asceticism, both stand in awe of her renunciations and cheer their reversal.13 Elsewhere 
in the Tales Chaucer is more direct. The Second Nun’s Tale, a story about a female 
ascetic—St. Cecilia—told by a female ascetic (although one never described in the 
General Prologue), is one of two hagiographies in the work, and the one that carries the 
strongest, most uncritical reverence for asceticism. Its prologue begins with an 
invocation of the Virgin Mary, who is so pure—the nun calls her “virgin wemmeless” 
(47), “mayden pure” (48), and “flour of holy virgines alle” (29)—that her body itself is a 
“cloistre” (43).14  The nun goes on to excoriate the sin of idleness and praise the 
doctrine of works (“feith is deed withouten werkis”) by way of entreating Mary to aid 
her in her tale-telling (64). The doctrine of works is the fundamental justification for 
ascetic practice itself, so in highlighting it, the nun is not simply asking Mary to endorse 
her industriousness, but paving the theological way for the proper appreciation of 
Cecilia’s renunciations. As for Cecilia herself, the tale goes on to say that she wore a hair 
shirt, renounced sexuality on the night of her wedding, and faced execution with such 
stout-hearted patience that she was able to preach for three days with her head half-
way cut off (the strokes of the axe are called a “penaunce” by the nun, though one that 
                                                        
13 A fuller treatment of The Clerk’s Tale’s contradictions can be found in Normandin, 127-128. 
14 All excerpts from Chaucer taken from The Riverside Chaucer, 3rd Edition and cited by fragment and line 
number.  
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no man should have to endure).  The ending of the tale betrays no skepticism or 
ambiguity:15 
Seynt Urban, with his dekenes privily 
The body took and buried it by nighte 
Among his other seyntes honestely. 
Her hous the chirch of seynt Cecily yet highte; 
Seynt Urban hallowed it, as he wel mighte; 
In which into this day in noble wyse 
Men do to Crist and to his seint servise. (VIII.547-553)  
Like The Parson’s Tale, the Second Nun’s Tale demonstrates the moral and didactic side 
of Chaucer, and lends credence to critics such as D.W. Robertson who believe Chaucer’s 
literary art invariably adheres itself to doctrinal orthodoxy.16 It also supports the notion 
that in a work as heterogeneous and generically complex as the Canterbury Tales, there 
is room for both religious satire (The Friar’s Tale, The Summoner’s Tale) and serious 
moral instruction.  
 
                                                        
15 Sherry Reames explains the tale’s moral coherence by tracing Chaucer’s likely sources. She postulates 
that The Second Nun’s Tale is an early, all but unrevised work added to The Canterbury Tales as something 
of an afterthought (55-56).  
16 Taking a position in the debate over Chaucer’s moral orthodoxy is beyond the scope of this study. In 
addition to Robertson, Judson Allen and Theresa Moritz take up the moralist cause, as does Victor Haines, 
especially in regard to the unironic nature of the Retractions. A subversive or heterodox Chaucer is argued 
for, through various avenues and to different extents, by Stephen H. Rigby, Roger Ellis, David Ramsey and 
many others.  
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The multivalent, sometimes contradictory treatment of asceticism both in 
Chaucer and in the various literary traditions of the middle ages offers a model for  
reading Measure for Measure as a play that treats asceticism with similar opacity. In 
Isabella there are vestiges of both Cecilia’s sainthood and Griselda’s excesses, as well as 
Madame Eglantyne’s potential hypocrisy. Just as works emerging from a homogenously 
catholic context could swing between moralizing critique, titillating satire, patient 
sympathy, and hagiography, so too was Shakespeare’s protestant world prepared to 
accept some negotiation between beatifying and proscribing Isabella’s asceticism.  
 In turning to the post-Reformation period, the doctrine of works emerges as one 
of the principal points of divergence that helps to explain shifting attitudes towards 
monastic celibacy. Ironically, the second nun’s claims of industriousness highlight the 
very thing that Lutherans and Calvinists found lacking in religious orders. The sloth of 
nuns and monks was a traditional part of anti-monastic complaint, as were, in 
something close to a contradiction, their heretical reliance on good works to achieve 
salvation.  In 1519, Luther had written a tract against asceticism—“On Monastic 
Vows”—in which he compared monks, with their adherence to a highly ceremonial life, 
to Jews, and in which he implored nuns and monks to abandon the ascetic life and 
reenter the world (Luther’s own wife was a former nun whom he had convinced to 
abandon the convent).  In Lutheran or Calvinist theology, asceticism is seen as a form of 
idolatry even more presumptuous than the veneration of icons, relics, and saints that 
typically bore the brunt of protestant disdain, for the renunciant’s self-imposed 
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suffering turns the human body itself into an object of religious wonder. In the catholic 
Middle Ages, such self-mortification was embraced as imitatio Christi—achieving 
spiritual fulfillment by imitating the sufferings of Christ—and was codified as such in a 
popular fifteenth-century manual for ascetic living by Thomas a Kempis.17 Carolyn 
Walker Bynum describes the imitatio Christi in the context of female asceticism in 
particular:  
No religious woman failed to experience Christ as wounded, bleeding, 
and dying. Women’s efforts to imitate the Christ involved becoming the 
crucified, not just pattering themselves after or expanding their 
compassion toward, but fusing with the body on the cross.(…)Horrible 
pain, twisting of the body, bleeding—whether inflicted by God or by 
oneself—were not an effort to destroy the body, not a punishment of 
physicality, nor primarily an effort to shear away a source of lust, not 
even primarily an identification with the martyrs (although this was a 
subsidiary theme)….asceticism [is] rather imitatio Christi, an effort to 
plumb the depths of Christ’s humanity at the moment of his most 
insistent and terrifying humanness—the moment of his dying. (131) 
In both Calvinist and Lutheran theology, such presumptions about the possibility of 
attaining Christ-like grace through ascetic works are rejected in favor of an exclusive 
                                                        
17 See Marchand, 31-50 
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focus on scripture and on a belief in the uncontestable sufficiency of Christ’s redemptive 
sacrifice: i.e., He suffered so that we need not.18  In a 1523 letter exhorting his sister, a 
nun in the Katherine Convent of Augsburg, to abandon the monastic life, Lutheran 
nobleman Bernhart Rem employs this very argument: 
I would rather be counted as carnal with the open sinners in the temple 
than be religious with you and those like you. Nevertheless, I wish you for 
once the correct knowledge of Jesus Christ, that the spirit that brings life 
would write in your hearts the overflowing good works of Christ, so that 
you know why he in human nature was fastened to the cross. When you 
know that, your little human discoveries and trust in your own works, 
habits, convent, fasting, and such things will soon fall away. It will be 
looked upon as very serious, for one does not presume to buy God’s 
grace with spiritual simony. Who has ears to hear, let them hear…Such 
presumption, that always presumes one is more facile than God and can 
achieve God’s grace through one’s own work….but I will say nothing 
about the convents, where many different types of work—all of it self 
                                                        
18 Attitudes toward imitatio Christi varied among different stripes of protestant, with later, more 
conservative (Anglican) protestants more likely to be optimistic about man’s Christ-like potential. This 
ambivalence is illustrated by the 1580 English edition of Kempis’ manual by Thomas Rogers, a protestant 
reworking more than a translation, which acknowledges the value in seeing Christ as a model of behavior, 
but which in two introductory epistles sternly cautions the reader against too rigorous and presumptuous 
an imitation of Christ’s physical suffering. See Hudson.  
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chosen—are practiced with the fine glitter of holiness. And it is worthless 
straw, whatever one makes of it. (Wiesner-Hanks, Convents 36-37) 
This patriarchal voice of anti-conventual polemic provides an early example of the social 
forces that would eventually destroy the practice of female claustration, both in 
Lutheran and Calvinist societies. Rem’s focus on the presumptuousness and quasi-
idolatry of ascetic practice is drawn directly from standard anti-catholic theological 
arguments about the inefficacy of works and the Judaizing ritualism of catholic religious 
traditions. It is an objection based in scripture—particularly Ephesians 2:8,9—and one 
that follows closely Luther’s own writings about monasticism as a form of self-worship 
(“Monastic Vows” 44:263). Calvin is somewhat less radical than Luther in his treatment 
of asceticism: he allows, for instance, that strict renunciation may be of practical use to 
those who are “prone to a certain vice,” but he insists that such actions are a matter of 
personal choice and circumstance, not an “invariable law” or even in and of themselves 
“holy” (Institutes 4.13.5-6).  He offers dire warnings about excessive fasting and self-
denial, calling the belief that such activities can affect salvation “contempt of [Christ’s] 
gifts” of suffering and sacrifce (4.13.12).   About institutional monasticism, Calvin is as 
harsh as Luther, dismissing pretensions towards monastic perfection as “vain 
arrogance,” “intolerable trifling,” and “fictitious worship” (4.1.11).   
Beyond the theological issues, the post-Reformation consciousness retained, and 
amplified, the old medieval capacity to imagine the nun’s concupiscence.  In Elizabethan 
and Jacobean England, printed accounts of nuns tended to focus on their sexual 
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debauchery, usually in consort with priests, monks, or other male renunciant clergy. 
However, while the moralistic and satirical voices of the Middle Ages used such exempla 
to critique ascetic failure and to preach by way of contrast the conventual life as a 
feminine ideal, protestant voices used similar scenarios to expose monasticism itself as 
fraudulent and heretical. Such scandalous material relies not on complex theological 
arguments, but on the ancient conflict between self-denial and self-indulgence. Some 
protestant authors clearly took pleasure in deconstructing the nun’s ascetic mystique by 
subjecting her to sexual debasement.19 
 Frances Dolan’s examination of such material provides valuable insight into the 
early modern horizon of expectations for how nuns should or might behave, and thus 
the immediate context in which Measure for Measure’s treatment of Isabella can be 
read.  Nuns, Dolan writes, are often ridiculed or scandalized in seventeenth-century 
polemical depictions, shown succumbing to seductions by priests, engaging in 
homoerotic dalliances with other nuns, or otherwise being led by “Nature” rather than 
unnatural vows (Dolan 510-511). For instance, in the 1590 pamphlet A Subtill Practise 
(not mentioned specifically by Dolan), a sexually willing and “sweet skind” nineteen year 
old nun—“as goode a lasse as euer hearde Masse at highe mydnyghte”—becomes an 
object of competitive discord between two lusty Friars, eventually resulting in 
                                                        
19 The scandalous pamphlets of the protestant world build upon a robust tradition of anti-monastic and 
anti-fraternal satire already common in the late middle ages. In addition to what is discussed above, 
Darryl Gless surveys some of this material in contextualizing his reading of Measure for Measure. While 
the medieval estates satire distinguishes between the hypocritical and the genuine religious life, 
protestant voices tend to be universally critical of monasticism. See Gless, 66-72.  
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catastrophe (3). In an even more antagonistic work, an exposé of a monastery for 
English nuns in Portugal reveals presumably shocking sexual transgressions (Dolan 517). 
This trope reached beyond the polemical tract to the stage, as one can see in Ithimore’s 
needling of Abigall in The Jew of Malta:  
ITHIMORE. I pray mistris, will you answer me to one question.  
  ABIGALL. Well, sirrah, what is’t.  
ITHIMORE. A very feeling one. Have not the nuns fine sport with the 
fryars now and then? (Marlowe, Jew 3.3.34-36) 
Titillating depictions of nuns were reassuring, Dolan argues, for they exposed to ridicule 
the extremes of catholic asceticism that protestants viewed as self-indulgent and 
slothful (518). Valerie Traub argues that the need for such debasement of nuns had a 
socio-economic basis: marriage and reproduction were at the center of the protestant 
social fabric, and biological propagation went hand in hand with financial enrichment 
and security (181). Thus, for early moderns, Dolan argues, “[a]s a woman who withholds 
herself from sexual circulation, the nun reinforces the imperative that women surrender 
to their own exchange” (511).    
While Dolan does not consider Shakespeare at length, she does briefly give 
attention to Twelfth Night, particularly Valentine’s description of the love-stricken Olivia 
as walking “veiled” like a “cloistress” (1.5.27). This figuring of Olivia, along with Viola’s 
insistence that she not leave “her graces to the grave” (1.5.226), reflect a belief that a 
beautiful nun is a waste of a gift bestowed by god.  But what about plays that deal 
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specifically with the question of female resistance to sexuality? Measure for Measure 
and The Two Noble Kinsmen are two plays that prominently feature female ascetics. In 
both plays, these renunciant figures face challenges to their celibacy, but these 
challenges do not result in debauchment or scandal of the type found in the polemical 
tradition examined by Dolan. Rather, both plays present a rather ambivalent picture of 
life as a votaress. In approaching Isabella in Measure for Measure, it is worth 
considering that a protestant audience, while they would not necessarily have thought 
of female ascetics as villains, may have found something distasteful in the wasteful 
spending of female beauty in the confines of the cloister. In this, they were similar to 
their predecessors of the popular medieval tradition; however, early modern criticism of 
asceticism was more deeply intertwined with the conforming pressures of orthodoxy, 
which adds urgency to the need for conventual liberation. Both Shakespeare and his 
audience, I argue, would have found a comic resolution that did not include the 
reappropriation of female renunciants back into the worldly social fold to be 
incomplete.  In gesturing towards such an assimilation, the play is thus socially 
conventional. However, in the process of achieving the resolution, such as it is, of the 
final act, Measure for Measure takes time to consider how female subjectivity may be 
empowered by an ascetic posture. Ultimately, I will argue that Measure for Measure in 
some sense connects back to the old folk tradition of the convent as a prison for the 
nun, who is at heart a social and sexual being. It is no coincidence that the play links 
prisons with convents, or that, like The Two Noble Kinsmen, it ends with a soon to be 
  
52 
former nun sharing the stage with a freed prisoner. However, I do not mean to suggest 
that the Measure for Measure is in any direct way polemical, for the play itself makes no 
coherent moral argument. The normalizing discourse of the final scene remains 
famously incomplete. Isabella, as a character capable of provoking both sympathy and 
scorn, stands at the heart of the play’s opaque treatment of the ascetic, and her final 
act—silence—stands as the most memorable manifestation of this opacity. Like 
Chaucer, Measure for Measure’s various, often contradictory voices provide no clear 
path to doctrinal truth. Instead, its various, competing voices reflect the roiling, 
unsettled state early modern religious discourse.  
  
Vincento’s Anxious Renunciation 
The comic plot of Measure for Measure is set in motion by an act of 
renunciation.  By trading in his political authority for a Friar’s robe, the Duke ironically 
fulfills a fantasy entertained by Shakespeare’s Richard II in the waning moments of his 
reign: 
The king shall be contented: must he lose 
The name of king? a' God's name let it go. 
I'll give my jewels for a set of beads, 
My gorgeous palace for a hermitage, 
My gay apparel for an almsman's gown, 
My figured goblets for a dish of wood, 
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My sceptre for a palmer's walking staff, 
My subjects for a pair of carved saints.  (3.3.145-152)20 
For Richard, the language of ascetic renunciation is penitential, as in the tradition of 
Boethius and his medieval imitators, or the humanist examples of Erasmus and even 
Thomas More.21  In the Boethian model, renunciation can function in a moment of 
extreme suffering as a salve against the cruelties of the world, devaluing the physical, 
accepting the inscrutability of fortune and the divine plan, and preparing the renunciant 
for the true significance of the ghostly life that is to come. There is, I believe, something 
of Boethius in Richard’s turn away from his own kingship: faced with an intolerable 
political situation, the king wrests agency away from his usurper and, in a moment that 
reestablishes his own self-determination, deposes himself.  Both his willing acceptance 
of his fall and his active participation in it echo the ascetic philosophy of Boethius: “if 
then you are master of yourself, you will be in possession of that which you will never 
wish to lose” (29).  
 On its face, the Duke’s “renunciation” in Measure for Measure seems to have 
little to do with Boethius or Richard’s self-deposition. While Richard is genuinely facing 
his own destruction, the Duke adopts the friar’s robe as an act of subterfuge with an 
explicit political purpose. Moving to the periphery of this quasi-medieval quasi-Vienna, 
                                                        
20 All excerpts from Shakespeare taken from The Riverside Shakespeare, 2nd Edition and cited 
parenthetically by act, scene, and line number.   
21 Boethius’s The Consolation of Philosophy is, in many respects, the foundational credo of Christian 
asceticism, and has been modeled or drawn from by many later writers, including More in his writings 
from prison such as the Dialogue of Comforts Against Tribulation.  
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he becomes, as more than one critic has noted, a manipulator of events on par with 
Prospero (Bawcutt 53). His “renunciation” is thus an embrace and a strengthening of his 
political authority, rather than a rejection of it. But the Duke’s actual motives for doing 
this have always troubled critics. N.W. Bawcutt writes in his critical introduction to the 
play that none of the motives offered by the Duke himself are particularly convincing, 
even the principal one, “the restoration of firm rule to Vienna after a period of laxity,” 
which “gradually slips from sight as the play progresses, and does not figure at all in the 
plays resolution” (53).22 But looking more closely at what the Duke actually says to Friar 
Thomas helps not only to explain his motives, but why an act of ascetic renunciation 
becomes the perfect vehicle for achieving his goals.    
 I have noted already above the subversive qualities of ascetic renunciation. 
Consider again Boethius, who wrote the Consolation while languishing in a traitor’s cell 
on the judgment of the tyrant Theodoric. The same strains of defiance are found, I will 
demonstrate, in Thomas More’s ascetic prison writings as he faced the ill-favor of a king 
no less severe. Peter Lake has detailed how catholic prisoners in Elizabethan and early 
Stuart England used ascetic vows and ceremonies to turn their prisons into makeshift 
monasteries, from which they not only endured state oppression with a stern and 
religious resolution, but actually were empowered to engage in polemical warfare with 
protestant authority (Lake and Questier, Antichrist’s 208-210). Asceticism demands the 
                                                        
22 Scholarly perspectives on the Duke’s renunciation and taking up of the habit are limitless, but recent 
work tends to focus on the related ideas of justice and surveillance. See Dollimore, “Surveillance”; 
Kamaralli; and Spencer.   
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kind of rigorous mental and physical self-ordering that empowers the individual in the 
face of external pressures, a quality noted by Michel Foucault.  Foucault categorizes 
asceticism (along with the classical stoicism) as a “technology of self,” which he defines 
as those that 
permit individuals to effect by their own means or with the help of others 
a certain number of operations on their own bodies and souls, thoughts, 
conduct, and way of being, so as to transform themselves in order to 
attain a certain state of happiness, purity, wisdom, perfection or 
immortality. (Technologies 18) 
The technology of self is distinct from other technologies that govern the way humans 
interact, including technologies of production, which drive economies, technologies of 
sign symbols, which allow interpersonal communication, and, most significant for my 
purposes, technologies of power, “which determine the conduct of individuals and 
submit them to certain ends or domination”(18). Foucault himself uses the historical 
examples of ancient Greek stoics and medieval monks in explaining the function of 
technologies of self. Monasticism, though it requires absolute subservience to the 
hierarchy of the monastery that at first blush could be thought of as a technology of 
power, is built upon technologies of self precisely because the end-result of this 
subservience is not the disappearance of self-will, but a complete hermeneutical 
mastering of it.  For the monk, every action must be considered for its propriety within 
the system of the cloister, and every thought must likewise be examined in the moment 
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of its conception to ensure that it is bent properly towards its religious purpose. The 
hierarchy of the monastery thus recedes into the background, a mechanism of 
enforcement no longer necessary. In theory, no aspect of the monk’s behavior goes 
unobserved or unrecognized, but the observation comes not from some carceral 
panopticon, but from within: the ideal result is an individual perfectly disciplined not by 
external authority, but through the contradictory act of will that is the denial of self-
agency. 
The Duke’s renunciation can be read as similarly, if counterintuitively, 
empowering. While this renunciation is strategic, it nevertheless answers a gnawing 
unrest in Vincento’s heart that mimics the vocational yearning of traditional 
monasticism. The Duke’s own words suggest this. In the play’s first scene, in which he 
delegates power to his subordinates, The Duke’s explanation to Angelo and Escalus is 
more revealing than Bawcutt claims. Just before his departure, the Duke confesses his 
anxieties about his relationship with his subjects:  
   I love the people,  
But do not like to stage me to their eyes;  
  Though it do well, I do not relish well  
  Their loud applause and aves vehement;  
  Nor do I think the man of safe discretion 
  That does affect it. (1.1.67-72) 
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The Duke finds distasteful his place in the public gaze, which he metaphorically renders 
as the position of an actor before a theater audience.23 Like the player, the Duke’s 
actions are by definition public and visible, and therefore subject to judgment. Ducal 
fiats share with stage-play an openness to an audience of reactors: everyone is aware of 
just who is doing what, and whether they find it good or not. The Duke’s distaste stems 
from the recognition that in exercising such judgment, the “people” maintain a certain 
level of authority over him. The audible signals of their pleasure-- “applause and aves 
vehement”—communicate approval, and the act of approval itself implies a power 
dynamic in which, ironically, the people are sovereign and the Duke subject, as the need 
for approval suggests a kind of subservience.  
Unsaid but vividly present in the reference to hails and applause is the potential 
for the opposite reaction: disapproval, scorn, ridicule, and contempt. The Duke’s 
sensitivity to the judgment of the people, particularly the possibility of negative 
judgment, is at the heart of his anxiety while in the public gaze.24 This same anxiety is 
behind the typical case of stage fright: the actor’s furious pacing in the wings before his 
entrance is born of the understanding that he is the audience’s subject, that though his 
words and actions command their rapt attention, it is they who have the final say over 
                                                        
23Daniel Massey, a veteran actor who himself was a subject of the public gaze, claims that in performing 
this scene he was able to “identify very strongly” with the Duke’s problems, including his sense of being 
“imprisoned…by pageantry”(17). 
24 Jonathan Dollimore describes the Duke’s renunciation as a symptom of his “anxiety about the 
ungovernability of his subjects,” which amounts to much the same thing as a fear of their disapproval 
(“Surveillance” 81). Effective governance and a certain immunity to critical judgment go hand in hand.  
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his success or failure. This dynamic occurs repeatedly in Shakespeare’s frequently 
deferential prologues, epilogues, and choral addresses, in which audience approval or 
forgiveness is directly solicited.25 Nor is the Duke the only Shakespearean ruler to feel 
thus subjected: Henry V laments that the kingship is a “hard condition,” for the king is 
“subject to the breath of every fool” (4.1.233-235), and thus consigned to a life of 
constant anxiety. Henry is building on a sentiment first expressed by his father in Henry 
IV Part 2, where beggars in fly-ridden hovels sleep soundly while “uneasy lies the head 
that wears a crown” (3.1.31). 
That the Duke feels constricted by his need for approval is made explicit in 1.3, 
when he further elaborates on his motives with Friar Thomas.  The Duke confesses that 
the discipline that Vienna requires will not be popular given the license he has granted 
throughout his reign. Delegating the task to Angelo while pulling the strings unseen is a 
way of displacing negative judgment onto his subordinate:  
  Sith ‘twas my fault to give the people scope,  
 ‘Twould be my tyranny to strike and gall them 
 For what I bid them do; for we bid this be done,  
 When evil deeds have their permissive pass, 
 And not the punishment. Therefore indeed, my father,  
                                                        
25 See, for example, the prologue of The Two Noble Kinsmen, which begs the audience’s pardon in the 
fashion of the captatio benevolentiae of classical rhetoric, or Henry V, which asks the audience to overlook 
the shortcomings of a limited medium. Troilus and Cressida is a less deferent exception, charging the 
audience “to like or find fault” as they will (Prologue 30).  
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 I have on Angelo imposed the office,  
 Who may in th’ambush of my name strike home,  
 And yet my nature never in the fight  
 To do in slander.  (1.3.35-42)  
The Duke sees the precise Angelo not only as the right man to put to the task of 
Vienna’s moral correction, but as a convenient lightning rod for the wrath of the 
people.26 Again, what the Duke fears is the collective opinion of his own subjects; some 
powerful men are venal or sadistic enough not to care what the people think 
(Tamburlaine, Herod, Caligula, and Nero), but the Duke seems to have much invested in 
a certain idea of himself as a popular and enlightened ruler, or what Martha Widmayer 
describes as an “obsessive concern with [his] reputation” (157). The pressure he feels to 
maintain that image is relieved in his act of renunciation. Donning the friar’s robe, he is 
freed from the subjecting gaze of the populace, and unburdened by the weight of his 
office he can enact his social program with complete impunity.  
 The friar’s robe itself is a guise pre-suffused with meaning, and the anti-
fraternalism that was popular even during the height of catholic hegemony in England 
had long before Shakespeare been adapted for protestant apologetics. 27 In Bale’s King 
John, for instance, friars are shown to be comical sneaks who hoard gold and keep nuns 
as whores, while professing holiness. They are also enemies of the state, conspiring 
                                                        
26 Zdravko Planinc observes a similarity between the Duke’s use of Angelo and Cesare Borgia’s similar use 
of a deputy, Ramiro D’Orca, as described by Machiavelli in chapter seven of The Prince (147).  
27 For more on anti-fraternalism in medieval literature, see Szittya, particularly 231-246.  
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against the crown in the name of Rome (Beckwith, Signifying God 121-157). Such a 
representation adds the danger of political conspiracy and insurrection to the well-
established medieval complaints about fraternal greed, sloth, and lechery. Beckwith 
sees Shakespeare’s flirtation with this tradition in Measure for Measure as an ironic 
inversion of anti-catholic tropes, for in this instance it is not the actual friar who poses a 
threat to political power, but the figure of authority himself acting as confessor while 
conspiring to disguise ducal power as divine grace (Grammar 76).  I agree with Beckwith 
that Shakespeare’s Duke cannot be viewed as part of the same tradition as the anti-
fraternalism of Bale, but her claim that the fusing of Duke and friar can be read as a 
“thorough-going critique of the inseparability of church and state invested in the person 
of the monarch” overstates the subversiveness of the characterization. The Duke’s 
temporary disguise as a fraternal ascetic, and with it his cooption of the sacraments of 
confession and the less formal clerical duty of paternalistic dispenser of advice (a 
familiar role for Shakespeare’s friars, whether in Romeo and Juliet or Much Ado About 
Nothing), actually does allow him to construct an outcome designed to please. What the 
play seems to suggest through the figure of the friar/Duke is that fraternal duties work 
best not as a lifelong commitment, but as one of many functions that fall under the 
purview of the post-Reformation ruler. Religious wisdom, clerical leadership, and 
political authority need not be divided amongst different estates, but can find a 
synthesized identity in the head of state. That he only temporarily plays the friar 
reinforces his flexibility to move between the religious and the secular, a flexibility taken 
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advantage of by all Tudor and Stuart kings.  The Duke dons the friar’s habit with the 
implicit promise that it will be taken off again, a promise that signals a similar destiny for 
Isabella.  
 
Isabella’s Resistant Celibacy 
The Duke’s renunciation demonstrates how an ascetic posture—even one 
adopted by a ruler for political purposes—can act as a check against forces of 
domination or subjugation.  I contend that the resistant force of asceticism is even more 
starkly apparent when examining a true renunciant, in this case one who as both a 
woman and a political subject is doubly vulnerable to domination. Isabella’s vows imbue 
her with a kind of stature—and power—not typically open to women in Jacobean 
society. They also allow her, as one editor of the play has noted, to sidestep the 
prescribed gender roles of wife, widow, mother, and whore repeatedly offered by the 
play (Kamps and Raber 196).28  
 As a nun, Isabella would have engendered contradictory feelings in members of 
Shakespeare’s audience. Institutional asceticism was a form of Christian worship long 
since exploded, done in not only by Cromwell’s visitations and Henry VIII’s edicts, but by 
                                                        
28 Flood believes that female asceticism is particularly oriented toward resistance: “Gender has become 
an important analytical tool for looking at the histories of asceticism, especially the relationship of the 
ascetic self to power in terms of conformity and resistance. Indeed, we might claim that resistance to 
power enacted through ascetic performance…is mainly female, in contrast to conformity to power, which 
is mainly male” (Flood 7).  Flood supports this somewhat reductive formula with the case of Simone Weil 
(37-63).  
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the theological changes discussed above. The early modern audience had been trained, 
in fact, to respond negatively to catholic clergymen of all stripes on the stage by a long 
parade of scheming bishops, treacherous cardinals, greedy, bumbling friars, and 
hypocritical monks.  However, the characterization of Isabella does not precisely align 
with such satirical depictions. Measure for Measure is a play that resists easy 
classifications, and Isabella is no exception. While a typical protestant might not have 
found admirable her vows of celibacy (and even that claim assumes an audience 
member with a fairly developed understanding of theology—hardly a certainty), her 
resistance to Angelo is a defense of her chastity: a distinction that makes all the 
difference in the world in a protestant worldview. Thus, in the immediate situation of 
resisting Angelo’s coercive assault, she is not torn between her brother’s life and Romish 
monasticism, but between filial love and a cardinal protestant virtue. Isabella is also not 
representative of the polemical tradition of sexualization discussed above and analyzed 
by Dolan. While she may be misguided from a protestant perspective, she is not lax in 
regards to her vows, nor is she held up as an object of ridicule, nor subjected to 
pornographic debasement. While Angelo’s attempted judicial rape recalls similar 
seductions of nuns by priests in polemical depictions, there is no sense in the play that 
the audience should be amused or aroused by the proceedings, nor is the audience 
given the protestant satisfaction of the nun’s eventual acquiescence. David Stevenson is 
perhaps correct that “a partial not-liking of Isabella is written into the play” (83); her 
conduct is not perfect, especially in her willingness to go along with the Duke’s effective 
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prostitution of Mariana, a hypocritical turn after her harsh judgment of Claudio and 
Juliet’s unlawful intercourse. However, the dislike is partial, I would argue along with 
Stevenson: the full brunt of audience outrage seems meant to fall upon Angelo, whose 
draconian moral regulation and outrageous hypocrisy overwhelm equally harsh 
judgments of Isabella. In the contradictory feelings she engenders, she recalls some of 
the similarly opaque or ambivalently drawn female ascetics in Chaucer.  The ambiguity 
of her moral position—and the ambivalence she has inspired in audiences and critics—
evinces the binary significance of the nun herself in the early modern, post-Reformation 
imagination. On the one hand, the most polemical protestant voices going back to 
Thomas Cromwell, John Bale, and even Calvin, took great pleasure in excoriating the 
nun for her hypocrisy, her presumption, and her slothfulness. On the other hand, a 
society that policed and controlled female sexuality as rigorously as early modern 
England, that placed high value on female chastity, and that saw sexuality as almost 
exclusively a matter of male agency, would doubtless have responded sympathetically 
to the sexual “purity” of a figure like Isabella. In some ways, the nun—obedient, chaste, 
and pious—possesses the qualities of an ideal Renaissance wife.  What an early modern 
comedy demands is not humiliation or debasement of such a figure, but her gentle 
submission at last to male sovereignty in marriage.  
 Thus, the play seems determined from its outset to bring Isabella back into the 
light, even as it demonstrates the power and stature of her position. This ambivalence is 
present from her introduction in the first act. Having just seen her brother hauled off to 
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prison on the imperative of the state, the audience finds Isabella pronouncing the holy 
wonder of her own imminent self-imposed enclosure:  
  Isab.  And have you nuns no farther privileges?  
  Fran.  Are these not large enough? 
  Isab.  Yes, truly; I speak not as desiring more,  
               Bur rather wishing a more strict restraint 
                           Upon the sisterhood, the votarists of Saint Clare.   (1.4.1-5) 
These lines make two things clear about Isabella’s relationship to the convent of St. 
Claire: first, that she has not yet formally taken the monastic vows that will sever her 
permanently from the world (she addresses the nuns using the second person, not the 
first person plural); and second, that her ascetic zeal exceeds even what is required by 
the rules of the convent. She demonstrates the characteristics of what Patrick Olivelle 
terms “elite asceticism,” practicing (or desiring to practice, in this case) “extraordinary” 
or “unusual” feats of self-control in relation not only to the worldly, but to more 
culturally normative ascetic traditions (31-32).29 Isabella’s desire is especially 
noteworthy given the reputation enjoyed by the rule of St. Clare for adherence to the 
strictest of vows. Francisca’s question—“Are these not enough?”—likely signals genuine 
                                                        
29 Olivelle defines three levels of ascetic practice, each of which is overlaid upon the other. Root 
asceticism, the broadest category, is “not an observable phenomenon, but, like a linguistic root…is a mere 
postulate as a cultural imperative” (29). Overlaid upon root asceticism is cultural asceticism, the 
observable manifestations of the root ascetic impulse in cultural traditions and institutions. Elite 
asceticism, finally, is overlaid upon (and surpasses) both more general categories, encompassing 
individuals who practice extraordinary forms of ascetic renunciation in relation to cultural asceticism (30-
31).  
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surprise, given what was known of the order at the turn of the seventeenth century. 
While no practicing communities of the Order of St. Clare existed in England in the first 
decade of the seventeenth century, accounts from continental sources document the 
nuns’ strict regimes of fasting, labor, and mortification.30 One potential votaress of the 
Ave-Maria convent in Paris, which had adopted the rule, changed her mind when 
exposed to the reality of life as a “Poor Clare”: 
To her mind, their high walls formed a narrow prison. Their terrible 
fasting…made her go pale, but especially the manner of their sleeping 
without being entirely recumbent at night and the obligation to go about 
entirely barefoot even in winter and on ice astounded her, such that she 
indeed believed that the day she entered this would soon be followed by 
that of her death, and what she considered only a prison for others 
would in a short time become her tomb. (Diefendorf, Penitence 56-57)  
This young prospective votaress, driven away in terror by the harsh reality of the rule, 
strikes a marked contrast with her dramatic counterpart who is disappointed by the 
laxity of that same rule. That the Poor Clares were themselves known to be 
extraordinarily ascetic, even for a religious order, further marginalizes Isabella’s religious 
orientation—“spiritual overreach,” as Gless describes it (97).31 Returning to Olivelle’s 
                                                        
30 English catholic refugees did practice the Rule of St. Clare at a convent founded at Gravelines by Mary 
Ward in 1608. The Rule provided an excellent organizational framework not only for piety but for 
scholarship and political activism. See Goodrich, 85-86.  
31 Natasha Korda offers a valuable overview of the Poor Clare’s vows of poverty, which had to be 
reconciled with the order’s wealth-generating properties in pre-dissolution England. See Korda, 168-170.  
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categories, Isabella embodies the virtuosic nature of elite asceticism, which tends to be 
practiced by extraordinary individuals operating at the limits of social normativity, 
rather than large communities (31).  
Elite asceticism is the subject matter of both hagiography and martyrology, and 
Isabella approaches this status not only through the extra-normative qualities of her 
bodily continence, but her capacity to imagine, even encourage, non-sexual violence 
against her physical being. Several times she expresses a willingness to die for Claudio, 
once to Claudio himself:  
  O, were it but my life, 
  I’d throw it down for your deliverance 
  As frankly as a pin. (3.1.103-105) 
Such a sacrifice, mimicking Christ’s substitutionary atonement for mankind, does not 
give Isabella the slightest pause, so perfectly does it adhere to the orthodoxy of elite 
ascetic martyrology. Even more evocative, however, is the hypothetical possibility of the 
suffering she would endure before yielding to Angelo’s bargain:  
Ang.  Admit no other way to save his life,-- 
(As I subscribe not that, nor any other, 
But in the loss of question),--that you, his sister, 
Finding yourself desir’d of such a person, 
Whose credit with the judge, or own great place, 
Could fetch your brother from the manacles 
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Of the all-binding law; and that there were 
No earthly mean to save him, but that either 
You must lay down the treasures of your body 
To this supposed, or else to let him suffer— 
What would you do? 
Isab.  As much for my poor brother as myself: 
That is, were I under the terms of death, 
The impression of keen whips I'ld wear as rubies, 
And strip myself to death, as to a bed 
That longing have been sick for, ere I'ld yield 
My body up to shame. (2.4.88-104) 
She would look upon such bodily torments with longing if they would preserve either 
Claudio’s life or her own virtue. The stripping of flesh from bones is a common 
punishment in martryrology and hagiography, but Isabella’s resistant claim that the very 
scores of the whip would adorn her flesh as rubies powerfully transforms punishment 
into a kind of holy vestment, a marker of her sainthood.32 Even the agency of the 
flagellation is somewhat obscure: she speaks of being “under the terms of death,” 
subject to external punishment, but the phrase “strip myself” suggests the self-agency 
                                                        
32 Flood, in theorizing about Simone Weil in the twentieth century, offers a surprisingly helpful 
formulation for considering Isabella’s words here: “The body and the encoding of tradition and culture 
upon it become, for her, a means  of transcending the body...Pain, willingly accepted, becomes the 
method for the body’s transcendence” (6).  
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of positive mortification. Martyrdom and asceticism come into alignment as Isabella 
imagines wearing her wounds as proudly as one might wear jewelry, language 
reminiscent of a phenomenon of hagiography wherein wounds acquire symbolic or 
metaphorical meaning.  In one example of such symbolization, Prudentius writes of the 
virgin martyr Eulalia, “mutilated by her torturers,” who claims that “God writes on her 
body” through her wounds (Taylor 36). According to Anna Taylor, Eulalia’s body, 
“written upon in her own blood become[s] in suffering and death a book for the faithful 
to read” (36).  As with Isabella, the wounds of the virgin become symbols of her 
godliness, as external punishment is appropriated into the larger framework of askesis.  
 Ultimately, Isabella’s willingness to endure suffering exemplifies the paradoxical 
nature of all asceticism; ascetic adherents shun pleasure and embrace agony, whether 
self-inflicted or enthusiastically accepted (Tinsley 24). The benefits of such ascetic 
reversal, David Tinsley explains, are often figured as therapeutic in ascetical discourse. 
Just as pre-modern medicine touted the restorative power of bleeding and other 
counter-productive measures, so too do ascetic writers preach the spiritually palliative 
value of pain: Tinsley, in paraphrasing one such tract, explains that “one should let God 
the physician prescribe the proper dosage. Superfluous blood corrupts the heart just as 
sin…corrupts the soul” (27). Isabella’s description of her prospective suffering and 
execution as a bed of comforts for sickness evokes this traditional therapeutic 
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formulation.33 Her somewhat dissonant unwillingness to include rape in the catalogue of 
palliative suffering, and thereby find a solution to her fraternal dilemma, can be 
explained in part by the aforementioned phenomenon of ascetic reversal. Sex, after all, 
comes under the category of pleasures to be fled. Appropriating sexual assault for 
ascetic martyrology—allowing something explicitly proscribed by religious vows to be 
welcomed as imitatio Christi—creates a cognitive dissonance too great to overcome. No 
wonder that Kathleen Coyne Kelly, a scholar of both hagiography and medieval 
asceticism, confesses that, despite the frequent specter of rape in saint’s lives, “I have 
never read a narrative which describes rape, or says that rape was committed, or even 
creates a before and after scenario” such as that found in Clarissa (43). Deferring to the 
breadth of Kelly’s reading in such material, I would argue that Measure for Measure 
demonstrates an instinctive understanding that the discourse of martyrological suffering 
cannot contain sexual assault, beyond its mere prospect, amongst its litany of 
punishments be ascetically appropriated.34          
Despite this one scruple, Isabella nevertheless stands at a double remove from 
the other nuns: she is less bound by the demands of renunciation than the rest of the 
Poor Clares, but she is also desirous of an even more thorough spiritual cleansing than 
they have undergone. This excess partially explains the long train of critics going back to 
                                                        
33 Tinsley draws from the late medieval ascetical tract De duodecim utilitatibus tribulationum, which 
provides a total of five “metaphors of purgation” that liken suffering to medicine (23-29). 
34 This formula should be limited to literal horrors, for Kelly muses that the punishment of female martyrs 
can symbolize or evoke sexual assault through a rhetoric of substitution or silence (43).  
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G. Wilson Knight who have understood Isabella as excessively cold and therefore 
unsympathetic (93).35 Critics such as Knight and Stevenson balk at the severity of 
Isabella’s asceticism, and while such a response is common enough, and consistent with 
the protestant context of the play’s production, it also perpetuates a specifically modern 
antipathy towards female asceticism that can itself register as dismissively patriarchal.36 
Such an attitude ignores what Jessica Slights and Michael Morgan identify as the 
resistant potential that “solidarity among women in an all-female community” and the 
volitional restraint of monastic life offers to the “conventional sex/gender identities and 
the play's heteronormative telos” (265).    
But in Measure for Measure’s complex, almost opaque treatment of asceticism, 
the polemical voice of protestant hegemony is never long silent. The play also seems 
intentionally, though subtly, to invoke a traditional protestant anti-monastic line of 
attack by having Isabella refer to her religious vows as “restraint” (1.4.4).  Restraint can 
be exercised upon oneself or imposed on an individual by external forces. As Natasha 
Korda explains, the nature of this desired restraint remains unspecified, but in any case 
it is volitional (Korda 159). The Foucauldian treatment of asceticism discussed above is 
built upon considering ascetic restraint as self-imposed: the monk or nun polices his or 
                                                        
35 Gless, in a similar register, cites Isabella’s “deviant relationship to law” (98).   
36 Tinsley identifies a similar dismissiveness in the misogynistic attitudes of many twentieth century 
medievalists and scholars of religion: “Scholars [have] responded to scenes of [female asceticism] with 
indifference, condescension, or scorn….In general, the presence of asceticism was seen as just another 
indication of the debased and degenerate forms of spirituality that occupied the lives of medieval 
religious women. For almost a century, religious writing by women came to be ignored, dismissed, or 
marginalized” (Tinsley 4-5).   
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her own behavior—exercises restraint—and thereby is subjectively empowered. 
However, in Isabella’s wish “for a more strict restraint/Upon the sisterhood,” the 
preposition “upon” hints of restraint in the sense of a means of control wielded by an 
external actor (4-5): the type of discipline Foucault associates not with monasteries but 
with prisons. The convent or monastery does depend on a “rule” (Franciscan, 
Benedictine, etc.) that is external to the self, but adherence to this rule must be willingly 
accepted by the self (save for the obvious cases where the taking of the habit is forced 
or coerced). This distinction between self-restraint as a means of empowerment and 
external restraint as a mechanism of domination is crucial to unpacking the protestant 
orthodoxy behind what Shakespeare here depicts. The difference between the 
monastery and the prison hinges on this distinction. Yet not only the pronoun “upon,” 
but the word “restraint” itself demands that a connection, rather than a distinction, be 
drawn between the two institutions. Isabella’s desire for “restraint” is voiced just two 
scenes after Lucio, watching Claudio hauled off to his cell on Angelo’s orders, asks: 
“Why, how now, Claudio? whence comes this restraint?” (1.2.124, emphasis mine).   
Claudio answers:  
  From too much liberty, my Lucio, liberty: 
  As surfeit is the father of much fast,  
  So every scope by the immoderate use  
  Turns to restraint. (1.2.125-128) 
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Here Shakespeare plays with the two meanings of “restraint.” To borrow loosely from 
V.N. Voloshinov, the flexibility of this sign in its signal manifestations creates telling 
juxtapositions. Lucio’s question is about external, forcible restraint. Claudio’s answer is 
clever precisely because it invokes both meanings of the word: feasting, self-indulgence, 
leads to fasting, a form of self-restraint, just as transgressive immorality—an excess of 
liberty--leads to forcible restraint by the law. The asceticism of fasting melds seamlessly 
into the subjugation of imprisonment. 
The careful reader or the closely attuned auditor may thus, upon Isabella’s 
utterance of the word “restraint” in 1.4, be immediately thrown back to the scene of 
Claudio’s arrest and imprisonment. The word “restraint” becomes a kind of verbal 
heteroptia: a word through which the contrary but related institutions of monastery and 
prison are not only juxtaposed, but essentially amalgamated. The word ties Isabella’s 
monastic renunciation to her brother’s imprisonment, and signals to an early modern 
audience that this comedy dramatizes not only one, but two liberations.  
 At the same time that the play positions Isabella as a prisoner-nun waiting for 
the gift of liberty-marriage, it cannot avoid demonstrating how profoundly empowering 
Isabella’s position is.  That, historically, many European nuns clung to their lives in the 
convent long after the tide of reformation swept over them attests not only to the fact 
that they possessed a sincere devotion to the ascetic life, but that they saw in their post 
monastic fates an intolerable diminution in status. Unlike former priests and even 
monks, who could, if so inclined, easily adapt to lives as protestant ministers or Anglican 
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priests, two decidedly unattractive fates typically awaited the “liberated” nun: in the 
best case, marriage to a former member of the secular clergy now freed from his vows 
of celibacy; in the worst case, the weakness and dependency of old maidhood (Wiesner-
Hanks, Convents 115-116). Either situation—barring marriage to an extremely powerful 
member of the clergy or, in rare cases, a gentleman of the nobility—represented 
potential subjugation to a nun who had become accustomed to answering to no man, 
and who was “free” within the confines of the conventual laws from the patriarchal 
domination that characterized every other facet of post-Reformation society. This was 
particularly true for the sisters of rank who had enjoyed positions of authority (16-17).  
But regardless of rank, the habit conveyed a kind of status: it elevated a woman above 
her secular peers by marking her as an extraordinary practitioner of her faith, one who 
had chosen the celibate ideal over the “concession” of mere chastity.  
 Isabella is merely a novitiate, not by any means a mother, and yet, even within 
the monastery she seems to be marked by qualities that distinguish her from her fellow 
nuns, expressing, as discussed above, a desire for renunciation beyond what is 
expected. She is also beautiful, and it is the convergence of her physical beauty and her 
ascetic firmness that makes her so extraordinary to those who look upon her. This 
sentiment is first expressed by Lucio the bawd, who finds his typical irreverence silenced 
by the presence of such a striking figure:  
   I would not—though ‘tis my familiar sin 
  With maids to seem the lapwing and to jest, 
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  Tongue far from heart—play with all virgins so.  
  I hold you as a thing enskied and sainted 
  By your renouncement, an immortal spirit 
  And to be talked with in sincerity 
  As with a saint.  (1.4.31-37) 
Performance matters here: the lines can be played as sarcasm or hyperbole, as Isabella 
herself interprets them. But Lucio’s brief but strong insistence in response to Isabella’s 
rebuke suggests a non-ironic interpretation: Lucio is genuinely impressed by the spiritual 
gravitas of Isabella’s presence. His description of her as a thing divorced from the 
material—“enskied” is Shakespeare’s very apt neologism—fits the austerity of her 
manner and stands out particularly through contrast with the “teeming foison” of Juliet 
and Claudio’s sexual reproduction (43).  
 This same power that silences the irrepressible Lucio also heats the “snow broth” 
that flows in Angelo’s veins.  The precisian, who fills his days with “profits of the mind, 
study, and fast,” certainly sees in Isabella, as many critics have noted, a reflection of his 
own cherished moral severity, but there is more at work here than mere narcissism.  To 
say that Angelo is merely falling in love with himself, or an image of himself, is to 
simplify a very complex set of reactions. I agree with Widmayer that Angelo’s attraction 
to Isabella is first and foremost of a sexual nature (Widmayer 67). However, it is a lust 
kindled ironically by rhetorical, rather than physical, touch, through an appeal to the 
same theological register that supports his own precise nature.  Angelo himself remarks 
  
75 
on this in a brief aside: “She speaks, and 'tis/Such sense, that my sense breeds with it” 
(2.2141-142). Here, as William Empson notes, two meanings of sense—Angelo’s as 
sensual feeling and Isabella’s as logical wisdom—combine in a sexually charged image of 
“breeding” that surprises even Angelo (274).37  Angelo’s lust triggers in his own mind, 
and to his own disgust, an image of a defiled holy space: “Having waste ground 
enough/Shall we desire to raze the sanctuary/And pitch our evils there?” (2.2.169-171). 
Given that England in the seventeenth century was still pockmarked by the ruins of the 
great religious houses shuttered by Henry VIII, the image of a razed sanctuary cannot be 
dismissed as a generalized metaphor of the sacred defiled.38 Rather, it suggests that 
Isabella’s specific identity as a nun is an essential component of the sexual desire she 
raises in Angelo. By figuring his lust for Isabella as a need to defile the grounds of a 
former convent or monastery, Angelo expresses the same urge to debase and demystify 
the sacred found in the more scurrilous material discussed by Dolan.39  For all the 
doubling language in the play—“O cunning enemy, that to catch a saint, with saints dost 
bait thy hook!”(2.2179-180)—a religiously sensitive reading of Angelo’s attempted rape 
of Isabella reveals not a meeting of mirror images, or the deluded self-righteous Angelo 
                                                        
37 That Angelo is “genuinely astonished by his desires” is one of his few sympathetic qualities, according to 
Empson, who traces the ambiguities created by the doubling language throughout this scene (274).  
38 Shakespeare also exploits the resonance of ruined monasteries with the late autumnal trees likened to 
“bare ruined choirs” in Sonnet 73 (4).  
39 The “evils” that Angelo talks of dumping on the sanctuary possibly signify either the building of privies 
or the voiding of waste itself (2.2.171n.) 
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identifying with the righteous Isabella, but a contest between two marginal figures in 
Jacobean society: a godly Puritan and a catholic nun.  
 Isabella’s fate in Measure for Measure, however, is not to be exposed as ascetic 
fraud, any more than it is Angelo’s fate to be severely punished; while other extra-
normative or problematic figures such as Malvolio in Twelfth Night or Jacques in As You 
Like It are excluded from comedic unification, Measure for Measure calls for a 
rehabilitation of social schismatics.  Like Angelo, Isabella is reappropriated in a way that 
is consistent not only with comedic harmony, but with official Elizabethan and Jacobean 
policies of inclusiveness.  Many readers are bothered by the Duke’s leniency in dealing 
with Angelo; Samuel Taylor Coleridge lambasted the play’s lapse of justice in allowing 
him to go unpunished (Geckle 71). Such dissatisfaction is certainly justified by the 
heinousness of his offenses. However, placing the pardon in the context of early 
seventeenth-century religious conflict can permit a different understanding of the play’s 
ending. The Elizabethan Settlement of 1559, and later the Hampton Court Conference 
called by James I, promoted a view of English protestantism that was nominally, if not 
always in practice, inclusive, expressing general tolerance towards protestant sectarians, 
including at least moderate Puritans. The 1604 settlement at Hampton Court reflects 
particularly the inclusive religious atmosphere in England during the period of Measure 
for Measure’s first performance, for it resulted in negotiated agreements between the 
Puritan representatives and James, who found the “radical” protestant element more 
reasonable to deal with than he’d imagined (Newton 41-43). This context of religious 
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inclusiveness and negotiation might help to explain why Angelo earns a place in the 
happy ending denied to Malvolio, another “kind of puritan,” in Twelfth Night (2.3.139).  
Though Angelo’s uncompromisingly rigid coldness is shown to mask a hypocritical 
libidinousness, the solution is not to expel him from Viennese society, but to reform him 
by firmly and properly affixing him to a connubial partner: to, in essence, bring him into 
the fold of correct familio-social interrelations. “Look that you love your wife,” the Duke 
orders Angelo, for “her worth” is worth his life (5.1.497): what is required for pardon is 
for Angelo to dispense with his presumptions toward unbending perfection (which, 
ironically, is redolent of a works-based morality), and embrace the protestant ideal of 
procreative marriage through submission to the Duke’s carefully orchestrated 
settlement.  
 For Isabella, the play rushes to perform a similar reappropriation. The Duke’s 
proposal beckons the votaress back into the world of familial and sexual responsibility 
that she had renounced by entering the convent. Without giving her a chance to 
respond, the play ends with the Duke reaching for, and perhaps taking, if so staged, her 
hand. As her rhetorical “touch” once inflamed the gross passions of Angelo, so now does 
the Duke’s touch signal a re-subjugation of this female ascetic by the correctness of 
protestant patriarchy.  “I have a motion much imports your good,” says the Duke 
(5.1.535), and the orthodox reading would support such a claim. This coupling of 
Duke/“friar” and nun, hearkening back as it does to the tropes of anti-catholic satire, 
serves here a grander purpose as part of a staged tableau of the Jacobean absolutist 
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social order, incorporating the political magistrate as the final architect of harmony. 
Isabella’s silence, engendering uncertainty in readers and directors for centuries, is, in 
such a performance, the strongest assertion of her assent possible. The convent and the 
habit have no place in the Elizabethan happy ending, built as the genre is upon marital 
bliss.  
 However, without voiced assent, the socially and generically normalizing 
insistence on marriage remains unfinished, or at least unconfirmed. Silence, after all, is 
itself a form of renunciation, an extreme but not uncommon monastic vow. The Poor 
Clares practice a form of it, as Francisca tells Isabella in her first scene: “When you have 
vowed, you must not speak with men/but in the presence of the prioress;/then, if you 
speak, you must not show your face/or if you show your face you must not 
speak”(2.1.10-13). Isabella has not yet sworn her vows, therefore in falling silent she 
acts purely from the self-restraint of the elite ascetic. Her silence is total, not conditional 
as in the letter of the rule. Characteristically, she does not follow the rule so much as 
she exceeds it, adopting a more strict restraint. She retreats, in a limited way, into the 
same protected space that would have shielded her from the subjugation of marriage in 
the first place, had only she not twice flaunted her claustration. Now vulnerable, 
exposed to the rapacity of social order, she invokes the one weapon left at her disposal 
by wrapping herself in monastic silence.     
So Measure for Measure ends, perpetually balanced in the liminal space 
between the orthodox and the subversive, with no hint from Isabella as to which way 
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the play inclines. As attested to by the numerous critics, myself included, who have 
leapt to fill her silence with commentary, this moment itself performs its own kind of 
resistance, one that has yet to be satisfactorily overcome: to paraphrase Wallace 
Stevens, it resists the intelligence, almost completely.  
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CHAPTER TWO: REFORMATION AND ROMANCE: THE KNIGHT’S TALE, THE TWO NOBLE 
KINSMEN, AND THE ECLIPSE OF CELIBACY 
 
Like Measure for Measure, The Two Noble Kinsmen, Shakespeare’s Chaucerian 
collaboration with John Fletcher, derives much of its dramatic tension from the 
subversive nature of female celibacy. The play’s very first scene hints at the threat that 
perpetual virginity presents to sovereign patriarchal power. Joining the three Queens 
and Hippolyta in entreating Theseus to make war on Creon before his wedding night, 
Emilia, the votaress of Diana, offers the following contribution to their rhetoric of 
persuasion:  
  If you grant not 
My sister her petition, in that force, 
  With that celerity and nature, which  
  She makes it in, from henceforth I’ll not dare 
  To ask you any thing, nor be so hardy 
  Ever to take a husband. (1.1.200-205)   
The conditional grammar itself reinforces the sense that this is not an entreaty so much 
as a threat. An unmarried votaress of Diana bends the will of her sovereign Duke by 
threatening both to cease her submissive devotion (“I’ll not dare ask you any thing”) and 
to withhold from him the principal source of her value. By vowing to never “take a 
husband” should Theseus refuse to make war on Creon, Emilia reminds the Duke of her 
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ability to frustrate his will by removing herself from the marketplace of matrimonial 
exchange.  
Walter Cohen sees this scene and others in which Emilia claims to “prefer 
virginity and the company of females to the prospect of marriage” to be representative 
of the play’s unappealing portrayal of heterosexual desire (432-433). Whether through 
the pitiful fate of the Jailer’s daughter, driven mad by the coarseness of Arcite’s 
rejection, the kinsmen whose brotherhood is rent by sexual jealousy, or Emilia herself, 
helplessly tossed in the tempest of their feud, The Two Noble Kinsmen is relentless in 
the doubt it seeds about amorous entanglement. At the same time, the play suggests 
that alternatives to such entanglement, including homosocial bonds and perpetual 
celibacy, offer a potential reprieve from the chaos of romantic love.  
As much as such alternatives are hinted at, however, they are ultimately put aside. The 
play centers not only on the conflict between feuding cousins over the love of a courtly 
amazon (an anachronistic conceit that Shakespeare and Fletcher inherited from 
Chaucer), but also the normalizing pressures of sexual union exerted upon a resistant 
female ascetic.  At the same time, the deadly rivalry of Palamon and Arcite itself serves 
as the rejection of another quasi-ascetic alternative: the homosocial perfection of 
associative male friendship. These horizontal alternatives to hierarchy (both sexual and 
political) are, in a familiar pattern, ultimately rejected in favor of social and political 
normativity, but, unlike Measure for Measure, The Two Noble Kinsmen’s generic 
hybridity and its loose identification with comedy free it from the restrictive bonds of a 
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comic ending. The result is a play that leaves its skepticism of sexual union explicitly 
intact through its conclusion, including a Chaucerian epilogue that acknowledges the 
tears of its audience. What I hope to demonstrate in this chapter is that The Two Noble 
Kinsmen’s preoccupation with overcoming the impediment that sexual abstinence 
presents to marital happiness is an artistic decision that reinforces, reluctantly, 
Jacobean socio-religious priorities. It is not a rejection of Chaucer, who presents a rather 
neutral stance on Emelye’s asceticism in The Knight’s Tale, but it does resolve the social 
tension brought about by introducing such a strong ascetic figure into a play destined 
for a nuptial resolution. However, in doing so, it also acknowledges that resolving that 
tension does not come without cost.  
 
Sign, Signal, and Periodization 
Interrogating the stance of Shakespeare and Fletcher’s play toward its 
Chaucerian source material is a necessary antecedent to serious engagement with the 
play’s treatment of asceticism. It is intuitive that two works of such similarity in action 
and subject matter as The Knight’s Tale and The Two Noble Kinsmen can yield different 
interpretations when social and historical context is taken into consideration; however, 
articulating how and why this is so is a task aided greatly by sociolinguistic theory, 
particularly V.N. Voloshinov’s categories of sign and signal in Marxism and the 
Philosophy of Language.  According to Voloshinov, signals, the formal and abstract raw 
material of utterance, possess an unchanging, normatively identical character, but such 
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“incontestable” forms do not in any meaningful way constitute language in its social 
existence (66). Voloshinov breaks with abstract objectivism in assigning meaning rather 
to signs, which are signals employed in the concrete situation of meaningful discourse. 
Signs are changeable and adaptable, where signals are fixed and immutable. Signals can 
be recognized, but only signs can be understood, as it is only in becoming a sign in a 
social and discursive context that forms acquire meaning: 
[T]he understander, belonging to the same linguistic community…is 
attuned to the linguistic form not as a fixed, self-identical signal, but as 
changeable and adaptable sign…. Only a sign can be understood; what is 
recognized is a signal. A signal is an internally fixed, singular thing that 
does not in fact stand for anything else, or reflect or refract anything, but 
is simply a technical means for indicating this or that object or this or that 
action. (68-6)  
The sign/signal dialectic is superficially similar to other binary systems of language 
(structuralism’s langue and parole, or the type and token of pragmatic philosophy). 
However, for Voloshinov the linguistic form acquires meaning only in specific acts of 
discourse, and therefore is inseparable from ideology: 
In actuality we never hear or say words, we say and hear what is true or 
false, good or bad, important or unimportant, pleasant or unpleasant, 
and so on.  Words are always filled with content and meaning drawn 
from behavior or ideology. That is the way we understand words, and we 
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can respond only to words that engage us behaviorally or ideologically. 
(70)  
Discourse of any kind cannot be isolated from behavioral or ideological impletion, and 
thus, according to Voloshinov, attempting to interpret utterances based on fixed and 
unchanging meanings is impossible.  Voloshinov’s insistence on the intersection of 
meaning and ideology in discourse will help to explain how the discursive gestures of 
ascetic renunciation can acquire multiple and seemingly contradictory meanings, and 
how such gestures can be oriented toward vastly different sociopolitical (or literary) 
goals depending on their context and the ideological identities of those who produce 
and receive them. For the critical agenda of this chapter, Voloshinov’s categories 
provide a vocabulary for explaining the new social meaning acquired by Chaucer’s 
subject matter in its reproduction by Shakespeare and Fletcher. As signals—discursive 
raw material stripped from their context—Chaucer’s Emelye and Shakespeare/Fletcher’s 
Emilia, along with the identically named goddess Diana that each prays to, are 
remarkably similar. Understanding these figures as signs, however, requires fully 
accounting for their ideological function in historical and generic context. Ann 
Thompson acknowledges this very fact when she remarks that the difference between 
The Knight’s Tale and The Two Noble Kinsmen is primarily a difference of “attitude” 
rather than “situations,” “ideas,” or “verbal details” (166). In other words, the greatest 
difference between the medieval poem and the early modern play is the ideological 
position that each adopts toward its subject matter.  
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 Shakespeare’s play, like Chaucer’s fragment, came into existence as part of a 
discursive field, in dialogue with other types of literary and verbal utterance. Most 
immediately, The Two Noble Kinsmen is responding to The Knight’s Tale, but it is also 
responding to the expectations of a Jacobean audience, the demands of 
commodification that required turning Chaucer’s ornate symmetries into moneymaking 
dramatic action, and the social and religious issues of its own historical moment. 
Chaucer’s poem was interoriented within a different discursive field: one that included 
his Italian sources, the aesthetics of continental romance that he both evoked and 
flaunted, the tastes of a courtly readership, Roman catholic theology, etc. While these 
points are perhaps obvious, they reinforce the Bakhtinian notion that all signifying 
action—verbal or literate—takes meaning only through its dialogic orientation.  Within 
any discursive gesture exists the ghosts and shadows of previous utterance and the 
range of potential counter-utterance: 
The word is not a tangible object, but an always shifting, always changing 
means of social communication. It never rests with one consciousness, 
one voice. Its dynamism consists in movement from speaker to speaker, 
from one context to another, from one generation to another. Through it 
all, the word does not forget its path of transfer and cannot completely 
free itself from the power of those concrete contexts into which it has 
entered. By no means does each member of the community apprehend 
the word as a neutral medium of the language system, free from 
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intentions and untenanted by the voices of its previous users. Instead, he 
receives the word from another voice, a word full of that other voice. The 
word enters his context from another context, permeated with the 
intentions of other speakers. (Bakhtin, Poetics 95) 
Such a framework offers a useful way for thinking about the transmission of literature 
across continents or centuries. One can imagine the story of Palamon and Arcite, and its 
signal components, performing a journey such as the one described above, in which its 
signifying elements move through a shifting “apperceptive background of 
understanding” that fundamentally alters what Bakhtin might label its actual meaning 
(rather than its more abstract neutral signification)”(Bakhtin, Dialogic 281). At the same 
time, the seventeenth century literary product that is The Two Noble Kinsmen carries 
with it, backgrounded but present, the ideological and rhetorical impletions of its earlier 
sources, particularly Chaucer.  Even if unconsciously, the latter work negotiates the 
rhetorical contours of its source in such a way that the component signals of The 
Knight’s Tale can be recast in an ideologically distinct signifying action; even elements 
left largely unchanged (such as the basic structures of plot and the broad outlines of 
characterization) acquire distinct socio-political significance in the new discursive field of 
seventeenth century protestant drama.   
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Chaucer’s Emelye 
Making large interpretive claims about The Two Noble Kinsmen often begins with 
considering one or both of the following two issues: the play’s complex and unsettled 
authorship, and its relationship to its Chaucerian source material. As I am less interested 
in personalities than in texts, I will let rest in this chapter the former controversy, 
accepting as probable the most recent analysis of Shakespearean and Fletcherian scenes 
provided by Lois Potter in the critical introduction to the Arden third edition of the 
play.40  The second issue, however, provides an excellent starting point for an 
exploration of one of The Two Noble Kinsmen’s major themes: the benefits of worldly 
renunciation in general, and the particular moral potential of sexual abstinence. Both 
the titular kinsmen and the love-object Emilia speak repeatedly throughout the play of 
the desirability of the celibate life, the dangers of sexual licentiousness, and their 
skepticism of marriage. Beyond these direct proclamations, the play seems inherently 
skeptical of marital bliss, promoting—seemingly in its stead—the associative ideal of 
same-sex friendship, both male and female. Ultimately the play embraces marriage in its 
conclusion, adhering to generic convention while glossing over the radical potential of 
some of its characters’ earlier conceits. In doing so, the play reaches the same 
                                                        
40 See Potter, 16-34. Potter proposes that an earlier collaboration was eventually completely worked over 
by Fletcher alone. A less nuanced essay on the subject can also be found in Eugene Waith’s critical 
introduction to his edition of the play. See, Waith, 7-23. The fact that there still is not total consensus on 
which scenes belong to whom reminds us of the role that subjectivity must play in such a process. In 
earlier analyses, critics tended to assign scenes they like to Shakespeare. See Mincoff, 97-115; Muir, 98-
147; and Proudfoot. 
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conclusion as Chaucer’s tale, and in much the same way. But far more interesting than 
the play’s closeness to its source in terms of plot and general subject matter is the great 
distance in social meaning carried by these seemingly similar elements. To paraphrase 
Bakhtin, the skeletal outline of the Palamon and Arcite story changes rhetorical shape as 
it moves from author to author, from one historical context to another, from one 
generation to another (Dialogic 195). Shakespeare and Fletcher speak to a different 
audience and anticipate a different field of responses, and the result is a work similar in 
facts, but quite distinct in meaning.  
 Understanding the divergence requires starting with play’s source and 
interrogating its attitude towards asceticism. In the third part of Chaucer’s Knight’s Tale, 
the virgin devotee of Diana, Emelye, prays to her patron goddess to protect her from 
the amorous pursuits of the knights Palamon and Arcite: 
O chaste goddesse of the wodes grene,  
To whom bothe hevene and erthe and see is sene,  
Queene of the regne of pluto derk and lowe,  
Goddesse of maydens, that myn herte hast knowe  
Ful many a yeer, and woost what I desire,  
As keepe me fro thy vengeaunce and thyn ire,  
That attheon aboughte cruelly.  
Chaste goddesse, wel wostow that I  
Desire to ben a mayden al my lyf,  
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Ne nevere wol I be no love ne wyf.  
I am, thow woost, yet of thy compaignye,  
A mayde, and love huntynge and venerye,  
And for to walken in the wodes wilde,  
And noght to ben a wyf and be with childe. (I.1439-1452) 
This prayer—part of one of the best known episodes in all of Chaucer’s work—is 
destined to go unanswered in part because the will of even so estimable a figure as 
Diana cannot take precedence over the wishes of her male Olympian counterparts. 
From a literary perspective, Emelye’s desire to remain chaste is a sole and rather 
impotent impediment to what Emelye Jensen sees as her one dramatic function: to 
serve as a “means for the two lovers to advance their claims” (321). As such, her 
virginity must also ultimately yield—as surely as Diana herself does—to male will. 
Jensen and other critics have seen Emelye’s prayer, along with her entire function in the 
tale, to be wholly inert and passive, existing merely “to intensify” the conflict between 
the knights rather than “suggest she has any say in the matter” (322).41 Emelye’s impact 
on the plot of the tale is far less active than many of Chaucer’s other female figures, but 
the significance of her prayer at least from a critical perspective is something I wish to 
reevaluate. William F. Woods argues persuasively that Emelye’s prayer and the figure of 
                                                        
41 Jensen’s reading hearkens back in part to older interpretations of Emelye as a more or less static figure. 
Robertson considers Emelye an allegorical symbol of virtue (266), while Muscatine dismisses the 
naturalism of all three characters, promoting a reading of the tale as a highly patterned “poetic pageant”  
(“Form” 69).  
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Diana herself are central to a critical understanding of the tale. Woods sees the prayer 
as a “crucial act of will,” one that decides the play’s outcome (276). Emelye, meanwhile, 
serves a balancing function between the rival lovers analogous to Diana’s role as a 
mediatrix between mankind and nature (277). But Diana is not simply a goddess of 
nature and the hunt, and by focusing exclusively on this aspect of her identity, Woods’s 
argument leaves room for expansion. In the Middle Ages, Diana was also strongly 
identified with female virginity. Emelye makes note of this in her prayer as she ties her 
own celibacy to Diana’s, referring to her twice as chaste and once as the Goddess of 
“maydens,” before professing her own desire to be a “mayden” all her “lyf” and to 
eschew the path of wifedom and motherhood in exchange for a life of vestal service.  In 
a fourteenth century medieval catholic context a life of such celibate devotion is hardly 
unorthodox: rather, an entire segment of women lived, and were generally admired for, 
just such a life in the convents and cloisters throughout the western world. Such 
institutions merely codified what had been a way of life exalted by early church fathers 
since the days of Augustine and Jerome.42 Choosing the habit allowed a woman to 
ascend the ladder of spiritual achievement, leaving the rank necessities of sex and 
childbearing to lesser women of the world. A woman holy enough to reject her natural 
concupiscence could, according to Jerome, rise to the very level of the higher sex: “As 
long as a woman is for birth and children, she is as different from man as body is from 
                                                        
42 See, for example, Augustine’s Of Holy Virginity, which accords a higher status to virginity than marriage 
(72).  
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soul. But when she wishes to serve Christ more than the world, then she will cease to be 
a woman and will be called man" (qtd. in Wiesner-Hanks, Christianity and Sexuality 30).  
 So can we, or should we, infer that a fourteenth century reader would have 
sympathized with Emelye’s wishes? Is Chaucer, in effect, ripping the habit off a nun 
when he delivers Emelye into the hands of Arcite at the tale’s conclusion?  The following 
extenuating circumstances argue against any direct criticism of asceticism. First, Emelye 
does not “serve Christ more than the world,” as Jerome implores women to do. Rather, 
she serves Diana. Writers of the Renaissance might have considered themselves 
possessed of a new historical awareness, as Peter Burke and A.C. Spearing argue, but 
Chaucer creates a clear distinction here between the classical past and his own 
present.43 While the tale is undoubtedly laden with both material and religious 
anachronism, Chaucer never can be said to conflate Emelye’s virginity with Christian 
asceticism. Rather, the language of the prayer deliberately distances Emelye’s brand of 
vestal virginity from catholic monasticism. Emelye does not seek to avoid marriage in 
the name of a life of quiet religious contemplation and conventual enclosure, for her life 
is anything but. She is, rather, a huntress and forest-stalker of Diana, devoted to 
“venerye”—a word which might be confused with one meaning sexual activity (often 
spelled identically in Middle English), but which actually refers to the killing and 
                                                        
43 “Renaissance writers and thinkers,” writes A.C. Spearing in articulating, though not necessarily 
endorsing, this viewpoint, “felt themselves to be bringing back to life cultural achievements that had died 
or slept” (11). 
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butchering of game animals. Interestingly, Chaucer uses the word again in the 
Canterbury Tales when describing the pilgrim Monk in the General Prologue:  
A monk ther was, a fair for the maistrie,  
An outridere, that lovede venerie, (I.165-166) 
Chaucer goes on to describe the Monk’s rather un-monk-like predilection for wild game, 
horses, and greyhounds, while satirizing his disdain for the rules of ascetic conduct that 
should theoretically govern his behavior:  
  What shoulde he studie or make hymselven wood, 
  Upon a book in cloystre alwey to poure,  
  Or swynken with his handes, and loboure,  
  As Austin bit? (184-187) 
The “outryder” monk adopts instead a more progressive and worldly view of his 
religious duties, one that allows for indulgence in “huntyge for the hare” and delectable 
roasted swans (191, 206).  Commentary on the monk’s unascetic nature is not confined 
to the General Prologue.  Just before the Monk delivers his tale, the Host praises him in 
particularly provocative language:  
I pray to God, yeve hym confusioun 
That first thee broghte unto religioun! 
Thou woldest han been a tredefowel aright. 
Haddestow as greet a leeve as thou hast might 
To parfourne al thy lust in engendrure, 
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Thou haddest bigeten ful many a creature… 
Religioun hath take up al the corn 
Of tredyng, and we borel men been shrympes. 
Of fieble trees ther comen wrecched ympes. 
This maketh that oure heires been so sklendre 
And feble that they may nat wel engendre. 
This maketh that oure wyves wole assaye 
Religious folk, for ye mowe bettre paye 
Of Venus paiementz than mowe we.   (VII.1943—61) 
The Host’s recognition of the Monk’s virility and fitness for sexual intercourse and 
reproduction continues the satire of the General Prologue, drawing a connection 
between the Monk’s enthusiasm for extraconventual exploits and his eligibility for other 
transgressions of the ascetic code: essentially, that venerye might go hand in hand with 
venery.  
 If a passion for venerye could be the launching point for the estates satire of 
Monk’s description in the General Prologue, it is worth considering what a similar trait in 
Emelye says about that character’s moral positioning in the sexual commerce of The 
Knight’s Tale. The tale does not treat Emelye as a cloistered ascetic in the medieval 
catholic sense. Nor does it seem likely that she is a satirical figure—meant to poke fun at 
the elasticity of ascetic vows—at least not directly, since Chaucer demonstrates 
repeatedly that he needs no allegorical screen to engage in estates satire.  
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 While her interest in hunting might, like the Monk, point to her sexual eligibility, 
such an easy correlation ignores problems of gender identification. Hunting evinces 
male virility, but stands beyond the typical idolatrous tropes of courtly effictio.  Nor is 
Emelye’s love of hunting connected in any way to the bawdier portrayals of female 
sexuality in medieval fabliaux or its off-shoots.  Rather, Emelye’s love of hunting is one 
aspect of her orthodoxy within the mytho-historical context of the tale itself, an aspect 
of her character that defines her not as religiously deficient (like the Monk) but as 
unquestionably devoted to the behavioral ideals of a follower of Diana. Contra the 
Renaissance belief in the ahistorical medieval writer, Chaucer’s Emelye neither satirizes 
nor is analogous to her closest Christian counterparts precisely because Chaucer’s 
historical consciousness, however incomplete, allows him to purposefully differentiate 
between two kinds of religious devotion. Whatever one might say about dangling 
anachronisms in The Knight’s Tale (such as a mention of Sunday matins) or its more 
systematic affronts to historical realism (medieval knights in mythic Greece), Chaucer, 
more or less, allows his pagans to be pagans.   
However, transplanting this episode in particular, and the matter of The Knight’s 
Tale more generally, into Jacobean drama, as Shakespeare and John Fletcher do in The 
Two Noble Kinsmen, complicates distinctions between past and present, Christian and 
pagan.  Chaucer, writing from the perspective of a medieval catholic, clearly 
differentiates between vestal virginity and conventual celibacy. The former is alien and 
pagan, historical and exotic, easily treated with literary or intellectual detachment and 
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firmly dissociated from Christian analogues. The latter is orthodox and—at least 
officially—commendable, treated with reverence or respect when sincere, but fair game 
for satire or critique when vows are flaunted.  For Shakespeare, meanwhile, and for a 
seventeenth century audience, the catholic conventual asceticism that had been a part 
of fourteenth century orthodoxy was itself viewed with a kind of otherness.  In other 
words, a shift to an early seventeenth century historical context drastically changes the 
social significance of not only ascetic renunciation in general, but the specific figure of 
Diana as a rhetorical or literary symbol. When compared to its Chaucerian ancestor, The 
Two Noble Kinsmen permits and invites a stronger association between the Greco-
Mythic and the newly heterodox catholic.   
 
The Virgin Goddess 
As in Chaucer’s time, the figure of Diana in the late sixteenth and early 
seventeenth century was strongly associated with both virginity and the natural world; 
however, in both the Middle Ages and Renaissance, this benign symbolic life existed 
simultaneously with far more negative associations.  From the early Middle Ages, Diana 
was linked with female fertility cults: an association that goes back at least to the 
conflation of Diana with pre-Hellenic fertility goddesses at the Temple of Artemis in the 
near eastern city of Ephesus (Hunt 347). Known alternately as Lucina, or occasionally by 
her older Greek appellation Artemis, this vision of Diana—one representing female 
sexuality, fertility ritual, childbirth, and redolent of the active paganism challenged by 
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scripture and early church writers—was a reviled one (McMullen 18). The conversion of 
Diana worshippers at Ephesus by John the Apostle depicted in the Book of Acts 
powerfully connected the image of Diana with pagan religious practice in medieval 
Christian thought,44 and Diana also retained into the Middle Ages an association with 
witchcraft and sorcery (Alfoldi 141).  
However, the Diana found in The Knight’s Tale—“Dyane of chastitee”—is much 
closer in character to the Diana of classical myth: a chaste huntress who serves as a 
counterweight, or sometimes as an active opponent, to Venus.  That Chaucer employs 
her in this fashion, freed from any antithetical relationship to Christianity and the 
symbolic weight of her medieval associations, supports Spearing’s contention that The 
Knight’s Tale exhibits a historical sophistication the belies surface critiques about Greeks 
in medieval tourneys (40). Chaucer is interested in recreating, to the best of his ability, 
the sense of a historically distinct and quite alien religion, and in this regard he far 
outpaces Shakespeare and Fletcher, going so far as to describe in detail Emelye’s 
ritualistic sacrifice in Diana’s temple: 
Up roos the sonne, and up roos Emelye, 
And to the temple of Dyane gan hye. 
Hir maydens, that she thider with hir ladde, 
Ful redily with hem the fyr they ladde, 
                                                        
44 See  Acts 19:8-41 
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Th'encens, the clothes, and the remenant al 
That to the sacrifice longen shal. 
The hornes fulle of meeth, as was the gyse, 
Ther lakked noght to doon hir sacrifise, 
Smokynge the temple, ful of clothes faire. 
This Emelye, with herte debonaire, 
Hir body wessh with water of a welle- 
But how she dide hir ryte I dar nat telle, 
But it be any thing in general; 
And yet it were a game to heeren al, 
To hym that meneth wel it were no charge, 
But it is good a man been at his large.- 
Hir brighte heer was kembd, untressed al, 
A coroune of a grene ook cerial 
Upon hir heed was set, ful fair and meete. 
Two fyres on the auter gan she beete, 
And dide hir thynges as men may biholde 
In Stace of Thebes, and thise bookes olde.  
Whan kyndled was the fyr, with pitous cheere 
Unto Dyane she spak as ye may here. (I 2273-96)  
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This level of ritualistic detail is presented without any overt or implied Christian 
denunciation, as often found in more clerical authors like Lydgate, or even medieval 
editors and reworkers of classical texts, such as Pierre Bersuire.45 The only editorial 
comment deals with the narrator’s decision to skip over some perhaps too-scandalous 
female nudity, but even in this brief interjection the narrator remains generous: “to hem 
that meneth well it wer no charge” (2287). Ultimately, Chaucer shows little interest in 
how the Pagan gods or ancient religion stand in relation to Christianity, either as 
barbaric antecedent or as allegorical raw material. As Spearing writes, “his wish was to 
evoke Pagan antiquity as he supposed it to have been, not to reprocess it as material for 
Christian teaching” (43). Emelye’s unapologetic pagan-ness, and the distance Chaucer is 
careful to establish between her own asceticism and that found in catholic orthodoxy, 
makes her placement in marriage against her own wishes an easily palatable conclusion 
for the tale, particularly given its generic link with medieval romance.  Emelye’s chastity 
is a marker not of her holiness, but of her Amazonian harshness, a restraint out of 
balance with the “Athens-like life of order” (McCall 65). Just like Theseus’s marriage to 
Hippolyta, Emelye’s “subjugation” by Palamon or Arcite is crucial to maintaining that 
carefully crafted order and a necessary part of what Muscatine considered the poem’s 
deliberate symmetry (French Tradition 181).   
                                                        
45 Bersuire is the author of the Ovidius Moralizatus, a moralized adaptation of Ovid’s Metamorphoses that 
uses allegory to Christianize the classical work. Similarly, the anonymous Old French Ovide Moralise 
undertook “the assimilation of the Ovidian metamorphosis into Christian salvation history” (Akbari 87).  
Lydgate, in his Fall of Princes and other works, uses a digressive moralizing voice to criticize the worldly 
ambition of his historical subjects. See Scanlon, 322-350.  
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 By the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century, Diana’s symbolic meaning is 
further complicated by an association between the goddess’s cult and Roman 
Catholicism.  For protestant apologists, John’s challenge to the Temple at Ephesus lent 
allegorical scriptural support to the iconoclastic project of the Reformation’s radical 
wing. A version of the story printed by Caxton in 1483 and still popular well into the 
sixteenth century may have appealed especially to the architects of the dissolution: 
Paul’s preaching literally destroys the temple of Diana, “so that the foundament turned 
up so down, and the image of Diana was all-to dashed and destroyed” (Bicks 182).  A 
Biblical episode that had come to stand for the triumph of Christianity over paganism 
could conveniently sustain an entirely new symbolic life: austere protestantism’s 
triumph over ritualistic Popery.  For example, in a 1614 sermon, Exeter College rector 
John Prideaux warned protestants not to backslide into catholicism the way the 
Ephesians in the Book of Acts had rioted for Diana in response to Paul’s teaching of 
doctrinal truth (5). Just as the apostle had challenged the paganism of the Ephesians, 
Prideaux praises King James for his ability and resolution “to withstand Popery” (36).   
Ancient paganism becomes indistinguishable from catholicism, and the reformist zeal of 
John among the Ephesians provides a relevant model for resisting the “abominations of 
Poperie” (37). Later in the century, John Vicars explicitly connected the goddess Diana to 
catholicism by referring to her as the “Romish-catholick’s Sweet-Heart” (Bicks 167). Such 
sentiments speak to the anti-Marianism of Protestantism in England, where rood 
screens bearing the image of the Virgin were often replaced by those bearing the royal 
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arms of the sovereign (Marotti, “Preface” 2). However, they also evince a sensitivity to 
the residual temptation to “worship” a virginal female goddess: a practice so deeply 
ingrained in western Christianity up to (and well beyond) the eve of the Reformation 
that it was difficult to extinguish. F. Elizabeth Hart notes this conflation of Mary and 
Diana in a “complex of Pagan and Christian figures,” though she fails to differentiate the 
somewhat tepid protestant respect for Mary as a vessel of God’s work from the catholic 
veneration that troubled reformists (359).  For Hart, the problematic nature of Diana 
stems from her sexually charged, fertility-goddess alter ego Lucina. However, I would 
argue that the chaste classical Diana of The Knight’s Tale and The Two Noble Kinsmen, 
presents her own set of theological problems as the embodiment of the ascetic female 
life.  
 The Two Noble Kinsmen is not the only Shakespeare play to make use of Diana 
either as a character or as a rhetorical symbol. She does play an important role as a 
character in Pericles, a play set in Ephesus. She is also commonly employed as a stock 
symbol of female chastity, particularly in comedies. Quite particularly, in fact: the name 
Diana in reference to the Roman goddess appears dozens of times in Shakespeare’s 
comedies or romances, but much less frequently in those plays commonly classified as 
tragedies or history plays.46 Why such a stark division? While such a small data set 
leaves “coincidence” as a reasonable answer to this question, I believe the explanation 
                                                        
46 Information about the frequency of the word Diana comes from The Harvard Concordance to 
Shakespeare. Bernard Spevack identifies 57 uses of Diana and its variants, of which only seven occur in 
tragedies or history plays.  
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is to be found in the most basic of generic issues. The action of all Shakespearean 
comedy—even those labeled “problem plays” or Romances—hurtles without exception 
toward a resolution based on marriage(s). While Diana is sometimes employed as a 
general symbol of female purity or beauty (as when Count Orsino compliments the 
disguised Viola on the porcelain quality of her Diana-like lip in Twelfth Night), she is 
most commonly invoked in such plays to hint at the (mostly negative) possibility of a 
female life without marriage entirely. For example, in A Midsummer Night’s Dream (a 
play which springs from similar subject matter as The Two Noble Kinsmen) Theseus 
wields Diana’s name as part of his threat to consign Hermia to a life of celibacy if she 
refuses to marry Demetrius:  
Take time to pause, and by the nest new moon-- 
The sealing-day betwixt my love and me 
For everlasting bond of fellowship-- 
Upon that day either prepare to die 
For disobedience to your father's will, 
Or else to wed Demetrius, as he would, 
Or on Diana's altar to protest 
For aye austerity and single life. (1.1.83-90) 
The implication that life as a virginal votaress to Diana is a fate on par with death is a 
conceit born of a genre that makes the right marriage central to all happiness. Service to 
Diana seems not only a dreadful fate to a young woman in love, it is also an obstacle to 
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the literary goals of comedy, in which the harmonies of marriage symbolize the 
reestablishment of social order from temporary chaos (Leggatt 216). The marriages that 
end comedies also augur continuity and the perpetuation of society through 
procreation: a sharp contrast to the finality of the tragic hero’s death (Hopkins 17). 
Diana is thus a convenient rhetorical token for the comedic playwright, a symbolic 
shorthand for the dead end of frustrated nuptials or willful celibacy. Thus, Portia’s plaint 
that she will “die as chaste as Diana” thanks to the restrictions set in place by her 
father’s will in The Merchant of Venice establishes the stakes of Bassanio’s suit (1.2.106). 
The scheming Iachimo in Cymbeline even makes Marvellesque use of the trope in his 
unsuccessful seduction of Imogen: 
Should he make me 
Live, like Diana's priest, betwixt cold sheets, 
Whiles he is vaulting variable ramps, 
In your despite, upon your purse—revenge it. (1.6.132-135) 
Each of these examples share the attitude that what Diana represents is a life lacking 
something, whether it be sexual fulfillment, marital bliss, or both. Diana is not only 
chaste, she is “cold,” she is austere, she is a symbol of frigidity rather than ennobled 
purity. Even in Pericles, the play in which Diana has her largest and most literal role, in 
which she is affixed with such luminous terms as “argentine,” “silvery,” and “bright,” a 
happy ending necessitates Marina abandoning of the Temple of Ephesus and marrying 
Lysimachus.  
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 One of the most telling mentions of Diana in Shakespeare, at least for the 
purposes of this chapter, is found in As You Like It. The smitten Rosalind’s banter with 
Celia about Orlando’s qualities and faults as a lover leads to a discussion of his kissing:    
Ros.  And his kissing is as full of sanctity as the touch of holy bread. 
Cel.  He hath bought a pair of cast lips of Diana: a nun of winter's 
sisterhood kisses not more religiously; the very ice of chastity is in them. 
(3.4.13-17) 
Rosalind begins with a favorable comparison of Orlando’s kissing to the “sanctity” of the 
Eucharist. That kissing could be as holy as the ritualistic trappings of sacrament sets up 
the irony of Celia’s continuation of the conceit: that Orlando’s “icy” lips are those of 
both the ancient Goddess of chastity and a catholic nun.47 The two symbols are 
juxtaposed as images of cold chastity, as the virtues of Orlando’s sanctity in Rosalind’s 
lines become the familiar and problematic frigidity of Celia’s. More importantly, Celia’s 
remarks demonstrate a clear rhetorical connection in the early modern imagination 
between the goddess Diana and catholic asceticism. The allusions are analogous, each 
representing an unnatural impediment to the socially harmonious resolution of 
marriage.  
                                                        
47 Whether the reference to “holy bread” is catholic or not is a question made difficult by the enormous 
complexity of Reformation Eucharistic theology. The best treatment of this topic is to be found in Lee 
Wandel’s The Eucharist in the Reformation. The appellation “holy bread” would have been controversial 
in some protestant circles, since the bread itself, lacking the real presence, is itself not holy, but only a 
“sign,” as Calvin said, whose adoration is strictly forbidden (Wandel 163).  
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 These examples both from polemical writings and literature demonstrate that 
Diana was often associated with catholicism, either as a figure of cultic superstition or as 
a negative symbol of nun-like ascetic zeal. I will read Emilia’s role in The Two Noble 
Kinsmen in light of this connection, and also consider how the tension between sexual 
renunciation and social order is explored through the play’s other characters and 
dramatic situations.  
 
Female Friendship and the Marian Diana of The Two Noble Kinsmen  
Emilia, similar to the Christian Isabella in Measure for Measure, is a renunciant 
formally sworn to holy orders, and thus evaluations of her asceticism must take into 
account contemporary attitudes toward female monasticism. But, unlike Isabella, 
Emilia’s resistance to sexuality appears at least potentially qualified by a valorization of 
female-female friendship that comes very near to homoerotic desire. This attitude 
toward friendship echoes common early modern valorizations of male-male homosocial 
bonds, including those made by Palamon and Arcite in the same play, but also has roots 
in a literary tradition that predates both Shakespeare and Chaucer. 48  
Of the recent critical work on The Two Noble Kinsmen not focused on authorship, 
a great deal has dealt with the play’s interest in same-sex relations. Alan Sinfield looks at 
the frankness of declarations of same-sex passion in the play and concludes that “either 
                                                        
48 Early Modern ideas of male-male friendship typically follow Cicero’s De Amicitia, but are also highly 
influenced by Montaigne’s “Of Friendship.” See Shannon, Amity 12-30.   
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same-sex practices are so remote from the minds of these people as to be off the map 
of potential human experience, or they are so commonplace as to be unremarkable” 
(73). Laurie Shannon examines the play using a methodology that sees associational 
forms of social engagement as checks on absolutist authority. Shannon explores 
Renaissance friendship in terms of its liberal potential: the associative bond between 
equals in same sex friendship exists as an antithesis to the vertical hierarchies (king and 
subject, husband and wife, lord and household, etc.) that predominate in early modern 
societies.  Such friendships are “utopian,” based upon homosocial sameness, voluntary 
cooperation, and mutual counsel, and offer “a thoroughgoing antidote to hierarchies 
and tyrannies now (seemingly) obsolete; the likeness between friends radically cancels 
vertical difference” (Amity 11). Shannon applies this formulation to a reading of The Two 
Noble Kinsmen that focuses on same sex female friendship; Emilia’s position as a 
votaress of Diana offers her a protected space within which such friendships may exist, 
but, more importantly, the life of vestal virginity recruits women into a community of 
“plural chastity” that “carries political meanings analogous to the autonomy valorized in 
ideal male friendship” (121).  Emilia also admits sexuality into this female version of 
idealized friendship, according to Shannon, revising traditional paradigms of ideal male-
male friendship that stretch back to Cicero’s De Amicitia (96).  
 As Shannon has shown, at the heart of The Two Noble Kinsmen is the sharp 
contrast between the horizontal equality of same-sex friendship and the complex 
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vertical hierarchies of heterosexual eroticism (98).49  The egalitarian nature of the 
homosocial bond is based upon the equality and sameness of those who enter into it 
(Shannon invokes Cicero’s term alter idem—another the same—from De Amicitia); the 
subordination necessitated by marriage is both a consequence of difference and a social 
relationship that reinforces it (40). The analogous relationship between marriage and 
political hierarchies is an early modern commonplace: families were understood to be 
nations in miniature in which husbands were sovereign (Wall 7). Shannon’s argument 
that the play is as fiercely skeptical of marriage as it is of political absolutism is correct, 
but she is, I believe, too quick to dismiss the social orthodoxy of the play’s conclusion. 
She departs from critics such as Philip Edwards, Barry Weller, and Mary Beth Rose who 
see the play as a process of normalizing or expunging distorted attitudes toward love, 
but her own claim that the play projects a “stunningly negative conception of marriage” 
is true only up to the point where the force of genre takes over in the final act (101).  
Like Measure for Measure, The Two Noble Kinsmen ultimately sees sovereign authority 
asserted and renunciants paired off; whether the ending is too rushed and absurd to 
take seriously artistically does not change the fact that it represents the fulfillment of 
generic expectation, which itself is built upon prevailing social mores. For a gloss of the 
play’s attitude toward marriage, I favor over Shannon’s a formulation by Weller: “The 
Two Noble Kinsmen is, at least in part, about the means by which society disciplines and 
                                                        
49 Shannon argues that the play “genders” same-sex association as female to “extraordinary effect, linking 
marriage and tyranny and intensifying the otherwise familiar disapprobation the play registers toward 
absolute power” (Amity, 101).   
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corrects such mutual self-sufficiency by seizing hold of such energies and incorporating 
them, often quite unerotically, for its own uses through the institution of marriage” (97).  
 My argument in this chapter is predicated on the conceit that the play attempts 
to establish social order out of chaos, in part by having marriage triumph over celibacy. 
Like other female characters in Shakespeare who express hostility toward marriage, 
Emilia practices a kind of civil disobedience. To resist marriage is to resist authority, not 
only inasmuch as such decisions in early modern society were the exclusive domain of 
the paterfamilias, but also because the institution of marriage was a bedrock foundation 
of both episcopal protestantism and Jacobean social order. Just as the kinsmen 
themselves must move beyond the confines of their prison cell in their contest over 
connubial happiness, so too must Emilia submit to one of them in order to arrive at a 
socially palatable conclusion.   
Part of Emilia’s antipathy to marriage is her wholly positive attitude toward same 
sex friendship.  Although Shannon locates Emilia’s resistance more strongly in her 
homoerotic impulses than in her ascetic vows, the two cannot be seen as anything but 
inextricably linked. For homoeroticism and ascetic celibacy, concepts that feel 
oppositional on the surface, share a resistant orientation toward socially normative 
ideas of sex and sexuality (Burrs 147). Following David Halperin’s definition of queerness 
as “whatever is at odds with the normal, the legitimate, the dominant...not a positivity 
but a positionality vis a vis the normative” (65), asceticism is a category of queerness, 
particularly in Jacobean England, and even more particularly within the imaginative 
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bounds of a Renaissance marriage plot. Emilia’s sense of attachment to other women 
complements the dramatic function of her ascetic determination: it is a literary obstacle 
to generic fulfillment and a social obstacle to normative expectation. Her inclinations 
are most evident in her passionate nostalgia for Flavina, a friend of her early 
adolescence:  
                                               but I 
And she (I sigh and spoke of) were things innocent,  
Lov’d for we did, and like the elements, 
That know not what nor why, yet do effect 
Rare issues by their operance, our souls 
Did so to one another. What she lik’d 
Was then of me approv’d; what not, condemn’d,  
No more arraignment. The flow’r that I would pluck 
And put between my breasts (O then but beginning 
To swell about the blossom) she would long 
Till she had such another, and commit it 
To the like innocent cradle, where phoenix-like 
They died in perfume. On my head no toy 
But was her pattern, her affections (pretty, 
Though happily her careless wear) I followed 
For my most serious decking. Had mine ear 
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Stol'n some new air, or at adventure humm’d one, 
From musical coinage, why, it was a note 
Whereon her spirits would sojourn (rather dwell on) 
And sing it in her slumbers. This rehearsal  
(Which, ev’ry innocence wots well, comes in 
Like old importment's bastard)  has this end,   
That the true love 'tween maid and maid may be 
More than in sex dividual. (1.3.59-82) 
Emilia’s words are resonant, even sensual, but whether they rise to the level of sexual is 
open to question.  The speech’s erotic potential is mainly confined to one suggestive 
image: the placing of like flowers between their breasts, there to remain in such an 
“innocent cradle” until they die “in perfume.”   But even such an image, with its 
emphasis on newly budding breasts, can be read non-erotically. Sinfield notes that the 
relationship seems to lack “the tensions that evidently characterize heterosexual 
union,” but he does not go beyond praising the “intimation” of a same-sex (not 
homosexual) relationship (Sinfield 70).  Weller, too, stops at calling the speech a praise 
of “single-sex friendship,” and actually focuses on Emilia’s insistence on the friendship’s 
“innocence” as a non-hierarchical and non-sexual alternative to marriage (99, 107). 
Shannon calls the lines “rapturous,” but only “delicately erotic,” and even that might 
overstate the case (“Argument” 671). Walter Cohen also finds it difficult to see the 
relationship as anything more than the innocent bonding of friends, whose “same-sex 
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innocence” stands in opposition to heterosexual “experience” and “the absolute 
monarch’s commitment to enforced marriage” (433). Biological reality may lend 
credence to such claims of innocence: Flavina was already dead by the age of 11, before 
reaching sexual maturity.  
Any faint hints of pre-adolescent eroticism are easily overwhelmed in Emilia’s 
speech by its direct concerns with innocence and the interconnectedness of souls, 
rather than bodies. “What she lik’d/was then of me approv’d,” says Emilia (63-64), and 
in such an exchange we see an alignment of tastes and perspective similar to the 
conventual ideal, where members of same-sex communities adhere to identical rules 
and life patterns. In fact, the rituals of Emilia’s and Flavina’s friendship seem designed, 
as Shannon says, to bring about sameness, or to achieve an indistinguishable doubling.  
Same-sex friendship is “more” than “sex dividual” for Emilia because, again echoing 
Shannon, it is based on “choice” and “conviction” rather than subjugation or hierarchy 
(“Argument” 672).  
But ultimately, whether the speech is erotic or not is not nearly as important as 
the fact that its attitude is extra-normative. The rarified space occupied by ideal male-
male friendship—such as that seen between Theseus and Pirithous—excludes its female 
counterpart. Emilia’s resistance to marriage, her determination not “to love any that’s 
called man”(86), is derided by Hippolyta, who finds her impulses childlike and immature. 
But the play is not nearly so dismissive, putting on full display the violent passions and 
cruel subjections that go hand-in-hand with sexual asymmetry and social hierarchy. 
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When compared to the ridiculous jealousies of Palamon and Arcite, the anxieties of 
Emilia in the face of coercive marriage, or the psychological destruction of the sexually 
enraptured Jailer’s daughter, the harmony of this innocent prepubescent friendship 
implicitly calls into question the primacy of heteronormative and connubial standards.  
 But this questioning never amounts to a rejection, for despite its suggestively 
combative and stressful progress, the play ultimately does normalize its sexual relations. 
Emilia’s queerness—in the broadest sense of the term—is whitewashed in her 
increasingly amorous responses to thoughts of each cousin in 5.3 (41-54); the 
Palamon/Arcite equation that had been imbalanced by the inclusion of Emilia is 
balanced out, though only through Arcite’s death and the compulsions of Theseus. 
Emilia’s final, desperate prayer to Diana, though moving, is rejected. It is framed as a 
prayer for intervention and protection:  
  O sacred, shadowy, cold, and constant queen,  
  Abandoner of revels, mute, contemplative, 
  Sweet, solitary, white as chaste, and pure 
  As wind-fanned snow, who to thy female knights 
  Allow’st no more blood than will make a blush,  
  Which is their order’s robe: I here, thy priest, 
  Am humbled fore thine altar. O, vouchsafe 
  With that thy rare green eye, which never yet 
  Beheld thing maculate, look on thy virgin;  
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  And, sacred silver mistress, lend thine ear 
  (which never heard scurrile term, into whose port 
  Ne’er en’red wanton sound) to my petition, 
  Season’d with holy fear.  (5.1, 137-149) 
The invocative epithets—sacred, shadowy, cold, constant, mute contemplative—stress 
the ascetic aspects of Diana’s divine nature in a caricature of similar Marian prayers of 
the Middle Ages.50 Diana is as pure as “wind fann’d snow,” and Mary had been 
venerated under the title of “Our Lady of the Snows” since at least the fourteenth 
century (Bartlett 78). That Diana shuns all things “maculate” is even more dramatically 
evocative, triggering instantly thoughts of the word’s common negation, immaculate, 
and its association with Mary.51 For literary analogues, we might go back to the second 
nun’s prayer to “wemmelees” (spotless) Mary that introduces her tale of St. Cecilia in 
The Canterbury Tales (VII.47).  Emilia’s prayer to a sacred, chaste, and holy lady—a 
queen, a glorious virgin—for intercession and protection would almost certainly have 
sounded “catholic” to Shakespeare’s audience, particularly as anti-Marian complaint 
was such an important part of Reformation apologetics and polemic. Compare Emilia’s 
prayer, for instance, to the Salve Regina:  
                                                        
50 The Marian “Obscero Te” builds an anaphora upon the word virgin--“Virgoante partum, Virgo in partu, 
et Virgo post partum,”—as a means of highlighting Mary’s sexual purity, such that even a parishioner with 
poor Latin could grasp the most important theme of the hymn (Philips 80).  The belief in the perpetual 
virginity of Mary, rather than merely the virgin birth of Jesus, was an accepted part of catholic doctrine, 
though an open question in Calvinist and Lutheran theology (Waller 116).  
51 The Immaculate Conception, the belief that Mary herself was born sinless, while a part of traditional 
catholic orthodoxy even before its adoption as official doctrine, was controversial in protestantism. Luther 
professed a belief in it, but later theologians were more equivocal. See Kreitzer, 135-136.  
  
113 
  Salve, Regina, Mater misericordiae,  
vita, dulcedo, et spes nostra, salve.  
ad te clamamus   
exsules filii Hevae,  
ad te suspiramus, gementes et flentes  
in hac lacrimarum valle.  
(Hail, holy Queen, Mother of Mercy, our life, our sweetness and our 
hope, hail. To you we cry, poor banished children of Eve; to you we send 
up our sighs, mourning and weeping in this valley of tears. Turn then, 
most gracious advocate, your eyes of mercy toward us.) (Collins 220, 
translation mine) 
The sense of the Virgin Mary as an advocate for her aggrieved subjects matches the 
sentiment of Emilia’s prayer, and it would be difficult for a member of Shakespeare’s 
audience to see a member of a female religious order praying at the altar of a divine 
lady and not think of a catholic nun before a statue of Mary. Diana of Greek Myth 
momentarily dissolves into the Virgin Queen who epitomized catholic heterodoxy. 
However, the scene is neither polemically critical nor heretically resistant; tonally, it is 
resigned to reality. The scene fits a pattern identified by Richard Wilson in The Winter’s 
Tale, Pericles, and All’s Well That Ends Well of women attending to other powerful 
women in protected female spaces “unseen by patriarchal power” that function as 
pilgrimage sites of divine revelation (248-249). However, while Wilson sees this 
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evocation of female pilgrimage to be evidence of catholic and Marian attachment in 
Shakespeare himself, Gary Waller proposes a more nuanced reading of such traces:  
They enact less a traditional religion, let alone a defiant return to it, and 
more a transformation of some aspects of it which Shakespeare finds 
tantalizing as explorations of the human condition and its utopian 
possibilities, especially as embodied in women and women’s experience, 
but all too rarely able to be realized. (166) 
Waller is not writing specifically of The Two Noble Kinsmen, but his description of 
suggestive but frustrated utopian potential fits the tenor both of Emilia’s prayer to 
Diana and the play as a whole. Emilia’s ascetic excess and misplaced obedience prepare 
the audience for her appropriation into marital relations by bringing her zeal to 
extremes that cannot be tolerated by either generic or social expectations. Her hope to 
be allowed to “continue in [Diana’s] band” represents a permanent extension of her 
problematic social nature, which must, in the play’s conclusion, be smoothed out and 
normalized if the happy part of the tragi-comic ending is to be achieved.  The process of 
normalization that is made final when the dying Arcite presents Emilia’s hand to 
Palamon begins at the conclusion of this faux-Marian hymn, where the rose that might 
have symbolized Diana’s intercession withers and falls the ground:  
  The flow’r is fall’n, the tree descends. O mistress 
  Thou here dischargest me; I shall be gather’d. (5.1.169-170) 
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To be discharged and “gathered” here means not only to be expelled from her holy 
orders, but to be appropriated as a token into the economy of sexual and connubial 
exchange: to be stripped of her status as an both an unattainable object of courtly love 
and a sympathetic sexual rebel, and to be bound by the force of political hierarchy to a 
second sovereign in marriage. While such a turn matches the dictates of reality, the 
gloomy tone of the play’s ending suggests that the associate form of celibate female 
friendship retains its utopian potential.   
  
Prisoners, Monks, and Knights: Rejecting Ascetic Withdrawal 
While Emilia is the most explicitly ascetic figure in The Two Noble Kinsmen, the 
play’s language of renunciation is not limited to her. The titular kinsmen, Palamon and 
Arcite, employ the rhetoric of renunciation from the moment of their introduction on 
stage. As Arcite enters in 1.2, he bemoans the depravity of the city: 
  Dear Palamon, dearer in love than blood,  
  And our prime cousin, yet unhard’ned in  
  The crimes of nature—let us leave the city 
  Thebes, and the temptings in’t, before we further 
  Sully our gloss of youth:  
  And here to keep in abstinence we shame  
  As in incontinence; for not to swim  
  I’th’aid o’th’current were almost to sink, 
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  At least to frustrate striving.  (1.1.1-9)  
This is strangely monkish language for the introduction of two chivalric knights. While 
knights were expected to follow a strict code of behavior, rigorous adherence to sexual 
abstinence is not a major part of the tradition of the knight as a literary character.52 
Chaucer never puts language like this into Arcite’s mouth, nor is there really any sense in 
the Knight’s Tale of the cousins’ unhappiness with the social and moral environment of 
Thebes. But in the play this opening speech establishes a conflict central to the work as 
a whole: the stress that political environment can place on personal conviction. The 
moral degeneracy that the cousins lament ultimately has a political source: the “most 
unbounded tyrant Creon,” as Palamon calls him, whose rule makes “villainy assured” 
and who fails to understand the worth of any act that does not directly benefit him (64-
69). This friction between subject and ruler will reoccur later in the prison scene, and in 
Emilia’s dilemma as a vestal virgin ordered to marry. Arcite’s desire to renounce his 
Theban citizenship is thus born out of an irreconcilable clash between political 
absolutism and the moral prerogatives of the individual. The fealty demanded of any 
subject, but most particularly of a knight, becomes an impediment to rather than an 
inextricable part of moral continence, as Arcite makes clear:    
   Clear spirited cousin,  
  Let’s leave his court, that we may nothing share 
                                                        
52 More typical is the idea of the knight as a courtly wooer, even one willing to transgress social codes or 
marital impediments, such as Lancelot.  
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  of his loud infamy; for our milk  
  Will relish of the pasture, and we must  
  Be vile, or disobedient—not his kinsmen 
  In blood unless quality. (1.2.74-79) 
I began my discussion of Measure for Measure by noting that it starts with an act of 
renunciation, though a feigned one. Here, the renunciant language is sincere: for 
Palamon and Arcite, renouncing their Theban citizenship, their Theban aristocracy, and 
even their blood ties to Creon becomes a potential means of not just avoiding carnality 
and dishonor but of regaining personal liberty, or their right to be, in Palamon’s 
language, “masters” of their own “manners” (44).   
 Early modern England was quite familiar with potential conflicts between 
personal morality and civic duty, having endured nearly a century of religious unrest in 
which negotiating the two could be perilous.53 The kinsmen’s dilemma is not wholly 
different from the dilemma faced by many during and after the Reformation who found 
their religious beliefs an impediment to their political loyalty; and, in fact, many religious 
dissidents in the sixteenth century fled the country rather than augment or suppress 
                                                        
53 Francis Bacon’s famous quote that Queen Elizabeth "not liking to make windows into men's hearts and 
secret thoughts, except the abundance of them did overflow into overt express acts and affirmations, 
tempered her law so as it restraineth only manifest disobedience," indicates Elizabeth’s own sensitivity to 
potential conflicts between personal conviction and obedience (Solt 108). While the quote is generally 
taken as an example of the queen’s relative liberality on the question of religious freedom, it also 
reinforces a certain intolerance for outward manifestations of heterodoxy.   
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their beliefs.54  Ultimately, Palamon and Arcite do not renounce Thebes, because the 
imminent conflict with Athens compels them to take up arms in her defense. The 
cousins draw a distinction between loyalty to king and loyalty to country, by necessity 
leaving “unreason’d” the fact that they fight for the side that is morally in the wrong 
(98). The abortive nature of their renunciation evinces a powerful tie to country that 
transcends the quality of its king, but the halfhearted words that usher them off the 
stage—they will fight with “hands advanced before…hearts,” i.e., physically but not 
emotionally invested in the combat—testify to the authenticity of their earlier 
renunciant impulses (112).  
 Separation from Thebes becomes a matter of necessity rather than choice when 
a triumphant Theseus, struck by Palamon and Arcite’s heroism on the battlefield, 
decides to spare the lives of the kinsmen and imprison them in Athens. The play’s prison 
scene (2.2), perhaps more than any other, draws a connection between ascetic 
renunciation and the harmony of associative friendship. In prison, the initially 
despondent Palamon and Arcite lament the end of their chivalric adventuring, but soon 
the prison becomes something similar to a monastery, a holy sanctuary in which the two 
can live out a fantasy of equal friendship and community free from the corrupting 
pressures of tyranny.  
                                                        
54 A notable artifact of English expatriation is the English college at Douai in what is now northern France, 
which became a seminary for English catholics who fled the country after the accession of Elizabeth. See 
Chadwick, 571-585 
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Nine lines into the prison scene, Palamon, noted by one critic as the more 
martial, less intellectually curious of the two kinsmen, embarks on a highly stylized and 
traditional ubi sunt lamentation (Herman 1-2):  
Where is Thebes now?  Where is our noble country?  
Where are our friends and kindreds? Never more 
Must we behold these comforts, never see 
The hardy youths strive for the games of honour,  
Hung with the painted favours of their ladies,  
Like tall ships under sail.55  (2.2.7-12) 
This is not the only instance of ubi sunt poetry in the Shakespeare canon: there are 
notable echoes of it in both Richard III (4.4.93-97) and Richard II (3.2.122-125), and the 
graveyard scene in Hamlet, most famously, is built around the medieval formula (Morris 
1035-1040). However, Palamon’s lament is perhaps the most traditional example, as it 
employs not only the verbal pattern of the ubi sunt but also its traditional subject 
matter: the loss of worldly pleasures. In the typical ubi sunt, a speaker will present an 
anaphoric list asking rhetorically after the whereabouts of pleasurable activities or 
objects of wealth and beauty, followed by the stark assertion that such things are lost, 
never to be regained. A representative example in English that either Shakespeare or 
                                                        
55 Eugene Waith points out the artistic inconsistency of Palamon’s lament: it neither matches the 
kinsmen’s earlier sentiments about the moral degeneracy of Thebes, nor the stoic patience of the scene’s 
opening lines (Two Noble Kinsmen, 1998 2.2.6-55n.)  
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Fletcher might have been familiar with is found in the last book of Chaucer’s Troilus and 
Criseyde when the hero grieves the departure of his beloved in an amalgamation of two 
medieval formulas, the ubi sunt and the effictio:  
  Where is myn owene lady, liefe and deere?  
  Wher is hire white brest? Wher is it, where? 
  Wher ben hire armes and hire eyen cleere 
  That yesternyght this tyme with me were?  
  Now may I wepe alone many a teere,   
  And graspe aboute I may, but in this place, 
  Save a pilowe, I fynde naught t’embrace.  (V.218-224)  
Although typically associated with secular poetry, the ubi sunt formula can also function 
religiously. In its focus on material transience, it is related to the memento mori 
tradition, which stresses the need to be mindful of the judgment at life’s inescapable 
end. Even in secular works such as Troilus and Criseyde, the formula evokes the 
generally ascetic commonplaces central to medieval religious life, or what Eamon Duffy 
calls the ascetic ethos at the heart of medieval catholicism (305).  
The ubi sunt formula does have life beyond Christian eschatological poetry, but 
the use of the topos at this particular moment in The Two Noble Kinsmen—immediately 
preceding what I would describe as the two knights’ monastic epiphany—calls attention 
to its theological associations. Palamon’s lament focuses in particular on chivalric 
exploits, both in tournaments and in battle: the former occasion for winning “praise” 
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and “garlands,” the latter for routing “whole armies” with swords of “lightning.” 
Similarly, in traditional medieval ubi sunt material, the manly activities of court life—
hunting, tilting, riding—are a favorite example of transient physical glories.56 Also 
common to the ubi sunt, as in the Chaucerian example quoted above, is the withering of 
female beauty or the loss of romantic love. This thread of the tradition is taken up by 
Arcite (in a clear example of the character differentiation noted by Herman and other 
critics) in his response: 
    Here age must find us,  
  And which is heaviest, Palamon, unmarried.  
  The sweet embraces of a loving wife,  
  Loaden with kisses, arm’d with thousand cupids,  
  Shall never clasp our necks; no issue know us; 
  No figures of ourselves shall we ev’r see 
  To glad our age 
  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
The fair-ey’d maids shall weep our banishments, 
  And in their songs curse ever-blinded Fortune 
  Till she for shame see what a wrong she has done 
                                                        
56 Rooney gives as an example the Middle English lyric “Ubi Sunt Qui Ante Nos Fuerunt”: “Uuere beþ þey 
biforen vs weren/Houndes ladden and hauekes beren,/ 
And hadden feld and wode?”(305) 
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  To youth and nature. This is all our world.  (2.2.28-34, 37-40)  
Arcite’s focus on the loss of any possibility of marriage –and with it sexual fulfillment 
and procreation—perpetuates the faint hints of religious solemnity in the scene. In this 
instance, ironically, the forced celibacy of imprisonment is bemoaned by a character 
who had championed his own “continence” in the play’s opening act.  Having 
complained about the difficulty of keeping “in abstinence” while surrounded by the 
“temptings” of the Theban court, Arcite now finds himself forcibly separated from any 
such temptation.  Perhaps, then, it is no surprise that once the pathos of lamentation is 
exhausted, it is Arcite who first proclaims their new prison’s monastic potential: 
     Yet, cousin, 
  Even from the bottom of these miseries, 
  From all that fortune can inflict upon us,  
  I see two comforts rising, two mere blessings,  
  If the gods please—to hold to a brave patience,  
  And the enjoying of our griefs together.  
  Whilst Palamon is with me, let me perish  
  If I think this our prison. (2.2.55-62) 
One could see the reference to the inflictions of fortune here as an echo of the Boethian 
ascetic tradition if fortune herself did not appear so commonly in Renaissance drama; 
but Arcite’s belief that prison offers the opportunity “to hold a brave patience” does 
sound an explicitly ascetic note. Patience, particularly patience in the face of 
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persecution or poverty, is a cardinal example of negative ascetic mortification, 
contained not only in monastic vows, but hagiography. In equating the exercise of 
patience with bravery, Arcite adapts his well-established chivalric courage to the 
religious fortitude of an ascetic martyr.57  
The other succor is the presence of Palamon, and the opportunity that 
imprisonment affords the two kinsmen for “enjoying” “griefs together.” The  paradox of 
the central conceit—that griefs can be enjoyed rather than merely endured—evokes not 
mere stoic resilience, but the classic ascetic reversal of sought after pain. These shared 
griefs, in Arcite’s figuring, represent a spiritually ennobling gift: “blessings” rather than a 
curse.  
 Arcite’s rhetorical reversal reestablishes his sense of personal agency; he asserts 
that imprisonment is not a matter of the body, but of the mind, and therefore beyond 
the prerogative of Theseus, who can only exercise power over the former. This resistant 
formula also found practical expression in late Elizabethan and Jacobean society, a time 
when prisons contained many catholic clergy whose religious activities marked them as 
threats to the state. Records indicate that, during Elizabeth’s reign, at least 130 priests 
were incarcerated between Marshalsea, the Clink, and Newgate at any one time, a 
situation which was only partially ameliorated during the reign of James I (Lake and 
Questier, Antichrist's 195). Peter Lake quotes Richard Broughton, who in a 1619 letter 
                                                        
57 Such “brave patience” also evokes the neostoicism that returned to fashion in the seventeenth  
century. See below for a discussion of the neostoical resonance of dispassion in Henry V.  
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wrote that because of refusals to take the Jacobean oath of allegiance necessitated by 
the Hampton Court conference, “threescore and more there are in prison at York, 
eighteen priests in the Clink besides Wisbech, Gatehouse, Newgate, Durham, 
Winchester and almost no jail of any shire where there are not some cath[olic] 
prisoners” (Antichrist’s 199). 
But, as Lake goes on to show, prison represented opportunity as much as 
oppression for some catholic resistors. Leaving aside the grislier fates that potentially 
awaited captured recusants, an examination of the use that catholics made of their 
prison sentences may help demonstrate the political utility of certain types of ascetic 
acts and gestures beyond the discursive.58 The superficial similarities between prison 
and monastery—institutions of enclosure, restraint, and order—in fact granted 
incarcerated catholics an opportunity to practice a radically politicized form of their 
religion: politicized not only because its exercise was a designed act of resistance to 
state punishment, but because it provided a visual supplement to the written polemic of 
the period.  
While Christopher Haigh has questioned the literal veracity of some catholic 
accounts of persecution—and certainly catholics had a polemical motivation for 
exaggerating the torments they endured--the horrid squalor suffered by the early 
                                                        
58 Executions, while not a daily occurrence, were nonetheless a potential reality. Edmund Campion, on a 
clandestine Jesuit mission with Robert Persons, was captured, imprisoned, and gorily executed for treason 
in 1581. Estimates place the total number of those executed for reasons stemming from religious dissent 
in the last three decades of the sixteenth century alone at 183 (McCoog 900).   
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modern prisoner is difficult to deny (“Monopoly” 147).59  However, prisoners who took 
the time to write accounts or essays about prison life did so for a political and rhetorical 
purpose, and catholics eager to frame their imprisonment in martyrological terms could 
draw connections between the physical agonies of prison and the exculpatory 
punishments of catholic eschatology and ascetic self-mortification. For example, one 
anonymous prisoner (G.M.) wrote of the penitential quality of the King’s Bench prison in 
the Essayes and Characters of a Prisons and Prisoners: 
It is a Purgatory which afflict a man with more miseries then euer he 
reaped pleasures. It is a Pilgrimage to extenuate sinnes, and absolue 
offenses: for here be seminaries and Masse-Priests, which doe take down 
the pride of their flesh more, then a voyage to the Holy Land or a hayre 
shirt in Lent. (3) 
Here the torments of the prison are compared both to the sin-cleansing fires of 
Purgatory and to one of its mundane ascetic approximations, the hair shirt; both 
metaphors link imprisonment with catholic forms of religious practice and belief, 
particularly the doctrine of works. An explicitly catholic afterlife and catholic asceticism 
are mined for the purposes of metaphor.  
 If, then, the self-imposed suffering of mortification, the self-chosen poverty and 
claustration of monasticism, and the penitential torments of Purgatory are all elements 
                                                        
59 For details on prison life for catholic recusants, see McGrath and Rowe.   
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of catholic orthodoxy that can be imaginatively linked with prison life, catholic prisoners 
had an opportunity to exploit prison’s potential as, ironically, a tool in their polemical 
and political struggle with the Elizabethan/Jacobean state.  And this is precisely what 
occurred at the Wisbech Castle prison, where imprisoned catholic clergymen, under the 
direction of Jesuit William Weston, regulated their daily lives with a quasi-monastic 
order (McGrath and Rowe 423). So too did the catholic inmates of Beaumaris Castle 
monasticize their imprisonment under the direction of William Davies after 1592, as 
Lake and Questier, who assembled many of these accounts, describe: 
Davies himself and four other priests were able to establish a spiritual 
regime within the prison of an almost monastic severity…. Davies 
instituted a thorough and intense liturgical round, focused on confession 
to him twice a week and the mass. The community in the prison fasted 
and practiced various mortifications. (Antichrist’s 200) 
The transformation of the prison community into a monastic one, and the appropriation 
of prison torments into a self-imposed regime of mortification and fasting, was an act of 
symbolic resistance, turning a state imposed punishment into an extension of the very 
religious practice that occasioned the punishment in the first place. In The Life of Father 
Bennett, Englishman, Jacque Brousse writes of the particular grace of those who cloister 
themselves in monasteries, forsaking the world, as some saints did. Brousse writes that 
for Father Bennett of Cafield, a Capuchin friar sentenced to the Tower and then Wisbech 
by Elizabeth’s council, prison itself became such a “[c]loistre for the austeritie of his 
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profession” (115).  In prison, Father Bennett proudly wore his habit and set about 
“preaching all the austerities of his rule, as fastings, discipline, and other mortifications” 
(108). Through such actions, Bennett was able not only to comfort fellow Catholic 
prisoners, but even to convert some “heretiques” who had the opportunity to witness 
his imaginative transformation of prison into monastery (115). In an ironic turn of 
events, prison had become in some instances the safest places in England to practice 
not simply catholicism, but the most outwardly visible type of radical catholicism. 
Decades after the dissolution of the monasteries, it was the Tudor prison that gave birth 
to a momentary and highly political new version of the ascetic community that was built 
upon precepts of resistance to the same Supremacy that had brought down the old 
religious houses a generation before.  
  Such accounts ironically figure the prison as a site of particular grace, of an 
exalted moral continence. Such a formula is similarly advanced by Arcite in The Two 
Noble Kinsmen:  
  Let’s think this prison holy sanctuary  
  To keep us from corruption of worse men.  
  We are young and yet desire the ways of honor,  
  That liberty and common conversation,  
  The poison of pure spirits, might, like women,  
  Woo us to wander from. (2.2.71-76) 
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Arcite’s “holy sanctuary” had but a few lines earlier occasioned the ubi sunt 
lamentations that opened the prison scene. Now, Arcite has connected the forced 
restraint of imprisonment with the morally ideal kingdom he had longed for in the play’s 
first act. Free of the temptations of women, liberty, and common conversation, the 
kinsmen are protected from the “corruption” of the world and its worse men. This 
imaginative rebranding of their prison as a kind of utopian monastic retreat where they 
can practice ideals of brotherhood and moral continence performs the same 
cancellation of tyrannical oppression that we see in the historical examples above. All of 
the griefs and miseries of prison can be enjoyed as occasions for stoic fortitude and 
moral purification, in this instance a kind of partially secularized version of the ascetic 
ideal.  
 Along with the moral safety of their imagined cloister, the kinsmen have the 
comfort of their own friendship. This, too, is not unconnected from the monastic ideal, 
which, unlike the eremitic asceticism of the early church, is founded upon a belief in the 
moral and spiritual edification enabled by the support of a likeminded homosocial 
community.60 For whatever else they were, monastic orders were always 
“brotherhoods” that extolled the virtues of communal (and sexually homogenous) 
                                                        
60 Martha Newman offers a useful historical example of this cooperative spirit in her account of the 
evolution of the Cistercian order. According to Newman, “A monk learned humility and obedience not 
only through his response to the abbot’s care and authority but also through his interactions with his 
brothers. Such community interactions could be coercive, as when the monks assembled in daily chapter 
to accuse one another of faults, but more often Cistercians portrayed the community as a positive force 
that provided each monk with examples and support: the desire to be admired and loved by one’s 
brothers, they suggested, should serve as an impetus for each monk’s spiritual development” (94).  
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interdependence in opposition to the intrusive influence of female sexuality and other 
worldly complications.  As a substitute for actual marriage and procreation, monasteries 
promoted a type of “sexless, spiritual (same-sex) generation” built on religious and 
intellectual exchange amongst monastic members (D. Clark 154). According to Brousse, 
the potential comfort (and perhaps, to the state, danger) to be found in cooperative 
monastic experience extended to imprisonment as well. After their arrest, Brousse 
relates, Father Bennettt and his traveling companion John Christostome, a Scottish 
priest, were questioned by Walsingham about the nature of their relationship: 
Among other things which the Secretarie [of State] asked him was this 
one, why they came two together, & one in the companie of the other? 
To whom this good Father answered, that this was more comfortable to 
the life of Our Blessed Sauiour and his Apostles to putt in practice his 
commandements to his Disciples, whom he sent binos & binos, two by 
two to preache the Ghospell. That this was likewise the practice of the 
primitiue Church, and the particular institution of their order, to the ende 
that they might comforte one another in the waie, and that one might 
partake of the necessities of the other. (106) 
Brousse contends that this speech and subsequent sermonizing moved even 
Walsingham, “one of the greatest enemies of the Catholique Religioun” (108). However, 
in the end the council acted prudently (and to Brousse, callously) by imprisoning the two 
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men separately, “that so they might bee depriued of theyre mutuall consolation, and 
rather to show their hate to the constitutions of theyr religion” (109).  
 Palamon and Arcite are not so unfortunate in The Two Noble Kinsmen in that 
they have available to them this “mutuall consolation.” The friendship of the kinsmen, 
at least as it is described in the prison scene, shares with monasticism a sense of both 
moral support and generative homosocial exchange. From Arcite, the procreative (and 
resistant) language is explicit:  
    And here being thus together,  
  We are an endless mine to one another;  
  We are one another’s wife, ever begetting 
  New births of love; we are father, friends, acquaintance;  
  We are, in one another, families:  
  I am your heir, and you are mine; this place 
  Is our inheritance; no hard oppressor 
  Dare take this from us. (2.2.80-85) 
Here we see, consciously or not, the monastic ideal spelled out: men in cloister being a 
“mine” of spiritual, moral, and intellectual riches to each other.  In Arcite’s fantasy, as in 
the monastery, same-sex companionship fulfills all of the social roles normally fulfilled 
by marriage and fatherhood, and it does so without the danger that naturally comes 
from triangulating such friendship with the demands of heterosexual, political, familial, 
or financial responsibility: 
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    Were we at liberty 
  A wife might part us lawfully, or business,  
  Quarrels consume us; envy of ill men 
  Crave our acquaintance. (87-91) 
Liberty, here, is the presumed danger: liberty and its concentric circles of difference and 
distinction, its inequalities of rank (tyrant), gender (wife), and morality (ill men) that 
strain the resolution of egalitarian companionship. Palamon accepts Arcite’s formulation 
enthusiastically: “You have made me/(I thank you, cousin Arcite) almost wanton with 
my captivity” (95-97).  The word “wanton” here is suggestive, not because it necessarily 
implies sexual ardor, but because it signifies how the passions of male friendship can 
approach the former in intensity.   
 Most crucially, the play posits that such friendship can only exist as an exclusive 
alternative to erotic heterosexual exchange—or marriage—and not as a complement to 
it. This, too, is fundamental to the monastic ideal. Sexual difference undermines and 
ultimately eradicates the spiritually and intellectually generative potential of the 
homosocial cloister. The desire for sexual fulfillment can even have the effect of turning 
voluntary renunciation into imprisonment, for it admits into the sphere of potential 
experience an act which a monastic order specifically proscribes; when the rigors of 
ascetic renunciation are resented for what the renunciant lacks, the monastic ideal is 
destroyed.  
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This is precisely what happens to Palamon and Arcite when Emilia enters their 
field of vision. Following Palamon’s initial stunned silence, the reactions of the kinsmen 
to an object of heterosexual desire explicitly reaffirm the state of incarceration that 
their earlier monastic idealization had attempted to cancel. Palamon, the initial viewer, 
intones: “Never till now I was in prison” (132), while Arcite, who had boasted of the 
moral liberty they might enjoy as prisoners, feels again his “shackles” (156). Their 
reactions owe something to the courtly love tradition (through Chaucer), where men are 
often figured as slaves, prisoners, or subjects to an all-powerful and despotic female 
love object.61 The process of the scene also permits a moral reading, where Emilia, a 
second Eve, admits discord and violence into a world that was momentarily marked by 
the harmony of equality. As Eve, in the antifeminist tradition, is the vessel of original sin, 
so too does the sight of Emilia rekindle in the prisoners the burdens of social and sexual 
entanglement.  The sudden reversal of the kinsmen’s renunciation results in the violent 
discord between them that drives the action of the play. 
But not all friendships are equal in this play. While Emilia’s passion for Flavina is 
treated as an unrealistic conceit of adolescence, better replaced by marriage, Palamon’s 
loss of Arcite in Act 5 is couched in the language of tragedy, a loss not worth what is 
gained:  
                                                        
61 This kind of language, associating love with imprisonment and chains, can be found as far back as 
Andreas Capellanus’s Art of Courtly Love (ca. 1184), which contains the following satirical etymology: 
“Love (amor) is derived from the word hook (amar), which signifies ‘capture’ or ‘be captured.’ For he who 
loves is caught in the chains of desire and wishes to catch another with his hook” (Capellanus 32). Older 
analogues can be found in Ovid (See Amores, 1.3).  
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  O miserable end of our alliance! 
The gods are mighty, Arcite. If thy heart,  
Thy worthy, manly heart, be yet unbroken,  
Give me thy last words; I am Palamon, 
One that yet loves thee dying. (5.4.86-90) 
The “miserable end” of one associative pair (an “alliance”) augurs the sealing of another 
pact that is hierarchical. David Wallace, in remarking upon the play at the end of his long 
study of hierarchies and associations in Chaucer, notes that Emilia’s function as mere 
possession outpaces even the passivity of Emelye the courtly love object in Chaucer 
(386). Emilia is “seen,” but there is no real sense that she is loved, even in the highly 
stylized courtly sense in which Chaucer’s knights love Emelye: “The female body,” 
Wallace writes, “divorced from time honored tradition as rhetorical power incarnate, is 
remarked chiefly as the object of masculine sight and discovery” (386).62 Not only is 
Emilia seen, she is also bought. She is a “prize” (5.3.135), as Theseus says to the still 
living Arcite one scene earlier, not an ally or a friend, one that Arcite admits he has had 
to “buy” at the cost of what is “dearest” to him (113-114). In his final speech, Theseus 
labels her a “stol’n jewel” now restored to a rightful owner who established ownership 
of her through the prerogative of his gaze (5.4.119). In wrangling over ownership of this 
gem, the kinsmen have forgotten Arcite’s claim that, as cloistered equals, they could 
                                                        
62 In making this point, Wallace notes the small but significant change from Palamon’s claim to have 
“loved” Emelye first (I.1146) in The Knight’s Tale, to his Shakespearean analogue’s assertion that he “saw 
her first” (2.2.160) (Wallace 386).   
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function as an inexhaustible mine of precious objects; to each other, they would not be 
embodied commodities of exchange, but the collective source of endless value.     
The destruction of friendship eclipses any satisfaction over Emilia’s subjugation, 
and the gloom that overhangs the play’s final scene is a consequence of this reality.  The 
Two Noble Kinsmen offers the premise that passionate, celibate same-sex friendship and 
marital happiness are mutually exclusive, and that, ultimately, the latter takes 
precedence over the former.  “Is this winning?” Emilia asks, a question that speaks to 
the tonal confusion of the play’s ending (5.3.138). No, it is not winning, but it is “due 
justice,” as Theseus claims, and paves the way for an uncontested wedding (109). Yet, 
for all that the play insists on a conclusion built on marriage, Arcite’s death serves as a 
reminder of the potential alternative that has been abrogated:  a relationship that is 
spiritually but not biologically generative. Palamon, in bidding farewell to his cousin’s 
corpse, remarks on this reversal, in which it seems that the true love has been sacrificed 
for the dutiful one:  
     O Cousin,  
  That we should things desire which do cost us 
  The loss of our desire! That nought could buy 
  Dear love but loss of dear love! (5.4.109-112) 
Emilia and Arcite are figured as precise equivalents—desire and desire, dear love and 
dear love—but the two are hardly interchangeable for Palamon. Rather, such a 
formulation seems a pale echo of the perfect homosocial mirroring seen earlier in the 
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friendship pairs of both Emilia and Lavina and the kinsmen themselves. The tragi-comic 
mode perfectly suits the ambivalence of this prospective marriage, with triumph and 
defeat, love and grief, gain and loss, wedding and funeral relentlessly juxtaposed. On 
this last score, Theseus sounds a particularly discordant note:  
              A day or two 
  Let us look sadly, and give grace unto 
  The funeral of Arcite, in whose end  
  The visages of bridegrooms we’ll put on  
  And smile with Palamon; for whom an hour, 
  But one hour since, I was as dearly sorry 
  As glad of Arcite. (124-130) 
In The Knight’s Tale, Chaucer has the decency to allow Emelye and Palamon “certeyn 
yeres” to recover from the ordeal of Arcite’s death (I 2967). In an absurd telescoping, 
Theseus declares that the wedding shall proceed after “a day or two,” literalizing 
Hamlet’s caustic joke that “the funeral baked meats did coldly furnish forth the marriage 
tables” at Claudius and Gertrude’s wedding (1.2.179-180). This truncation of mourning 
underscores the final irony of The Two Noble Kinsmen that despite the normative order 
of its resolution—with Palamon and Emilia paired off as man and wife, ascetic vows 
renounced, and the purgation through violence of destabilizing male rivalry—there is 
little harmony to be found. In the end, the Emilia-Palamon pair-bond comes off as an act 
of literary and social duty, one that fails as a consolation for what has been lost. The 
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speaker of the Epilogue indicates some literary self-consciousness of this fact. Looking 
out into the audience, he expresses his disappointment: “No man smile? Then it goes 
hard I see” (Epilogue 4-5). 
  
137 
 
CHAPTER THREE: ASCETIC PERFORMANCE AND THE ANXIETY OF KINGSHIP 
  
The first part of this study was built upon a central conceit that ascetic or 
renunciatory gestures, in their potential to frustrate traditional top-down, patriarchal 
social structures, could take on a transgressive, even rebellious quality. Thus, Isabella’s 
vows of celibacy function as a partial check on Angelo’s exploitation of state sanctioned 
power. Emilia’s service to Diana in The Two Noble Kinsmen must be overcome to 
successfully meet the demands of aristocratic and courtly marriage. Even for the men of 
the play, an embrace of contemplative celibacy rhetorically transforms imprisonment by 
an enemy state into an enlightened claustration. This resistant or transgressive potential 
is also seen in historical examples, such as the “monastic” prisoners of Wisbech and 
Beaumaris.  
 But asceticism, in all of its guises, was a highly flexible kind of political vocabulary 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. While their broad association with catholic 
heterodoxy in England made ascetic gestures in certain forms and situations particularly 
anti-normative, in truth such gestures, like all discursive forms, acquired political 
meaning from their source and context, rather than as what Voloshinov would call 
signals in the absolute sense. It is useful then to consider ascetic acts and utterances 
which emerge from higher positions in what Pierre Bourdieu might term the “power 
relationships” of the early modern political field. The habitus—that is, the entrenched 
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cultural expectations—of the early modern court allowed askesis to register and be 
received in various ways, dependent on the orientation of its actors within said field. 
Because “forces are only manifested in their relationship with certain dispositions,” that 
is, because meaning with a field is ultimately dependent on power structures, “the same 
practices may receive opposite meanings and values…in different configurations or in 
opposing sectors of the same field” (Bourdieu, Distinction 87). Thus, the inverse 
relationship of subject and ruler also allows the resistant potential of asceticism 
explored in earlier chapters to become a force that legitimizes rather than subverts 
power. This somewhat counterintuitive relationship between renunciation and 
legitimation will be the subject of my next two chapters.  
 In this particular chapter, I will interrogate the use of ascetic and renunciatory 
language and acts by both historical and literary kings. I will begin with the historical 
example of Philip II of Spain’s palace-monastery, which I argue is an example of ascetic 
image construction particularly suited to a king who saw himself as the warden of the 
catholic faith. From there I will move to the historical and literary case of Queen 
Elizabeth’s translation of Boethius, a text which I read as simultaneously ascetic and 
propagandistic. Examples from early modern drama will round out the chapter, 
demonstrating how Shakespeare’s kings utilize ascetic or renunciatory discourse for 
conciliatory or political effect. However much renunciation might seem at cross 
purposes with the mechanisms of power, early modern rulers—both catholic and 
protestant--did not hesitate to take advantage of the flexible social energy of ascetic 
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gestures. So too do Shakespeare’s kings and potential kings find politically useful—in 
several different, often contradictory ways—both public and private renunciations of 
the bodily and the worldly: an irony made possible in part by the public and 
performative nature of kingship itself.  
 
The Escorial 
In July 1584, King Philip II of Spain entered for the first time the newly completed 
palace, monastery, and reliquary of San Lorenzo de El Escorial. The massive edifice, 
begun some two decades earlier, was envisioned as both a monument to Habsburg 
political glory and a grandiose symbol of Spain’s role as the center of the catholic world 
(Parker 31). Its completion marked the apotheosis of Philip’s counter-reformation 
project. Twenty years earlier, Philip, like all catholic monarchs, had looked with some 
dread upon the rising tide of protestantism across western Europe. His successes, solid 
but not overwhelming, against Henri II and his German protestant Allies in the Italian 
War of 1551-1559, culminating with a smashing victory at San Quentin in 1557, provided 
the Spanish King with both the political capital and the religious surety to proceed with 
the construction of such an ostentatious monument (Lazure 31). By the 1580s, 
developments in European religious and political affairs could not have been exactly 
what Philip hoped for when he chose to proceed with the Escorial in the early 1560s. 
England, temporarily saved from heresy by the counter reforms of Philip’s wife Mary I, 
slipped out of the fold again with the rise of Elizabeth. France, meanwhile, was riven in 
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two as Huguenots and the Catholic League vied for the Crown of Charlemagne in the 
bloody Wars of Religion. Nevertheless, this fortress of gray limestone (possessing what 
one art historian calls an “an aura of a prison”), encompassing, side by side, both a royal 
residence and a Hieronymite monastery, indelibly and unmistakably linked Spanish 
Hapsburg power to the preservation of catholic orthodoxy (Kamen 116). It succeeded in 
doing nothing less than Philip envisioned by marking Spain as the de facto capital of 
catholic Europe. 
 In the history of early modern Europe, religious iconography and rhetoric formed 
part of the constructed image of every European sovereign. The uniqueness of the 
Escorial, however, comes from its particular juxtaposition of functionalities. As a grand 
palace and burial site for Hapsburg rulers, it reified dynastic, earthly power; however, as 
a reliquary and a monastery, it also looked to the otherworldly and eternal.63 Guy Lazure 
has written of Philip’s deep and authentic piety, a piety particularly manifest in his 
obsession with and devotion to catholic relics. Relics have a long history as tokens of 
political and military power in medieval Europe (The Crusaders, notably, carried at 
various times both the true cross and holy lance before their armies in the Levant), but 
the monastic life, at least in theory since the late middles ages, had been idealized as 
mutually exclusive with earthly authority.  These relics, according to Lazure, functioned 
for Philip as a fulcrum between piety and authority, between palace and monastery:  
                                                        
63 The architecture may even have been mean to evoke the supreme imitatio Christi of martyrdom. One 
theory posits that the layout of the Escorial was patterned on the grill on which St. Lawrence was cooked 
alive, as represented by Titian in a painting ca. 1559 (Kamen 43).  
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Philip II, sensing that a solely temporal power remained all too terrestrial 
— and therefore incomplete — aspired to capture the sacred energy 
emanating from his relics to consolidate his own personal power. Within 
the Escorial itself, relics were placed right at the symbolic junction of the 
religious and the monarchal, the devotional and the ceremonial, the 
private and the public. Indeed, a great number of them were embedded 
in a giant two-sided reliquary altarpiece that faced both a passageway 
leading to the royal apartments and the basilica choir. Even in the 
discursive architecture of José de Sigüenza’s history of the Escorial, the 
description of relics marks the high point of a spiritual itinerary within the 
walls of the palace-monastery, a physical and spiritual journey that 
encouraged the visitor-reader to purify his soul as he was progressively 
lead towards more and more private, sanctified, and inaccessible places. 
(Lazure 67)     
Lazure’s analysis of the function of relics in the architectural and symbolic vocabulary of 
the Escorial implies an attempt by Philip to bridge the distance between monastery and 
palace. Something about sharing his home with monks was important for Philip’s image 
of himself as a king, and the image he wished to project to his subjects. Partly, as Lazure 
explains, creating a palace that could also function as a site of pilgrimage served a 
legitimizing function for Philip’s kingship: it drew from the connection between divinity 
and monarchy upon which Renaissance kingship, catholic or protestant, depended. But 
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even in his own time, the palace/monastery helped to project a public image of the king 
as not simply pious, but ascetic himself. Numerous accounts, both contemporary and 
modern, reinforce the idea of a withdrawn, secluded king who increasingly renounced 
worldly things. In 1584, a Venetian diplomat described Philip as one who was known to 
“love retreats and solitude, and flee from nearly every kind of pleasure” (Kamen 123). 
Another ambassador claims Philip sought out “deserted spaces” and preferred to be 
alone (123). Scholars of our own time echo these sentiments. One popular historian, for 
example, has described Philip as “austere, penitential… ensconced in a secluded study,” 
a kind of half-king/half-monk (Davies 534). Art historian Henry Kamen, who has 
collected many of these accounts, actually disputes the historical veracity of Philip’s 
monkishness, but his revisionism is evidence enough that the palace continues to 
conjure up the image of an ascetic king (123). I cite these contemporary sources not as 
the best evidence of fact, but because they speak to the long endurance of a 
constructed image explicitly meant for public consumption.   
 Whether Kamen is right that this ascetic image of Philip is “invented” or not is 
not as important to this chapter as the question of who was doing the inventing (122). 
Both early modern and contemporary accounts of Philip’s renunciatory attitude indicate 
that the Escorial did and does position Philip as a certain kind of king. Kamen’s argument 
that such descriptions of Philip boil down to nothing more than an “ideological fiction” is 
intriguing, but he does not consider the possibility that the original fashioner of this 
fiction might have been Philip himself, and that rather than an attempt to make Philip 
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look “timid,” “nervous,” “a physical coward,” or even “insane,” the monarch’s close 
association with the Escorial may have served an explicitly political purpose (140). 
Aligning himself with the ascetic life linked Philip indelibly with catholic orthodoxy 
precisely because asceticism and the larger issue of a theology of works provided the 
most anti-protestant type of religious image construction possible.  The monks, the 
relics, and the imposing monastic architecture itself all functioned together as an artistic 
and discursive rebuttal to the new sola fides heresy that, in its most radical forms, 
rejected all such ceremonial trappings and traditional forms of practice.  The Escorial, 
and along with it the image of a king half cloistered, offers an example of how the 
ascetic gesture might serve the mechanisms of power.   
 In protestant England, there was also room for ascetic discourse to function as a 
discourse of legitimation, though in a somewhat different register. This, I will argue, can 
be seen in Elizabeth I’s translation of Boethius’s Consolation of Philosophy.  
 
Boethius and Elizabeth: Asceticism and Legitimation 
In 1593, Queen Elizabeth chose to translate Boethius’s Consolation of Philosophy. No 
explicit record is left of the reason—political or personal—that lay behind this impulse, 
but it demonstrates both the enduring relevancy of Boethian philosophy in the late 
sixteenth century, and that Elizabeth had a personal interest in the work (Benkert 1). 
Even more curious is the timing of the translation, which came during a period of both 
foreign embroilment (a costly and ultimately ineffectual war to defend protestantism in 
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France) and court instability (6). The 1590s saw rapid turnover in the makeup of court as 
the deaths of several well established (and for Elizabeth, well handled) nobles died, 
making room for new court appointments. This turnover made this period the most 
fractious of Elizabeth’s reign, as remaining prominent members of court—chiefly Essex 
and Cecil—squabbled over the rebalancing of court power; in the estimation of one 
historian, the period from 1593 to 1596 was the worst “faction fight,” contested in both 
court and council, that Elizabeth ever had to negotiate (Adams 31-32).  
The failed military intervention in the brutal religious wars of France also must have 
weighed on Elizabeth, as it was a move she had strongly resisted at the outset. In 1589, 
the Huguenot Henri IV of France inherited a kingdom that was his only nominally. Paris 
(and great swaths of the rest of the country) was under the control of the Catholic 
League, and any semblance of monarchical control had by then “dissolved into anarchy” 
(Diefendorf, Beneath 174). Parliament urged Elizabeth to intervene, suggesting that this 
conflict went beyond mere politics and had instead the character of a holy crusade. 
Elizabeth eventually acquiesced at great cost to the treasury, but the aid did not help 
Henri retake the capital; the Catholic League—supported by most of the general Parisian 
populace—endured and eventually broke the king’s siege, partly by appropriating their 
hunger and want into morale lifting rituals of penance and fasting (Diefendorf, 
Penitence 34-25). Henri’s eventual conversion to catholicism proved the final 
humiliation for Elizabeth and the end for radical protestant dreams of bringing a 
Huguenot to power across the English Channel. 
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Given the stress at court in the period, then, why did Elizabeth elect to embark on 
such a bookish endeavor? Did a political motive go hand in hand with an intellectual 
one?  Lsybeth Benkert asserts in her study that the act grew out of Elizabeth’s active and 
ongoing campaign of public image construction (20). Since early in her reign, Elizabeth 
had been careful to construct a public image that would at once project power while 
maintaining femininity. Susan Frye’s landmark study of Elizabeth’s image construction 
identifies this careful balancing of identities as early as her entry into London continuing 
throughout the 1590s. According to Frye, early representation and iconography of 
Elizabeth combined an active presence with the language of domesticity; in something 
of a contradiction, such representations projected a comforting image of feminine 
normativity while also resisting the “gendered assumptions of her passivity” (42). Part of 
the mythos of Elizabeth as simultaneously active and passive (and the juxtaposition of 
those two terms already recalls ideas about ascetic behavior discussed in above 
chapters) was drawn from her brief period of imprisonment during the reign of Mary I. 
Elizabeth herself used the incident of her imprisonment as evidence of the divine 
endorsement of her accession. As Frye writes:  
By the 1570s and 1580s, as the queen and all those who competed with 
her for representation produced a complex iconographic system, 
Elizabeth I’s perfections and limitations were increasingly defined 
through the motif of imprisonment and delivery…Like all of Elizabeth’s 
preferred representations, however, the allegory of her imprisonment 
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cut two ways: it recalled her own sanctity and courage at the same time 
that it participated in one of the most prevalent paradigms for the 
containment and subordination of women. (77)  
Elizabeth’s imprisonment provided her with a background of personal martyrology that 
was rhetorically and propagandistically useful both for the sympathy it could generate 
and the normative gender-typing it allowed. However, the power of the prison narrative 
as propaganda depended a great deal on the specific way in which it was understood. 
While in historical fact Elizabeth’s imprisonment and release had more to do with the 
political opportunity seen by the Marians in marrying Elizabeth off, Elizabeth herself 
pointed to the resistant and mystical power of her celibacy, which marriage necessarily 
would abrogate, as the cause of her delivery (Frye 72). That the nature of Elizabeth’s 
imprisonment and release was politically relevant can aptly be demonstrated by a 
passage from George Gascoigne’s 1575 work The Princely Pleasures at the Courte of 
Kenelworth. Gascoigne, whose piece includes a masque that was to be presented to 
Elizabeth during the festivities of her well known visit to Dudley at Kenilworth, 
represents Elizabeth through the figure of the nymph Zabeta. Mythically dramatizing an 
endless debate of Elizabeth’s reign, Gascoigne has Zabeta consider advice on marriage 
and celibacy from Juno (advocating the former) and Diana, who as usual stands in the 
way of patriarchal family (and in this case, state) harmony. While much of the masque 
features Diana’s arguments in favor of indefinite virginity, the final point made by Iris—
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Juno’s messenger—draws directly from Elizabeth’s personal history of imprisonment 
and delivery: 
  Remember all your life,  
   before you were a Queen :  
  And then compare it with the days  
   which you since then have seen.  
  Were you not captive caught?   
   were you not kept in walls?  
  Were you not forc'd to lead a life  
   like other wretched thralls?  
  Where was Diana then?  
   why did she you not aid?  
  Why did she not defend your state  
   which were and are her maid?  
  Who brought you out of briers?  
   who gave you rule of realms?  
  Who crowned first your comely head  
   with princely diadems?  
  Even Juno, she which mean'd,  
   and yet doth mean likewise,  
  To give you more than will can wish,  
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   or wit can well devise.  
  Wherefore, good Queen, forget  
   Diana's 'ticing tale :  
  Let never needless dread presume  
   to bring your bliss to bale. (51) 
The scene above, though eventually published by Gascoigne, was never performed, a 
fact Gascoigne blames mundanely in a supplementary note on a time squeeze and bad 
weather (53). However, the masque was in fact deliberately suppressed by Elizabeth, 
who doubtless chafed at not only its verdict in favor of Juno, but its cooption of her 
imprisonment for the hymeneal cause (McCoy 130). Note, for example, how Iris mocks 
Diana’s silent impotence in the face of Elizabeth’s suffering. As a “thrall” trapped 
“behind walls,” Elizabeth’s imprisonment as described even vaguely calls to mind a kind 
of conventual claustration, though a coerced one. Why, the poem implicitly asks, would 
Diana intercede to rescue Elizabeth from what so effectively enforces the celibate ideal? 
As the poem states, then, Elizabeth should thank Juno for her deliverance, a line which 
directly alludes to the fact that the queen-to-be found succor not as an inviolable virgin 
but as a marriageable woman.  The exhortation for Elizabeth to marry becomes explicit 
later in the poem:  
  Then give consent, O Queen 
   to Juno’s just desire, 
  Who for your wealth would have you wed, 
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    And for your farther hire 
  Some Empress would you make. (52) 
The language Gascoigne uses is transactional: Juno would have Elizabeth wed for 
“wealth” and the elevation of her political power as an “Empress.” However, Elizabeth’s 
own representation of her imprisonment and liberation explains why such worldly 
vanities, and Gascoigne’s call for her to serve Juno, might have been met with 
displeasure. For Elizabeth, the prison narrative demonstrated what Frye terms an 
“active virginity” that countered political subjugation with stoic patience (72). In the 
iconography and propaganda of the period, Elizabeth’s imprisonment was linked to her 
accession precisely because the entire episode could be couched in the terminology of 
holy martyrdom. Elizabeth, in speaking of her imprisonment years later, spoke of the 
fact that she did “dyffere from [Mary] in relygeon” and thus her imprisonment was a 
form of religious persecution (74).  A frontispiece to the 1631 edition of Thomas 
Heywood’s Englands Elizabeth, Her Life and Troubles, shows Elizabeth being crowned by 
cherubim while overlooking Woodstock, the most notorious of several sights of 
imprisonment (75). Most significantly, Elizabeth’s early trials earned her a place in the 
foundational martyrology of Foxe’s Actes and Monuments. Foxe emphasizes Elizabeth’s 
physical suffering, and adds the threat of sexual peril to her miseries:  
In which story we first have to consider in what extreme misery, sickness, 
fear, and peril her Highness was; into what care, what trouble of mind, 
and what danger of death she was brought: first, with great routs and 
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bands of armed men, (and happy was he that might have the carrying of 
her,) being fetched up as the greatest traitor in the world, clapped in the 
Tower, and again tossed from thence, and from house to house, from 
prison to prison, from post to pillar, at length also prisoner in her own 
house, and guarded with a sort of cut-throats, which ever gaped for the 
spoil, whereby they might be fingering of somewhat. (Foxe 265) 
The leering specter of the gaping cut-throats is not mere titillation; it also amplifies the 
sense of danger by imperiling that which, even in Foxe’s time, had become a crucial part 
of Elizabeth’s self-fashioning: her virginity. As Stephen Hamrick points out, such a 
narrative also further connects Elizabeth’s accession with divine favor, ascribing her 
deliverance not to the calculations of her captors, but (as Elizabeth herself did) to 
providence (119). Frye explains that Foxe is silent on the question of perpetual celibacy, 
as endorsing such a “virtue” would run counter to Foxe’s radical protestantism (77).64 
However, his narrative does draw a telling connection between divine protection and 
Elizabeth’s inviolate body that contributed to the mythology of her virginity. God not 
only delivered Elizabeth, he kept her free of sexual despoilment. Should such a miracle 
be thrown away on a mere husband?     
                                                        
64 To my knowledge, Elizabeth herself never directly proclaimed perpetual virginity, a catholic virtue, as 
her goal (I invite correction on this score). With typical caution, she allowed marriage to remain at least a 
tacit possibility for as long as possible. Nevertheless, making her celibacy-in-all-but name a part of the 
mythology of her image construction doubtless played upon an enduring if technically unorthodox 
reverence for both perpetual virginity in general and the Virgin Mary in particular.  
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Thus, I would go further than Frye in pointing out that this paradigm of “heroic” 
imprisonment is also deeply connected to Elizabeth’s constructed chastity in that both 
draw power ultimately from the ascetic tradition, which time and again shows ascetic 
temperance to be both spiritually and politically potent. Furthermore, the prison 
narrative may be considered foundational to Christian asceticism in that it can be traced 
back to the very work which concerns this chapter immediately: The Consolation of 
Philosophy.   
 The Consolation owes a deal of its literary power, as well as its enduring 
popularity in post-classical Europe, to the dramatic circumstances (supposed 
circumstances, one must qualify) of its composition. Written while its author was 
imprisoned by the tyrant Theodoric for crimes of political dissidence, The Consolation 
offered subsequent generations a sturdy model for a kind of passive, literary resistance 
to such circumstances (Donato 597). It is written as a dialogue between Boethius and 
Dame Philosophy, in which the former receives instruction for the purgation of his grief 
over the loss of what he terms “externa bona,” material pleasures, by turning inward 
and embracing philosophical detachment (Boethius 2.5). While the text itself is not 
explicitly Christian, its attitude of patient sufferance in the face of misfortune, as well as 
its stoic appreciation for bodily continence and its skepticism of worldly satisfaction, 
made it generally appealing to a Christian audience in subsequent centuries.65 In effect, 
                                                        
65 Scholars disagree over how “Christian” the Consolation is. Most accept the personal Christianity of 
Boethius himself, though the text is silent on explicitly Christian theological themes. For Boethius’ 
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Boethius established an enduring bridge between an abstemious but irreligious Classical 
Stoicism and the almost mystical exaltation of continence in early and medieval 
Christian asceticism. Thomas Aquinas, for example, cites and offers commentary on the 
Consolation in defense of an ascetic life in the Summa Theologica, noting particularly 
Boethius on the value of external goods (Summa 1, Question 4) and worldly fame and 
glory (Summa 1, Question 2).  
 But, as mentioned above, the Consolation’s power lies not in its philosophical 
conclusions alone, but in the way these ideas are developed within a context of political 
persecution and unwarranted punishment. Boethius was not simply a philosopher, but a 
martyr as well, and in this dual guise he offered an early and foundational example of 
renunciation as political act. Such a model served well Thomas More, for example, who 
adopts a remarkably similar posture in the Dialogue of Comforts Against Tribulation, 
composed during the period of More’s imprisonment prior to his execution by Henry 
VIII. Although More never mentions Boethius explicitly, the indebtedness seems clear, 
particularly in the overall structure of the work, as well as More’s rigorous explanation 
of the nature of misfortune, which strikingly mirrors the Consolation (Miles 97). More’s 
titular comfort evokes the trope of de contemptu mundi, taking as a given that his 
imprisonment merely offers a literal manifestation of the suffering that accompanies all 
human life. The trope naturally leads to the unfolding of ascetic discourse in the 
                                                        
personal religious beliefs and analyses of the Consolation as essentially Christian, see Lewis, 76-79; 
Chadwick, especially 1-65 and 219-222; and Lu, 214-215.    
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Dialogue, as the renunciation of worldly things dulls the threat of earthly punishment. 
All pleasures and all pains experienced by the corporal form are insignificant next to the 
glories that await beyond:  
For surely, for this state of the world, the joys of heaven are by man’s 
mouth unspeakable, to man’s ear not audible, to men’s hearts 
uncogitable. So far forth excel they all that ever men have heard of, all 
that ever men can speak of, and all that ever man can by natural 
possibilty think on. And yet, where the joys of heaven be such prepared 
for every saved soul, our Lord saith yet by the mouth of Saint John that 
He will give his holy martyrs that suffer for His sake many a special kind of 
joy. For He saith: “To him that overcometh I shall give him to eat of the 
tree of life. And also he that overcometh shall be clothed in white 
clothes. And I shall confess his name before My Father and before his 
Angels.” And also He saith: “Fear none of those things that thou shalt 
suffer, but be faithful unto the death. He that overcometh shall not be 
hurt of the second death.” (More 3.28) 
Here is the familiar theme of ascetic martyrology that suffering, at least the right kind of 
suffering, presages reward. The reminder that the suffering of the holy merits a “special 
kind of joy” is indelibly linked to the ascetical precept that penitential works create 
hierarchical degrees of salvational piety. But such renunciatory declarations can shift 
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nimbly into a more politically relevant kind of discourse. Particularly poignant, given 
More’s circumstance, is his criticism of royal power: 
But when that whole kingdoms and mighty great empires are of so little 
surety to stand, but be so soon translated from one man unto another, 
what great thing can you or I, yea or any lord the greatest in this last, 
reckon himself to have by the possession of an heap of silver or gold? For 
white and yellow metal[s] are not so profitable of their own nature, save 
for a little glittering. (3.5)  
In the Dialogue, this discourse on the fleeting nature of empire occurs within the 
context of an allegorical setting (Hungary under threat of Turkish invasion). This 
“allegorical smokescreen,” as Leland Miles terms it, provides More with an opportunity 
to safely attack Henry VIII while offering comfort to England’s catholics under threat of 
persecution (“Introduction” xliii). Kings, More writes, should not be judged on their 
wealth and power, but on their willingness to abject themselves and admit their 
impotence before God, as David did, and King Achab “when he when he fasted and 
went clothed in sackcloth and all besprent with ashes” (2.7). When More invokes the 
stubborn hard heartedness of Pharaoh in the face of God’s truth, it is easy to picture 
Henry’s own bull-headed rush into the folly of Lutheran heresy (1.4). 
 For Elizabeth, the consolation of the persecuted is a strange literary register to 
take up. In both More and Boethius, renunciatory contemplation is employed to eclipse, 
not endorse, royal power. If we are to locate a political meaning in her Consolation, 
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therefore, that must point toward some other end than rhetorical resistance to power. 
The first possibility, supported by the contemporary reports of William Camden, is that 
Elizabeth turned to Boethius for her own consolation after the failure of her 
intervention on behalf of the protestant cause in France. Camden provides an account 
of the Queen receiving the news of Henry IV’s conversion:  
But whilst the Queen only for Religions Sake, aydes the French King, 
distrusting his owne strength, at so great charges, and so great troubles 
of mind, as if she esteemed his losse, her owne, behold a most certaine 
report flies over to England, spreading out, that the French King, either 
had embrassed, or would shortly embrace the profession of the Romish 
Religion. (qtd. in Ha 17)   
According to Camden, the Queen was all but overcome by this news, so far had she 
stretched beyond her comfort in aiding the French king, and then only to defend 
protestantism. She wasted no time in venting both her fury and her grief at its source by 
means of a letter to her former ally Henri:   
Alas, what great sorrow, what inward griefe, what sighs have I felt at my 
heart for these things which Morlante hath told me! Alas, is the world 
come to this passe? Could it bee that any worldy matter should make you 
forsake the feare of God? Can we expect any happy event of such a fact? 
Or can you thinke that hee which hath hitherto with his owne right hand 
upholden and kept you, would now forsake you? It is a matter full of 
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danger to doe evill that good may come of it. Yet I hope a sounder Spirit 
will inspire into you a better minde. In the meane time, I will not cease in 
the first place of my prayers, to commend you to God, and beseech him 
that the hands of Esau may not spill Jacobs blessing. Whereas you doe 
religiously offer me your friendship, to my great cost I know I have 
deserved it; neither should I repent it, had you not changed your father. 
Certainely, from henceforth I cannot be your sister by the father; but the 
truth is, I shall ever more dearely love mine owne father then a false 
father; which God knoweth very well, who bring you back againe to a 
better mind. (Camden 1593.15)66 
Here, as Ha writes, emerges Elizabeth’s “distress at Henry having foresworn 
protestantism”(16).67 Camden, in fact, lists Boethius as one of several authors that 
Elizabeth turned to in times of sorrow for “comfort,” and that he was particularly in her 
thoughts in 1593 (1593.16). Several sections of Elizabeth’s translation evoke the general 
sentiment of inward grief in the letter. The very first words, for instance, take up the 
register of lament: 68  
  Righmes that my groing studie ons p[e]rformed 
                                                        
66 Citations from Camden taken from the Hypertext Critical Edition of Dana F. Sutton, cited by the year of 
Elizabeth’s reign and section number of the English translation.  
67 For another perspective on the translation as an act of consolation in response to the news from 
France, see Mueller and Scodel, 8. 
68 The Kaylor/Philips text is faithful to Elizabeth’s manuscript in ways that are occasionally confusing. I 
have attempted to clarify spelling and punctuation without obscuring meaning, with my changes in 
brackets. I cite by page number.  
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   In teares alas crumpeld woful staves begin[.] 
   My muses torne behold what write I shold indites 
Wher tru woful verse my face w[i]t[h] dole bedews. (43)69  
That Elizabeth found something cathartic in such expressions of Boethian grief is 
probable, and the Boethian formula of rejecting the vanity of worldly success could 
provide comfort in the face of failure. Expressing contempt for the material world 
becomes a means of mitigating worldly defeat. Elizabeth’s own fruitlessly taxed treasury 
comes to mind in her rendering of the Boethian rejection of the hoarding of wealth:  
Go to, yf now the giftes of fortune be not fleeting & changeable, what is 
ther that eyth[e]r thou canst make thyne, or if thous seest & p[er]cevist, 
wilt not dispise? Are riches eyth[e]r thyne or by their nature pretious? 
What is the gold th[ere]of, but heap of gathered pence? And such as 
shynes more w[ith] their spending than w[ith] their heap….And if it can 
not byde by a man that is given to an oth[er], Than money is most 
pretious when turnd to others by liberall use. (69)  
                                                        
69 Elizabeth’s wording here suggests the influence of another Boethian translator, Chaucer, who opens the 
Troilus with similar diction:  
        The double sorwe of Troilus to tellen, 
       That was the king Priamus sone of Troye, 
       In lovinge, how his aventures fellen 
       Fro wo to wele, and after out of Ioye, 
       My purpos is, er that I parte fro ye. 
       Thesiphone, thou help me for t’endyte 
       Thise woful vers, that wepen as I wryte! (1.1-7) 
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The note of consolation for Elizabeth comes from the text’s reminder that her royal 
treasury had been nothing more than a “heap of gathered pence.” In spending the 
money for the sake of others, that is, by being charitable, Elizabeth has turned that gold 
into its “most pre[t]ious” form by divesting herself of it; an empty treasury is thus a 
thing to be wished for, a disentanglement from “skant & needy riches”(69).  
Such a discourse of renunciation from humbled monarchs recurs on multiple 
occasions in Shakespeare, whose kings attempt to resist the pains of loss. For instance, 
Henry VI, Shakespeare’s most conspicuously monkish king, sees the world as irrevocably 
bleak before he renounces any desire to remain enthroned:  
Would I were dead, if God's good will were so; 
For what is in this world but grief and woe? 
O God! methinks it were a happy life 
To be no better than a homely swain  
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  
Ah! What a life were this! how sweet! How lovely! 
Gives not the hawthorn bush a sweeter shade 
To shepherds looking on their silly sheep 
Than doth a rich embroider’d canopy 
To kings that fear their subjects’ treachery?  
O yes, it doth; a thousandfold it doth.  
And to conclude, the shepherd’s homely curds,  
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His cold thin drink out of his leather bottle,  
His wonted sleep under a fresh tree’s shade,  
All which secure and sweetly he enjoys,  
Is far beyond a prince’s delicates— 
His viands sparkling in a golden cup,  
His body couched in a curious bed,  
When care, mistrust, and treason waits on him.  
(3H6 2.5.19-23, 41-54) 
This renunciation of the vanity of kingly luxury is explicitly predicated on the reality of 
political failure: the “subjects’ treachery” that will ultimately rob him of his crown.  
Henry, in envying the shepherd, understands that he can “conquer fortune’s spite/By 
living low where Fortune cannot hurt” him (4.6.19-20). In Richard II, the king, faced with 
inevitability of his deposition, reduces all possession to “that small model of the barren 
earth/Which serves as paste and cover to our bones” (RII, 3.2.153-154), before 
renouncing the crown and all the material trappings of rule. The artifice of kingly 
authority and material possession is exposed: 
  Cover your heads, and mock not flesh and blood 
  With solemn reverence, throw away respect, 
  Tradition, form, and ceremonious duty, 
  For you have but mistook me all this while.  
  I live with bread like you, feel want,  
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  Taste grief, need friends: subjected thus 
  How can you say to me I am a king? (3.2.171-177) 
Partly, the strategic nature of such renunciation (“throw away respect, tradition,” etc.) is 
a matter of personal agency, an emotional self-defense against catastrophe. But, as 
Katherine Maus argues, it also serves an external, political function, as part of an 
“enthusiastic self-dramatization” that seeds doubt about the legitimacy of Bolingbroke’s 
usurpation (“Richard II” 462).  
 For Elizabeth, renunciatory rhetoric in the Consolation can also be both self-
directed and political. For instance, in Elizabeth’s words, Dame Philosophy’s exhortation 
to renounce Fortune’s gifts sounds a note of self-admonishment:  
What is it th[ere]for O man that hath thrown down to wo & wayle? Thou 
hast seene I believe some new unwonted thing. Thou yf thou thinkest 
that toward the[e] fortune be changed, art deceaved. This was ever her 
manner, this was her nature. She hath ev[e]r kept toward the[e], rath[e]r 
her own constancy in her mutabilite. Such one was she whan she beguild 
thee, & did deceave w[i]t[h] alluremtes of false felicitie. Thou hast 
understode now, the doutfull face of the blynde Goddesse, w[hi]ch 
though she hyde herself to others, hath made her self to the[e] manifest. 
Yf thou allow her use her fashon, complayne not thereof; Yf thou hatest 
her treason, skorne her & cast her of[f], that so falsely beguylde the[e], 
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for she that now is cause of thy woe the self same ought be of thy quyett. 
(61-62) 
Dame Philosophy’s warning against being beguiled by Fortune perhaps spoke to 
Elizabeth’s own sense of being misled in the matter of France. Military glory, in 
Boethius, represents a particularly fleeting form of material success, as More notes in 
the Dialogue of Comforts.70 But self-criticism might also function as criticism of the 
masculine war-making voices that surrounded her. In the case of Elizabeth, the 
beguilement on behalf of Fortune came from some of her own councilors (including 
Walsingham and Leicester) and the militant protestants in Parliament, who pressed the 
issue of the intervention despite her reservations (Doran 41-43). The hawkish faction of 
Parliament proved particularly disappointing to Elizabeth, promising to fully fund the 
endeavor, then balking at the queen’s request for money during the 1593 session 
(Benkert 6). However, before this disappointment, the queen became swept up in her 
role as the defender of the faith, living and dying with the news from France as if it were 
her own throne at stake, as Camden writes, and fully committing crown wealth to the 
cause (Camden 1593.15). The Consolation thus might be more than Elizabeth’s self-
                                                        
70 “What should a man greatly rejoice in that, that he daily seeth most abound in the hands of many that 
be naught? Do not now this great Turk and his bashaws, in all these advancements of fortune, surmount 
very far above any Christian estate, and any lords living under him? And was there not yet hence upon 
twenty years the great sultan of Syria, which many a year together bare as great a port as the great Turk? 
And after in one summer unto the great Turk that whole empire was lost. And so may all his empire now 
(and shall hereafter by God’s grace) be lost into Christian men’s hands likewise, when Christian people 
shall be mended and grow in God’s favor again.” (More 3.5)  
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admonishment, offering as well a critique of the factional voices that continually sought 
to impose their will upon her.  
 The criticism also might be pointed toward Henri IV himself, whose betrayal the 
Queen never forgave. Jamie Goodrich, for instance, argues that expressions of grief in 
the consolation were “a careful bit of political staging by Elizabeth” to limit criticism of 
her relationship with Henri by strongly and publicly asserting the personal nature of the 
betrayal (263-266). The argument she constructs against Henry, however, is built upon 
the Boethian conceit of the worthlessness of kingly power. To Elizabeth, Henri had 
chosen such power and the security of his earthly crown over God. Such a motive does 
explain the political utility for Elizabeth of Book 3 of the Consolation, which offers a 
lengthy discourse upon the worthlessness of high office. Ultimately, the crown Navarre 
bought with his soul is unlikely to bring him happiness: 
But kingdoms & kings familiarities, can they not make a man happy, what 
els? Yf their felicytie ev[e]r last. But full be old examples & of pre[s]ent 
age that kings have changed w[it]h misery their lott. Yf this Raigne of 
kings be autor of felicitie, shall it not bring misery in part that lackes, and 
so diminish luck? For tho mens Dominions stretch furr, yet more people 
ther must needs be, never unacquayened w[it[h kings Raigne. For where 
the making felicitie endith, there skanted is the force, & so wretched 
makes. Thus must it needs follow that greatest portion of mysery of kings 
have.  (85) 
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Power, in other words, can only bring grief to the powerful, who must feel aware of its 
very limits. A king whose happiness relies on authority is always doomed to suffer 
misery due to what he lacks. Elizabeth echoes this very argument in her letter to Henri, 
in which she chides him for prizing the “worldly matter” of the crown over a “feare of 
God,” who is the source of a peaceful mind (Camden 1593.15). 
However, despite such veiled polemic directed at rivals and enemies, the 
Consolation translation should be read principally as an act of public image construction, 
for references to Henri or Walsingham remain oblique, while Elizabeth as the text’s 
source is certain. What strategic value to Elizabeth’s public image can be found in a text 
that is so radically anti-monarchical? A clue may lie in another translation of the 
Consolation produced in Tudor England.         
 Some thirty-seven years before Elizabeth’s translation, George Colvile published 
his own rendering of the Consolation of Philosophy during the reign of Mary I. Despite 
its anti-monarchic bent, the work was dedicated to the queen herself. Colvile’s 
dedicatory epistle to Mary in the 1556 publication includes some potentially subversive 
didactic commentary.  Colvile asks that the Queen consider the “tyrannical rayne of 
Theodoryke,” the Visigoth King of the sixth century (3). He goes on to relate to the 
queen how Theodoric, an Arian by faith, had his once trusted advisor Boethius 
imprisoned and then executed for a number of perceived slights, among them 
suspected complicity with the Christian Emperor of Byzantium. “Upon these two causes 
falsely surmysed by the kyng,” writes Colvile, “Boecius was accused by vyle and 
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slaunderous persons for money, and beyng never put to aunswer, found guilty” (3). 
Colville’s decision to stress to Mary the fate of Boethius—execution at the hands of a 
sitting monarch because of religious factionalism without  just due process, on the 
suborned testimony of paid informants—could be read as a rather courageous attempt 
at counsel, considering that Mary herself was accused of similar tyranny by 
protestants.71 Whether Colvile was truly cautioning his queen about tyrannical impulses 
through the rhetorical mirror of Theodoric is impossible to say with certainty, but it does 
point toward an answer on the question of Elizabeth’s use of the Consolation in her 
ongoing program of image construction.    
 If tyranny finds its source in a desire for material gain, then the ascetic worldview 
endorsed by the Consolation stands at cross purposes with such impulses. Elizabeth had 
good reason to consider the nature of tyranny. As Mary Villeponteaux explains, 
accusations that Elizabeth was herself a tyrant were a constant source of consternation 
for her (28). This anxiety flared up often, but particularly in the period surrounding the 
execution of Mary Queen of Scots in 1587. The weeks leading up to and following 
Mary’s death saw the publication of numerous poems and pamphlets that denounced 
the queen as tyrannical (28). One in particular that circulated on the day of Mary’s 
funeral, directed to restive catholic subjects, labeled Elizabeth a latter day Jezebel who 
had acted with arbitrary cruelty in the matter of the Scottish queen (29). That such 
                                                        
71 See Duncan, 111-129 
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charges affected the queen can be seen in a speech she made to Parliament in 1586 as 
the polemical voices surrounding Mary’s imprisonment were reaching a crescendo. 
Anticipating, as Villeponteaux notes, the clamor that will come with the execution, 
Elizabeth takes care to rebut claims not only that she acts tyrannically, but that she is by 
nature a “tyrant,” a title that Elizabeth “above all things has most abhorred” (29). 
Instead, Elizabeth proclaims her merciful nature:  
But to clear myself of this fault, this I may justly say: I have pardoned 
many traitors and rebels, and besides I well remember half a score 
treasons, which have been either covered or slightly examined or let slip 
and passed over, so that mine actions have not been such as would 
procure me the name of tyrant. (29) 
Elizabeth stresses her non-tyrannical nature by admitting her occasional laxity in 
enforcing justice; she not only eschews unjust persecution, she also often lets actual 
treasons go unpunished, so hesitant is she to wield the reins of retributive or punitive 
power.  
Her abhorrence for tyranny is such that she will put her own life in danger rather 
than model herself on the tyrannical example of kings who used torture as a first 
resort.72 Whether accurate or not, her public image of temperance depended in part on 
distancing herself from the very charges of capricious punishment thrown at her during 
                                                        
72 Villeponteaux gives several other examples in her first chapter, 1-33.  
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the period of Mary’s imprisonment and execution. Elizabeth’s demonstrated sensitivity 
to charges of tyranny lends biographical resonance to her Consolation, in which the 
tyrant who would exert royal prerogative through cruelty deludes himself, for the power 
to cause pain can be resisted by stoic fortitude. Elizabeth renders into English one of 
those most famous Boethian examples of stoic resistance to torture, one that likely 
resonated in the 1590s when the threat of conspiracy was always present:  
Whan a tyrant thought to afflicte a poore man w[i]t[h] his tormentes to 
confesse the knowers of a conspiracy against him, his tongue he byt & 
threw away, throwing it to the face of the wicked tyrant. So the torture 
that he supposed to make stuff for his cruelty, a wise man made for his 
v[i]rtue. (72) 
While a positive mortification as radical as biting one’s own tongue out goes beyond 
Christian askesis, such a passage evokes ascetic resistance in the theater of state 
punishment so common to the genre of martyrology with which Elizabeth would have 
been familiar. Adding to its resonance, this particular Boethian exemplum would have 
been familiar to Elizabeth in 1593, and to many others, for its enactment in what was 
undoubtedly the most famous play of the day:    
Hieronimo 
   What lesser liberty can kings afford  
   Than harmless silence? Then afford it me.  
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   Sufficeth, I may not, nor I will not tell thee.  
             King  
   Fetch forth the torturers: traitor as thou art,  
   I'll make thee tell.  
Hieronimo                         
   Indeed,  
   Thou may'st torment me, as his wretched son  
   Hath done in murd'ring my Horatio:  
   But never shalt thou force me to reveal  
   The thing which I have vow'd inviolate.  
   And therefore, in despite of all thy threats,  
   Pleas'd with their deaths, and eas'd with their revenge,  
   First take my tongue, and afterwards my heart.  
                               [He bites out his tongue]  
King  
   O monstrous resolution of a wretch!  
   See, Viceroy, he hath bitten forth his tongue,  
   Rather than to reveal what we requir'd.  
(The Spanish Tragedy, 4.4.180-191)   
When Kyd’s tyrant calls forth the torturers, he is summoning those instruments of kingly 
power that Elizabeth in her speech to Parliament claimed to use only sparingly. 
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Hieronimo’s response that torture cannot force him to reveal that which he has “vow’d 
inviolate” recalls, consciously or not, Boethius’s maxim that, as Elizabeth renders it, “the 
rule of any man stretche [as far] as the body alone”73 (Consolation 72). In her 
Consolation, as in The Spanish Tragedy, tyrannical means ultimately fail in the face of a 
heroic resistance that is heedless of bodily torment.  
Elizabeth’s translation places its sympathies with subjects rather than kings  
because Elizabeth is harnessing the rhetorical power of the Boethian renunciation of the 
tyrannical. Her translation gives new voice to the Consolation’s dismissal of the reckless 
exercise of power, which to Boethius is doomed to end in misery:  
The tyrant that proved the danger of his Lot, dissembled his Raigness 
feare by sword hanging on his head. What then is powre that can not 
chace bittes of Care nor then the stinges of feare? Will thye have to lyve 
secure, but may not, yet boast of their force? Dost thou suppose him 
mighty, who[m] thou seest can not what he wold, performe: dost thou 
think him strong that fills his sydes w[it]h garde[s], that whom he 
affrightes, himself doth feare? Who that he may seeme mighty, throwes 
himself to the hands of slaves? (85) 
The mind of the tyrant is never at rest. In the Boethian formula, the king who rules by 
fear, must in turn be ruled by fear, as he puts his life in the hands of the very slaves over 
                                                        
73 Rebecca Howard provides a fuller accounting of Kyd’s engagement with Boethius, particularly the idea 
of ghostly consolation. See Howard, 9-15.   
  
169 
whom he holds sway. All kings labor under the mistaken notion that their power has 
meaning, but the tyrant suffers most of all from the anxieties born of hatred. For 
Elizabeth, rendering this material in her own voice becomes an act of ascetic 
performance, an excellent example of Gavin Flood’s theoretical formulation that “the 
ascetic self shapes the narrative of her life to the narrative of tradition” (2). Not just this 
passage, but the Consolation as a whole and the very act of translating and 
disseminating it inoculate Elizabeth against the label of tyrant and distance her from the 
very Theodorics, Neros, and Caligulas who serve as its tyrannical examples. For a queen 
plagued by the specter of factional insurrection spurred on by the propaganda of rivals 
foreign and domestic, this rhetorical abrogation of tyranny is unmistakably political. Like 
her mask of virginity, it dissociates her from the worldly sphere where all appetites, 
bodily and political, take root.  
 Thus, somewhat counterintuitively, ascetic performance by kings can actually 
reify the very power it seems to renounce. Elizabeth and Philip both offer historical 
models of ascetic performance in action, but the Shakespearean stage presents similar 
examples of this paradox. In Richard III, for instance, Richard uses rumors of his ascetic 
nature to forestall the anxiety over his fitness to rule:  
Cat. He doth entreat your Grace, my noble lord, 
To visit him to-morrow or next day. 
He is within, with two right reverend fathers, 
Divinely bent to meditation; 
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And no worldly suit would he be mov’d, 
To draw him from his holy exercise.  
.......................................................... 
Buck. Ah, ha, my lord, this prince is not an Edward! 
He is not lolling on a lewd day-bed, 
But on his knees at meditation; 
Not dallying with a brace of courtezans, 
But meditating with two deep divines; 
Not sleeping, to engross his idle body, 
But praying, to enrich his watchful soul: 
Happy were England, would this gracious prince 
Take on himself the sovereignty thereof: 
But, sure, I fear, we shall ne'er win him to it. (3.7.59-64, 71-80) 
The image of Richard bent in “holy exercise” recalls the etymological root of the word 
asceticism: the ancient Greek word askein (to exercise or train). Buckingham’s claim that 
Richard turns away from sexual pleasure and sloth in pursuit of an almost monastic 
devotion to meditation legitimizes his fitness for the throne by distancing him from his 
sensual predecessor Edward IV. Murmurs of fratricidal violence are preemptively 
silenced by this constructed ascetical image, an image which Richard reinforces by 
initially renouncing the crown when first offered (3.7.144-162).  
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 Shakespeare demonstrates an understanding of the versatile energy of ascetic 
and renunciatory postures for those in power. In the next chapter, I will interrogate the 
multifaceted ways in which renunciation registers, somewhat unexpectedly, in 
Shakespeare’s most triumphant history play. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: PASSIONS FETTERED: RENUNCIANT KINGSHIP AND LITERARY 
RETRACTION IN HENRY V 
The act of literary retraction has long been an object of struggle for Chaucerians: 
how is one to interpret a final gesture, such as is found in The Canterbury Tales and 
Troilus and Criseyde, that renders inert if not worthless all that has come before? 
Looking back on the sum of his artistic creation, Chaucer feels impelled to renounce it, 
along with much of his other work that deals with the vanities of the material world:  
For oure book seith, “al that is writen is writen for our doctrine, and that 
is myn entente. Wherfore I biseke you mekely, for the mercy of God, that 
ye preye for me that Crist have mercy on me and foryeve me my giltes; 
and namely of my translacions and edytinges of worldly vanitees, the 
whiche I revoke in my retracciouns: as is the book of Troilus; the book 
also of Fame; the book of the XXV. Ladies; the book of the Duchesse; the 
book of Seint Valentynes day of the Parlement of Briddes; the tales of 
Caunterbury, thilke that sownen into synne; the book of the Leoun; and 
many another book, if they were in my remembrance, and many a song 
and many a lecherus lay, that Crist for his grete mercy foryeve me the 
synne. (X.1082-86) 
The challenge presented by the Retractions (and the entirety of the didactic Parson’s 
Tale which precedes it) has resulted in a multitude of critical explanations and apologies, 
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mainly split between those who, like David Aers and Melissa Furrow, find the 
renunciation sincere and those, such as Olive Sayce, Judson Boyce, and Theresa Moritz 
who find it ironic, forced, or a mere dramatic conceit. However, whether viewed as 
sincere or not, the Retractions are nevertheless rooted in the ascetic ethos of medieval 
catholicism in their renunciation of “lecherus” subject matter and “worldly vanitees” 
(1084).  
Although Shakespeare did not write retractions in a purely ascetic/Chaucerian 
fashion, the fact that his plays often conclude with a character or a choral figure uttering 
lines of moral crystallization or thematic summation can similarly frustrate or 
complicate a response to the text as a whole. In particular, the final lines of the Chorus 
in Henry V read as noticeably out of register with the play itself.  Norman Rabkin has 
recognized that the speech mitigates the optimism of the play’s military victories, noting 
that “the Epilogue wrenches us out of the paradise of comedy” by reminding us of the 
tragic fate that awaits England’s next generation (289).  However, these final lines also 
directly refute Henry’s assertions of providential authority and appear to situate the 
dramatized historical events within a universe that is arbitrary and patternless. This 
literary act of renunciation, like its religious counterparts, projects meaning across 
multiple fields, not only political but aesthetic. In renouncing Henry’s providential 
authority, the epilogue also comes dangerously close to being, in effect, a renunciation 
of the play itself, akin to the regretful impulse which John Tatlock sees at the heart of 
Chaucer’s Retractions (Tatlock 528).       
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At the same time, the play’s titular character, not a monkish figure at all, also 
speaks and acts in renunciatory ways throughout the play. Having inherited the crown 
from a usurper, Henry V employs ascetic language and attitudes for the purpose of 
strengthening his own rule; such language allows him to forestall charges of tyranny and 
sidestep questions about his culpability in waging war. Sitting upon a throne scarred by 
two generations of rebellion, Henry’s various renunciations function as a legitimization 
of his succession and as a performative justification of his war-making.   
 
The Renunciation of Providence  
With his enemies brought to heel, France and England united under a single 
crown, and the daughter of his enemy on his arm, King Henry V prepares to exit the 
stage to words of Christian connubial bliss and providential peace, spoken by Queen 
Isabel. It is God, “the best maker of all marriages,” who has sealed these pacts both 
domestic (Henry and Katherine) and political (England and France) (5.2.359). The 
extended matrimonial analogy does invite a note of darkness, with motherly warnings 
about “fell jealousy,” which can trouble the marriage bed as well as an alliance, and 
even lead to “divorce”: a word of some significance in Tudor England (5.2.331-339). 
However, the warning passes quickly, giving way to a utopian vision of a world where 
English and French are almost indistinguishable. Henry has his Kingdom, his betrothed, 
and, even in the eyes of his former enemies, the endorsement of God in these 
conquests. It is, as Lance Wilcox notes, a kind of whitewashing of the complex, blood 
  
175 
spattered warrior we have followed through four acts, though one whose optimism it is 
tempting to accept (74).74 However, before the sense of triumph can settle irrevocably, 
the Chorus reappears to recite a sonnet:  
  Thus far, with rough and all-unable pen, 
Our bending author hath pursu’d the story, 
In little room confining mighty men, 
Mangling by starts the full course of their glory. 
Small time; but in that small most greatly lived 
This star of England. Fortune made his sword; 
By which the world's best garden he achieved, 
And of it left his son imperial lord. 
Henry the Sixt, in infant bands crown'd King 
Of France and England, did this king succeed; 
Whose state so many had the managing, 
That they lost France and made his England bleed; 
Which oft our stage hath shown; and, for their sake, 
In your fair minds let this acceptance take. (Epilogue 1-14)                                 
That the Chorus speaks a sonnet is relevant to the rhetoric. Superimposed upon the 
classic Shakespearean 4/4/4/2 structure is the more ancient, balanced, and binary echo 
                                                        
74Henry’s wooing of Katherine in 5.1 has more than its share of critics, who fault it for its abuses of genre, 
its insipidness, its gender politics, etc.  See Hedrick, 471-472; Rabkin, 292. 
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of the Petrarchan octave and sestet. The octave, along with a final round of apologetics 
for the limitations of stagecraft, offers a retrospective on Henry V himself. Its sentiments 
repeat much of the rhetoric of the prologue and elsewhere, though the reference to 
“fortune” is, as Andrew Gurr notes, “particularly pointed” (Henry V, 2005 Epilogue 
7n.).75 Fortune is the blind goddess of arbitrary fate, a medieval inheritance still 
omnipresent in the Renaissance. As a trope, she is anti-providential, for she “by 
indiscriminate strokes” overthrows kingdoms, as Dame Philosophy tells Boethius (2.1). A 
more local reminder of her blindness is offered in the play by Pistol, distraught over the 
coming execution of Bardolph, who discourses upon Fortune with Fluellen:  
Pis. Bardolph, a soldier, firm and sound of heart,  
And of buxom valour, hath, by cruel fate,  
And giddy Fortune's furious fickle wheel,  
That goddess blind, 
That stands upon the rolling restless stone-- 
Flu. By your patience, Aunchient Pistol. Fortune is painted blind, with a 
muffler afore her eyes, to signify to you that Fortune is blind; and she is 
painted also with a wheel, to signify to you, which is the moral of it, that 
she is turning, and inconstant, and mutability, and variation: and her foot, 
look you, is fixed upon a spherical stone, which rolls, and rolls, and rolls. 
                                                        
75 The reference to fortune can be traced back to Holinshed, who describes Henry as “a captaine against 
whom fortune never frowned nor mischance once spurned, whose people him so severe a justice both 
loved and obeyed” (583).  
  
177 
In good truth, the poet makes a most excellent description of it. Fortune 
is an excellent moral. 
Pist. Fortune is Bardolph's foe, and frowns on him; 
For he hath stol’n a pax, and hanged must a be. (3.6.27-40) 
It would be possible to interpret the Chorus’s use of Fortune as a generalized 
personification of military triumph, if it were not for the fact that Shakespeare reminds 
the audience of her allegorical nature two acts earlier. Leslie Thompson has written of 
“the hope and the resignation that characterize the Renaissance attitude to Fortune,” 
and in the exchange above we see both Pistol’s resignation and Fluellen’s oblique 
reminder that a reversal of the wheel is never out of the question (L. Thompson n.p.).76 
That this blind huswife should be the force behind Henry’s sword amounts to a direct 
refutation of providence. It is a statement that complicates Henry’s claim that “God 
fought for us” (4.8.120).   
 Things get even worse in the sestet. The volta, occupying its Italian position 
between lines 8 and 9, turns the sonnet from Henry V to Henry VI, the tragic figure at 
the center of Shakespeare’s First Tetralogy. If the purpose of Henry and Katherine’s 
marriage is, like the ending of any comedy, to “guarantee the future” and to promise 
happiness to “the generations to come,” as Rabkin writes, what to make of this glimpse 
at coming calamity? (288).  By turning toward the generation to come in the sestet, 
                                                        
76 A great deal has been written on the subject of fortune, its use in medieval literature, and its relevance 
to Shakespeare. See Farnham, 78 and passim; Knight, 221; and Strohm, Politique 120-130. 
  
178 
Shakespeare also pulls back the curtain of comedy’s deceit that marriages form the 
perfect vehicle of social reinvigoration.77 Our first and only King of France and England, 
the boy who would change everything, is dispensed with, almost matter of factly, in six 
lines.  Henry VI’s loss of everything his father gained is well established historical and 
literary fact already, and that fact cannot be completely abrogated by mere silence; 
however, by raising his specter here in these final lines, Shakespeare effectively destroys 
any lingering providential euphoria; it is, in effect, a retraction.      
 The sonnet is similar to the contradictory voices that Joel Altman identifies in the 
choruses of Senecan tragedy influential to the development of early modern drama 
(Play of Mind 246). In its capacity of offering moral commentary on the play, the 
Senecan chorus “frequently disengages itself from the plot to adduce theses that offer 
new perspectives on the action,” which can often “run counter to the events of the 
play” (246). Such is the case here, where the chorus speaks as if he is not willing to 
accept the triumphant pageant just staged.78 The disconcerting wrench that Rabkin  
describes readers and audiences feeling as the epilogue registers is about more than a 
simple darkening of an otherwise (potentially) happy ending.  It is the result of a 
complete rupture of the play’s narrative momentum. In its effect, the final sonnet 
                                                        
77 For a study of the play’s comic elements and its relationship to comedy as a genre, see Barton. 
Anecdotally, based on my experience no line in any Shakespeare play—comedy, tragedy, or history—
produces a bigger laugh in an undergraduate literature class than Henry’s “Here comes your father” as 
delivered by Kenneth Branagh (5.2.279). 
78 Altman gives as an example the chorus in Theyestes, which treats the prospect of a feigned 
reconciliation between Atreus and his brother as if it were real (246).  
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approaches parabasis, defined by Paul de Man as both “the interruption of a discourse 
by a shift in rhetorical register” and, more thoroughly, as “a sudden revelation of the 
discontinuity between two rhetorical codes” (de Man 300). The term is doubly 
applicable, for the sonnet is parabasis in the first, more classical sense as a choral aside 
addressed to the audience, but de Man’s later definition more aptly captures the 
epilogue’s supreme narrative irony. The sonnet disturbs the illusion of the dramatic 
construct of the play in the way that all choral speeches and asides do, projecting 
discourse across the fourth wall that divides actor and audience, but it also, more 
significantly, reveals the illusory nature of all the Chorus’s previous declamations, and 
the play’s dramatizations, of Henry’s triumphs. In rejecting Henry’s providential 
authority and undermining the value of his victory, the epilogue lays bare the 
discontinuity between Henry’s religious propaganda and historical truth, between the 
neatness of a providential narrative and the more complex reality of opportunistic and 
impermanent conquest. 
In performance, the ironic disillusionment of the final parabasis can disappoint 
or confound in the same way as Chaucer’s Retractions; or, to use an early modern 
example, it mimics the experience of reading one of Shakespeare’s more asymmetrical, 
top loaded sonnets, in which the turn does not occur until the first word of the final 
couplet. When two lines ironically (re)solve fourteen lines of problematic tension, the 
suddenness of the resolution can be as disconcerting as satisfying. As Paul Fussell writes 
of such sonnets, “the gross imbalance” of build up and resolution “has about it 
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something vaguely risible” in which one is reminded of pins popping balloons (Fussell 
122). But, also like the non-dramatic example of Chaucer, for readers of the play the 
final sonnet invites a rereading of the text that considers Shakespeare’s rejection of 
providence from the outset. Just as some Chaucerians have used the retraction as a 
starting point for returning to the tales proper and locating textual evidence of 
Chaucer’s moral orthodoxy, so too can a deductive reexamination of Henry V (that is, 
one that takes the renunciation of providence as a logical premise) reveal the cracks in 
the play’s providential veneer. 79 
A play that seems on its face to embrace a providential vision of history, Henry V 
is in some sense the least problematic of Shakespeare’s English histories:  the complex 
triads and blurred boundaries of the Henry IV plays give way in Henry V to the clear 
oppositions of French and English, domestic and foreign, noble and common, and 
heroes and villains.  One early critic who embraced a providential reading of the play 
saw Henry’s victory as evidence of a pattern of divine retribution in which justice is 
delayed until the third generation, sparing Henry any backlash for his father’s deposition 
of Richard (Campbell 122). E.M.W. Tillyard, in his foundational study, constructs an 
elaborate providential framework in which Henry’s victories emerge as a momentary 
reversal in a process of national purgation culminating with Richmond’s victory at 
Bosworth in Richard III (Tillyard 234-314). Such providential readings have now mostly 
                                                        
79 For a moral reading of Chaucer’s Retractions, see Robertson, 369 
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fallen out of favor, in large part due to a reevaluation of Henry’s own character. The 
decades after Rabkin’s influential and thorough problematization of the play have 
brought a host of critical perspectives that have probed the fissures in the play’s 
providential veneer.  Herschel Baker makes note of Henry’s “hardness” of character in 
the exercise of war, particularly his “dreadful talk” before Harfleur and his killing of the 
French prisoners, though admits that he is “at his best” when indulging in patriotic 
rhetoric (976-977). Katharine Maus finds the play “not only deeply equivocal” about 
Henry’s heroism, but “self-consciously so” (“Henry V” 760). Joel Altman, in situating the 
play historically, explains the ambivalent portrayal of Henry’s adventure as a reflection 
of the “complexity of response” that the campaign to subdue Ireland in the 1590s 
engendered in Shakespeare’s audience (“Vile” 8).  Richard Van Oort sees even in the 
rousingly communal “We few, we happy few” a dangerous gesture towards elite 
factionalism that undermines the play’s patriotism (330). Such critical perspectives have, 
in fact, come to dominate the scholarly response to Henry V, seeing the play not as 
patriotic triumph but something potentially far darker. 
The source for the play’s providentialism is Henry’s own professed and publicly 
displayed Christian zeal, which stands in contrast to the profligacy of youthful Hal.  At 
the play’s outset he solicits both political and religious justification from the Archbishop 
of Canterbury for his invasion of France.  Henry would make his claim “with right and 
conscience,” as legitimacy is a necessary prerequisite for the providential backing he will 
appropriate. The worldly motives for his conquest—following his father’s advice to vent 
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aristocratic restlessness at an external and alien foe, outrunning the persistent legends 
of his truant youth, along with the more mundane and constant reasons for pursuing 
England’s interests on the continent—are all publicly subsumed by Henry himself 
beneath an outward show of legal and religious endorsement.  In the play’s first scene, 
the King acknowledges that the war must be undertaken “by God’s help” (1.2.222), God 
being the only figure capable of arbitrating the legitimacy of kingships, and Exeter, as 
the King’s herald, begins his ultimatum by insisting that Henry is himself God’s herald, 
and that the titles in question are ultimately a numinous loan: 
    He wills you, in the name of God Almighty, 
             That you divest yourself, and lay apart 
                         The borrowed glories that by gift of heaven, 
                         By law of nature and of nations, 'longs 
                          To him and to his heirs, namely, the crown 
                          And all wide-stretched honours that pertain 
                          By custom, and the ordinance of times, 
                          Unto the crown of France.  (2.4.77-84) 
In making what is, in effect, an exhortation to renunciation (divestment), Exeter draws 
distinctions here between several different levels of authority. Henry’s claim to the 
throne stems from a threefold legitimacy: divine law, natural law (as his is the blood 
closest to the legitimate line), and the law of “nations,” by which is meant formal laws 
fixed by documentation. To reinforce this third branch of Henry’s legitimacy, Exeter then 
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produces a genealogical document, a codified representation of Henry’s link to King 
Philip IV through Queen Isabella.  The French claim, meanwhile, rests on the inferior 
foundation of common law and historical accident—“custom and the ordinance of 
times”—which must yield to codified precedent.  
 The French, prior to the play’s opening, had attempted to counter Henry’s legal 
legitimacy with documented legal precedent of their own: the “Salic law” that forms the 
subject of the play’s opening debate. Having heard the Archbhisop’s demolition of the 
Salic argument, however, Exeter preemptively distinguishes Henry’s straightforward 
claim from the French legal argument, which is based on an obscure Carolingian edict of 
uncertain jurisdiction, an “awkward claim/picked from the wormholes of long-vanish’d 
days” and “from the dust of old oblivion rak’d” (2.4.85-87). The ultimate purpose of this 
legal wrangling is to establish that Henry’s invasion has the backing of divine providence 
as a cause of “right” and “conscience,” and that the shape of divine providence can be 
determined by the authority of earthly laws. This begs the question of how Henry’s 
public assertions of providential authority reflect the play’s own sense of reality: in 
other words, whether all this talk of providence is merely a political tactic meant to 
shore up domestic support, a self-delusion born of kingly pride, or whether Shakespeare 
truly is writing a providential play. 
The theological basis for a providential reading of history has its own uncertain 
history. From patristic times, Church fathers had sought to reconcile material suffering 
with providential possibility.  The question, which predates Christianity itself, is how 
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God’s hand may be witnessed on Earth.  The earliest Church fathers, despite suffering 
under the yoke of persecution, were optimistic. Tertullian, for instance, saw God’s 
providence as unquestionable, and saw all suffering of the righteous as a justifiable 
symptom of God’s guidance: “It is the winnowing fan whereby God cleanses the Church, 
separating the martyrs from the deniers” (Roberts 141).  
Augustine complicated the issue by establishing two levels of providence: 
general and particular, but he remained insistent about the supremacy of God’s will. 
Augustine rejected arbitrary chance and fortune, explaining the suffering of the good 
and the happiness of the wicked as part of a fundamentally providential worldview: 
For if every sin were now visited with manifest punishment, nothing 
would seem to be reserved for the final judgment; on the other hand, if 
no sin received now a plainly divine punishment, it would be concluded 
that there is no divine providence at all.  And so of the good things of this 
life:  if God did not by a very visible liberality confer these on some of 
those persons who ask for them, we should say that these good things 
were not at His disposal; and if He gave them to all who sought them, we 
should suppose that such were the only rewards of His service; and such 
a service would make us not godly, but greedy rather, and covetous. (City 
of God 8.6)  
The “problem” with the Augustinian view, obviously, is that it acknowledges the 
difficulty in distinguishing between providential shape and arbitrary shapelessness.  In 
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other words,  while Augustine asserts that there is value in occasional manifestations of 
special providence, its practical distinction from a world governed by Fortune—where 
good and evil may triumph and suffer according to arbitrary rather than divine 
patterns—is not readily apparent.  
Theological questions about providence stand separate from questions about its 
political utility. Aligning political and military motives with the will of God, particularly in 
public oratory, is a challenge faced by Henry in justifying his invasion. Providential 
language allows princes and executives to frame political action within a narrative of 
moral binaries: good vs. evil, God vs. the Devil, etc., and to mitigate if not disguise 
entirely practical causes and motives.   To use a familiar example, Queen Elizabeth, in 
one version of her speech to the troops at Tillbury, labels the Spanish not simply the 
enemies of England, but “the enemies of my God” (Levin 144).  The asserted 
righteousness of the combat, a rhetorical device meant to inspire, does not, however, 
stand on its own, but rather is paired with secular and material incentives: honor and 
financial reward (Elizabeth speaks of “virtues in the field,” an ends with a promise that 
“rewards and crowns…shall be duly paid”) (144). Providential justice, honor, and 
material gain form a network of incentives that all contribute to rallying support for 
Elizabeth’s military cause.  
These same three incentives are at work in Henry V. Material gain is at the 
forefront of Pistol’s thoughts when he implores his compatriots of Eastcheap to descend 
“like horse-leeches” on France “to suck, to suck, the very blood to suck” (2.3.55-56). 
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Such rapacity finds a more understated articulation in Henry’s longing to rule over 
France’s “ample empery” (1.2.226). Honor forms the theme of Henry’s St. Crispin’s Day 
Speech (just as avoidance of its opposite, shame, in the exhortation before the walls of 
Harfleur).  However, it is providence that is most central, at least in the play’s first four 
acts. Henry’s repeated invocation of God’s endorsement has struck some critics as self-
conscious, if not nakedly Machiavellian. Peter Parolin, for instance, finds Henry’s “godly 
self-presentation” to be “untrustworthy,” noting a “disjunctive gap” between the King’s 
providential rhetoric and his campaign’s mundane reality (49). Matthew J. Smith, 
meanwhile, views Henry’s providential language as part of an embrace of the theatrical 
in kingship, allowing him to evade difficult questions about cause by appealing to the 
reifying forces of the ceremonial (417).80 The providential claims themselves are 
numerous. Henry’s first scene does not end before he invokes providence three times: 
by “God’s help” they will bend France or break it (1.2.224); by “God’s grace” they will 
play a victory set of tennis in Paris (1.2.262); and all their hopes for conquest lie “within 
the will of God”(1.2.289). Parolin finds this to be an unconvincing performance, and 
claims of divine sanction are undercut by the first scene, conventional anti-catholic 
boilerplate that reveals Henry to be a useful dupe of scheming bishops. Maurice Hunt 
writes that the plotting bishops “accentuate…the [anachronistic] protestantism” of 
Henry’s godliness (187). However, they also deal a crippling blow to an uncritical 
                                                        
80 For more on Henry’s use of the ceremonial, see Zeeveld, 1–173; Hardin, 124–63; and  Knapp, 115–40 
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acceptance of either divine or legal justification. Knowing that the Archbishop urges 
Henry on merely to distract him from a bill put forth by the House of Commons that 
would strip the church of “temporal lands” bequeathed it by “men devout” (1.1.9), it is 
hard to take seriously his over the top genealogizing in 1.2. Canterbury’s Salic Law 
speech, taken almost verbatim from Holinshed, climaxes with an assertion that Henry’s 
claim to the crown is “clear as is the summer’s sun” (1.2.86), a line that I would argue is 
written to get a laugh, and is frequently played as such in modern performances.81 But 
whether the line is funny or not, Henry’s response, “May I with right and conscience 
make this claim?” (1.2.96), indicates that he, at least, failed to follow the twists and 
turns, and thus needs to prompt Canterbury for a more direct endorsement. 
Canterbury’s response to this question is perhaps even more confounding:  
The sin upon my head, dread sovereign! 
For in the book of Numbers is it writ, 
When the man dies, let the inheritance 
Descend unto the daughter. Gracious lord, 
Stand for your own, unwind your bloody flag, 
Look back into your mighty ancestors: 
Go, my dread lord, to your great-grandsire's tomb, 
From whom you claim; invoke his warlike spirit, 
                                                        
81 See, for instance, the 1989 film directed by Kenneth Branagh, in which this line is greeted by chuckles 
throughout the council.  
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And your great-uncle's, Edward the Black Prince, 
Who on the French ground play'd a tragedy, 
Making defeat on the full power of France, 
Whiles his most mighty father on a hill 
Stood smiling to behold his lion's whelp 
Forage in blood of French nobility. (1.2.97-110) 
John Mattox sees the Archbishop’s willing acceptance of the sin upon his head (evoking 
the response of the Jews to Pilate in Matthew 27:25) as evidence of the sincerity of his 
argument, and therefore antecedent to a classification of Henry as a “just warrior” 
(Mattox 33). However, whether Henry is justified in his own mind or not, the Archbishop 
is rather silent on divine will. The tortuous legalese of his Salic Law arguments are more 
evocative of the courtroom than the cathedral, and lawyerly behavior in Shakespeare is 
generally prima facie evidence of dishonesty.82 And in this final exhortation, the 
Archbishop turns to the secular motivations of honor, ancestry, and filial pride 
(motivators that Henry himself will use both at Harfleur and Agincourt). Even the Biblical 
justification, on its face a hint of providential potential, lacks binding force, being drawn 
from the cultural law of the Old Testament, which both catholics and protestants alike in 
                                                        
82 Shakespeare’s disparagement of lawyers approaches ubiquity. O. Hood Phillips tersely opens his 
chapter on Shakespeare’s representation of lawyers with the claim that “[t]here are no complimentary 
references to lawyers…in any of the plays” (Phillips 62).  From a historical perspective, Rosemary O’Day, in 
considering the reputation of lawyers in the seventeenth century, notes that people generally accepted as 
a given that lawyers were “partial and corrupt” in the cause of their clients and that charges of “avarice, 
manipulation, and downright corruption were legion” (O’Day 14). Henry himself seems conscious of the 
potential for lawyerly manipulation of the truth by the Archbishop (1.2.12-16).  
  
189 
the seventeenth  century would have considered theologically non-binding, valuable 
only as raw material for allegorical exegesis (Killeen 494).  
Henry’s own doubts about his providential authority emerge in the play’s fourth 
act. In the play’s only soliloquy, the king, who moments before defended his cause and 
its justice to his men in disguise, offers a prayer to the “God of Battles” to give courage 
to his soldiers and, perhaps more importantly, to spare him from any punishment for his 
father’s deposition of Richard II:  
O, not to-day, think not upon the fault 
My father made in compassing the crown! 
I Richard's body have interred new; 
And on it have bestowed more contrite tears, 
Than from it issued forced drops of blood: 
Five hundred poor I have in yearly pay, 
Who twice a-day their wither'd hands hold up 
Toward heaven, to pardon blood; and I have built 
Two chantries, where the sad and solemn priests 
Sing still for Richard's soul. More will I do 
Though all that I can do is nothing worth; 
Since that my penitence comes after all, 
Imploring pardon. (4.1.292-303) 
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This prayer, with its catalogue of good works, demonstrates just how much of Henry’s 
providential bravado is actually little more than public image construction. The 
desperate prayer of act four shows not a king confident in God’s help, but one who is 
terrified of his wrath.  Tillyard, Campbell, and other early proponents of a providential 
reading offer explanations for why Henry is allowed to triumph despite the uncertainty 
of his claim to the English throne, but they do not account for Henry’s own self-
consciousness about this fact. The transferring of Richard’s body to a new burial ground, 
the construction of chantries and the employment of the poor to ease his soul’s passage 
through Purgatory, even the king’s own “contrite tears” speak to his doubts about the 
justice of his own cause.83 If his father gained the crown by a “fault,” a rather startling 
admission, then it not only calls into question Henry’s own legitimacy but the 
justification of his entire invasion. “No King of England if not King of France,” Henry 
declares at the outset of the war (2.2.194), and logically the inverse must be true as 
well. The distance between the self-doubt of this moment and the certainty with which 
he carries himself before his army reveal Henry’s providential claims to be little more 
than a strategy of public performance, to set at ease every mind but his own.  
 
                                                        
83 Paul Strohm explains the political utility of the historical Henry’s treatment of Richard II’s corpse (which 
Shakespeare took from Holinshed) as an act that helped to legitimize his rule by appropriating Richard as 
a kind of spiritual father in place of Henry IV : “Richard’s reburial may thus be seen as Henry’s 
exceptionally imaginative and adroit attempt to encourage and effect a form of transference—in this 
case, a transference of emotional affiliations from Richard’s residual aura to his own” (Strohm, Usurpation 
117). For the entire analysis, see Strohm, Usurpation 101-127.   
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The Ascetic Hero 
My argument that the renunciation of kingly providence in the Epilogue serves 
as an effective starting point for reading Henry’s providential rhetoric throughout the 
play as strategic, helps as well in an interrogation of Henry’s own renunciatory rhetoric.  
When the Archbishop takes upon his head any sin for the invasion in 1.2, he is nothing if 
not calculating; he is, in fact, working upon the king’s public image. Henry has already 
evinced a sensitivity to the question of guilt in an illegal war, warning Canterbury:  
For God doth know how many now in health 
Shall drop their blood in approbation 
Of what your reverence shall incite us to. 
Therefore take heed how you impawn our person, 
How you awake our sleeping sword of war-- 
We charge you, in the name of God, take heed; 
For never two such kingdoms did content 
Without much fall of blood, whose guiltless drops 
Are every one a woe, a sore complaint,  
‘Gainst him whose wrongs gives edge unto the swords 
 That makes such waste in brief mortality. (1.2.18-23)  
This is but one of several instances in which Henry seemingly renounces his own will. 
What he does, whether it is just or not, he will only do because he is incited to, not 
because he chooses to. The “wrongs” that give edge to those swords that will shed the 
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blood of innocents will belong, therefore, not to him. It is a rather extraordinary 
comment for a king to make, especially one as daring and courageous as Henry. 
However, as Bradley Greenburg notes, it fits a pattern of “self-exculpation” wherein the 
king repeatedly shelters himself from blame (Greenburg 184 ). Moments later in the 
scene, Henry will shift to the moral ledger of the Dauphin the “thousands” who will 
suffer in the coming war, who will die not as a result of Henry’s invasion but because of 
the Dauphin’s irreverent stubbornness. Henry’s stated belief that any victims of the sack 
of Harfleur will be “guilty in defense” (3.1.124), responsible for their own suffering 
(including rape and infanticide) if they choose go on fighting, may be justifiable by 
certain standards of medieval war, but his gory rhetoric lacks “a certain moral force” 
when uttered at the head of invading army (Greenblatt, “Bullets” 42).84   
Such renunciation of agency should not be taken as emblematic of the king’s 
passivity, but rather, as Greenburg writes, as “a proactive, confrontational response to 
the exigencies of kingship” (184).  Greenburg sees Henry (more or less as the king sees 
himself) as embodying two natures: a hero king with a catalogue of gesta (deeds, in 
medieval Latin, often but not always military in nature), and a saint, clothed in the 
trappings of divine will (186). Henry himself describes this bifurcated vision of his own 
humanity, albeit in generalized terms, in his speech at Harfleur:  
                                                        
84 E.A. Rauchut provides the relevant legal context for Henry’s charge of guilt by defense (55-57).  
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In peace there's nothing so becomes a man 
As modest stillness and humility: 
But when the blast of war blows in our ears, 
Then imitate the action of the tiger; 
Stiffen the sinews, summon up the blood, 
Disguise fair nature with hard-favoured rage. (3.1.2-8) 
“Stillness and humility,” resonate as essentially ascetic affectations, at least in the 
broadest sense of the term ascetic.85 Even in a narrower, more particularly religious 
sense, both stillness and humility register ascetically, being often cited by monastic and 
eremitic writers as sine qua non virtues of an exalted life.86 Other points in the play 
likewise point to the king’s emotional temperance and restraint. When the Dauphin’s 
ambassador timidly asks if he is safe to speak freely should his words provoke anger, 
Henry reassures him:  
  We are no tyrant, but a Christian king, 
Unto whose grace our passion is as subject 
As are our wretches fett’red in our prisons; 
Therefore with frank and with uncurbed plainness 
                                                        
85 As discussed in the introduction, Patrick Olivelle defines asceticism both broadly and narrowly. Of his 
broad definition, he writes: “[a]s control and discipline inflicted on individual bodies and appetites, 
asceticism (large and loose) is perhaps the most essential ingredient of culture and social living—it is the 
operating system of the cultural computer” (Olivelle 28).  
86 Stillness, humility, and dispassion--another proclaimed Henrician virtue--were all singled out as 
essential components of the eremitic system of the Patristic ascetic John Climacus, as well as other desert 
monks of the earliest Christian times. See Ryrie, 139-40; and 205-206; .    
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Tell us the Dolphin's mind. (1.2.240-244) 
Both the sentiment and the imagery are redolent of the monastic. Henry’s passions are 
fettered by his grace like prisoners; the word grace signals that his even-headedness is 
explicitly religious in origin, while the metaphorical chains and prisoners evoke bodily 
enclosure itself. In fact, what Henry describes here is a version of what in ascetic 
theology is termed dispassion, the restraint of emotions, particularly the emotions of 
personal involvement. According to John Climacus, dispassion, apatheia, is part of the 
ladder of divine ascent, a discipline to be ranked alongside celibacy and silence toward 
the exaltation of the soul (Ware 32). Like stillness and humility, dispassion exemplifies 
religious will suppressing bodily and psychological instinct. Dispassion, though perhaps 
not termed such, was also one of the branches of ascetic action that remained highly 
thought of well into the post-Reformation period. While Calvinist theology would not 
permit the idea of pure self-sufficiency or the presumptuous notion of the complete 
mastering of passions, protestants of the late sixteenth century did nevertheless praise 
the effort to bring the passions under control after the stoic model of Seneca (Aggeler 
223-224). An example of late sixteenth century writing on dispassion is the Neostoical 
treatise The French Academie, penned by Huguenot Pierre de La Primauday and 
translated into English in 1594. De La Primauday singles out mastering of the passions as 
a natural outgrowth of Christian grace (careful to avoid the implication that such 
continence amounts to an example of salvation through works):  
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[O]ur passions, properly called perturbations according to the 
philosophers whence all the miseries and evils of mankinde prouceed, 
and whereof we minde chiefly to speake…come from our will, corrupted 
by the provocations and allurements of the flesh, and which wholly 
resiste the divine nature of the reasonauble parte of the soule, fastening 
it to the bodie with the naile of pleasure…and although passion be 
contrarie to reason…yet reason, by the meanes of Godes grace, can both 
easily constraine, master, and compel all passions in such sort, that they 
shall take no effect. (La Primauday 31-32).  
Henry, after Primauday’s model, asserts that his passions are “subject” to Grace; that is, 
subsumed beneath the salutatory faith of a “Christian king.” That Henry shortly loses his 
temper after the revelation of the Dauphin’s tennis balls casts doubt on the 
completeness of his dispassion; though such doubts as to veracity do not abrogate the 
role of dispassion in his constructed public image.  
These ascetic virtues, however, serve an explicitly political purpose, in much the 
same way as has been already discussed above. Henry is not dispassionate in seclusion 
as part of a program of imitatio Christi; rather, he proclaims his dispassion in audience 
with his council and the delegate of his enemy. His purpose in doing so is as he himself 
says: to demonstrate that he is no tyrant, that the cool and temperate winds of grace 
keep the temptations to exploit power in check. In other words, to shield himself from 
the type of charges that terrorized and ultimately destroyed the last two kings. It is 
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useful to recall here Gavin Flood’s thesis that asceticism is always essentially 
performative, “enacted within a community and tradition,” but with the purpose of 
appropriating that tradition toward subjective ends (7). Henry, in performing both the 
suppression of his own will and the restraint of his passions, is exploiting tradition as 
part of his project of legitimization. Hal learned this strategy early on, as demonstrated 
in his most famous act of renunciation in 2 Henry IV:  
I know thee not, old man: fall to thy prayers; 
How ill white hairs become a fool and jester! 
I have long dream'd of such a kind of man, 
So surfeit-swell'd, so old and so profane; 
But, being awaked, I do despise my dream. 
Make less thy body hence, and more thy grace; 
Leave gormandizing; know the grave doth gape 
For thee thrice wider than for other men. 
Reply not to me with a fool-born jest: 
Presume not that I am the thing I was; 
For God doth know, so shall the world perceive, 
That I have turned away my former self; 
So will I those that kept me company. 
When thou dost hear I am as I have been, 
Approach me, and thou shalt be as thou wast, 
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The tutor and the feeder of my riots: 
Till then, I banish thee, on pain of death, 
As I have done the rest of my misleaders, 
Not to come near our person by ten mile.   (5.5.45-63) 
The most important aspect of this renunciation is its context. Hal waits for the moment 
of maximal political benefit to renounce Falstaff and the bodily excesses for which he is 
a walking allegory. The coronation procession is not simply a public event, it is the 
supreme theater of royal ceremony, the moment during which Hal’s position in the 
public consciousness cannot be more prominent. Hal has already performed various 
rehearsals of this renunciation over the course of two plays (the play within the play, 
the flinging away of the sack at Shrewsbury, the farewell to Falstaff’s “corpse” after his 
fight with Douglas), but only in this final, theatrical gesture does he reap the political 
rewards of renunciation. The general renunciatory speech-act of Falstaff’s banishment 
contains within it specifically ascetic commands and declarations: most obviously that 
Falstaff “leave gormandizing” and make his swollen body less.87 But Hal’s claim that he 
has “turned away” from his youthful errancy also evokes, intentionally or not, ascetic 
tradition and the refashioning of the self “away from old habits and defilements” (Flood 
161).88  Hal is no longer the thing he was, a sentiment that speaks to the fulfillment of 
                                                        
87 Kristin Poole argues that Falstaff’s obesity is characteristic of anti-Puritan satire, particularly that found 
in the Anti-Marprelate pamphlets and plays (16-44).  
88 Richard Valantasis provides a general definition of asceticism as the refashioning of the self: “Asceticism 
may be defined as performances designed to inaugurate an alternative culture, enable different social 
relations, and to create a new identity” (548).  
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ascetic aspiration. The new king adopts the mantle of the born again or, perhaps, the 
convert; as D.J. Palmer notes, the renunciation of Falstaff fits St. Paul’s exhortation in 
Ephesians to put aside the old man and embrace the new (Palmer 12). However, the 
turn away in this instance is nakedly political, an act of public self-legitimation.  That this 
renunciatory performance has its desired effect is attested to by the conversation 
between Fluellen and Gower in Henry V:  
Fluellen: If you mark Alexander's life well, Harry of Monmouth's life is 
come after It indifferent well; for there is figures in all things. Alexander, 
God knows, and you know, in his rages, and his furies, and his wraths, 
and his cholers, and his moods, and his displeasures, and his indignations, 
and also being a little intoxicates in his prains, did, in his ales and his 
angers, look you, kill his best friend, Cleitus. 
Gower: Our king is not like him in that: he never killed any of his friends. 
Fluellen: It is not well done, mark you now take the tales out of my 
mouth, ere it is made and finished. I speak but in the figures and 
comparisons of it: as Alexander killed his friend Cleitus, being in his ales 
and his cups; so also Harry Monmouth, being in his right wits and his 
good judgments, turned away the fat knight with the great belly-doublet: 
he was full of jests, and gipes, and knaveries, and mocks; I have forgot his 
name. 
Gower: Sir John Falstaff. (4.7.31-51) 
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Not only is Henry’s renunciation of Falstaff remembered by Fluellen and Gower, but it 
has become, in effect, part of the king’s legend, one that in Fluellen’s somewhat dizzying 
inverse logic connects him to that most legendary of monarchs, Alexander the Great. 
The act has secured Henry’s place in history, while Falstaff’s name is tellingly forgotten 
by Fluellen. In 1 Henry IV, Hal promised that his reputational resurrection would be 
activated by the killing of Hotspur in battle (“I will redeem all this on Percy’s head”) 
(3.2.132); however, it is not valor but restraint, silence, dispassion, humility and the 
nexus of ascetic virtues that liberate Henry V from the shadow of Eastcheap. The 
renunciation of Falstaff and the refashioning of his self become the great gesta of Hal’s 
personal history, providing the reputational and political capital to pursue the foreign 
adventure that perpetually eluded his embattled father.  
But unlike a monastic, Henry confines these virtues of stillness, humility, and 
dispassion to their proper sphere: peace. Temperance must be laid aside to “imitate the 
action of the tiger” (3.1.6). War allows, even necessitates, the purposeful embrace of 
anger and violence: thus his ability before the gates of Harfleur not only to exhort his 
men to violence, but to threaten its residents with the most horrific atrocities. Again, at 
Agincourt, Henry finds opportunity to vent the ruthlessness he is so proud to contain by 
ordering the execution of all his French prisoners. The battlefield is its own kind of stage, 
with its own active and verbal lexicon of authority and legitimation. Henry is adept at 
playing both monk and soldier, and each guise forms an essential part of his kingly 
  
200 
identity.  Still, even before the battle of Agincourt, in his most famous performance of 
all, Henry sounds a quasi-ascetic note: 
  God’s will, I pray thee wish not one man more. 
  By Jove, I am not covetous for gold,  
  Nor care I who doth feed upon my cost;  
  It yearns me not if men my garments wear;  
  Such outward things dwell not in my desires. (4.3.23-27) 
By renouncing attachment to gold, food, clothing, and any “outward things,” (a fairly 
precise translation of the Boethian externa bona) Henry employs ascetical discourse; 
however, it is a strikingly secular version of asceticism, for in this instance the 
immaterial thing that is sought in place of the material is not religious exaltation, but 
militaristic honor.89 The immaterial nature of honor has already been discoursed upon in 
the Tetralogy by Falstaff in 1H4: honor cannot heal the sick, nor be seen, nor felt. It is 
“air, a trim reckoning” (1H4 5.1.135). In Shakespeare’s most dramatic theater of war on 
the field of Agincourt, honor, rather than religion, becomes the antithesis to the tyrant’s 
greed. In thus privileging it, Henry positions himself as doubly removed from tyranny, 
not only Christian but honorable, following two indices of conduct that reject 
                                                        
89 The idea that the pursuit of immaterial honor can dampen the need for the necessities of the flesh can be 
identified elsewhere in Shakespeare. In Antony and Cleopatra, Antony is said to have been able to survive 
famine conditions after a disastrous military defeat by drinking horse urine—“the stale of horses”—and 
“with patience more than savages could suffer” eating “the roughest berry and the rudest hedge” (1.4.60-
64). Sexual desire can also wane in the single-minded soldier. Lady Percy complains in 1 Henry IV that 
Hotspur has made her “a banish’d woman” from his bed, and given away her sexual rights to thoughts of 
the battlefield (2.3.39-50).  Henry might even sound a note of this Hotspurian celibacy when he tells 
Katherine that he is merely a “plain soldier” with no gift for wooing (Henry V 5.1.131-165). 
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materiality. Honor may be mundane, and its pursuit may even be antithetical to the 
grace that holds sway over Henry’s passions—Henry himself admits the possibility that it 
is a “sin” to covet it (4.3.28)—but as an abstraction it functions well enough as a stand-
in for the spiritual in the typical oppositional dialectic that defines asceticism. The 
message, believable or not, is that no such king could possibly pursue war out of self-
interest. No rhetorical moment in Shakespeare demonstrates more effectively the 
flexibility of ascetic language across fields and power systems. That the play casts 
doubts on Henry’s authenticity only reinforces the fact that such discourse from a king is 
almost invariably political: not a protestation of faith or scruples, but a strategy whose 
explicit purpose is the exercise of the very power it seems to negate.       
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CONCLUSION 
 
 Whether as embodied on the stage, as seen in history, or as imagined in the 
mind, ascetic acts had the power to affect more than the spiritual state of their 
practitioners in Tudor and Stuart culture; such acts very often (invariably, as theorists 
such as Flood argue) were directed outwards, to an audience whose responses the 
practitioner hoped to shape or direct.  A persecuted catholic, either in prison or in the  
theater of the gallows, could embrace some of the most extreme manifestations of 
asceticism as a means of resistance. So too could women, caught in the machinery of 
patriarchal culture, wield renunciant vows as a shield against encroachments on their 
subjectivity.  Even monarchs, speaking from the apex of vertical hierarchy, could 
manipulate ascetic discourse for various ends. Ultimately, asceticism, like any type of 
discourse, has the flexibility granted to it by the shifting social positions of its actors and 
audience.   
 
The Limitations of the Study 
It is common in the social sciences to conclude a dissertation with a confession 
of the study’s limitations. While such apologia is not customary in the humanities, I wish 
nevertheless to discuss some areas for further inquiry which the exigencies of 
circumstance kept out of the current work.  
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 The most obvious omission is a chapter on revenge tragedy, a genre long 
recognized for its utilization of memento mori imagery and de contemptu mundi 
philosophical conceits. Such vestiges of cultural asceticism provide a rhetorical and 
ideological framework for revengers to strike at tyrannical authority. Both Hamlet and 
The Spanish Tragedy utilize the subversive potential of ascetic utterances. Hamlet, for 
example, is not actually able to kill Claudius until after his apotheosis in the graveyard. 
This scene dramatizes the moment in which the revenger grasps the rationalization that 
will allow him to act against a sitting king. The highly traditional ubi sunt poem elicited 
by the sight of Yorick’s skull very quickly shifts to a more directly relevant subject: the 
transience of royal power itself. Yorick’s skull becomes Caesar’s and Alexander’s, and  
Hamlet’s realization that “[i]mperious Cæsar, dead and turn’d to clay/ Might stop a hole 
to keep the wind away,” is followed immediately by the entrance of Claudius, whose 
political authority, in that moment, has been stripped of all significance through its 
juxtaposition with the image of ancient kings stopping beer barrels (5.1.213-214). 
Meanwhile, the action of The Spanish Tragedy, as only gestured toward in the third 
chapter of this study, is driven by a central figure who is empowered by an ascetic 
posture that combines Boethian contemptus mundi with the self-mutilation of pagan 
Stoicism. 
 Another Shakespearean figure worth considering through the lens of my 
argument is the civil renunciant: he who renounces his civic or national identity as a 
means of freeing himself from forms of restraint or domination demanded by law or 
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custom. For instance, in Timon of Athens, Timon’s renunciation of Athenian society (and 
his descent into misanthropy) severs his ties with the debt-based economy in which he 
finds himself ensnared. Debt functions in the play as materialistic proxy for the Boethian 
wheel of fortune that the poet and painter discuss in the play’s opening.  In the 
wilderness beyond the walls of the city, Timon—“no idle votarist”—is empowered to 
resist and strike back at fortune, using his serendipitous gold not to reenter the 
Athenian economy, but to help Alcibiades raze the city and massacre his bondholders 
(4.3.27). Coriolanus, like Timon, plots the destruction of his native city after he is 
shamed by the demands of his countrymen. Unwilling to subject his body to the gaze of 
the plebeians, his renunciation of Rome (which follows the pronunciation of his 
banishment) liberates him from the necessities of political compromise and allows him 
to pursue an existence of purely personal agency. His renunciant fantasy of becoming a 
“lonely dragon” in his fen, cut off from all social connections, ultimately goes unfulfilled. 
Like Timon, his final fate reifies the political authority of Rome, mirroring Elizabethan 
orthodoxy about the dangers of antisocial behavior and misanthropy, as well as evoking 
actual historical exiles such as Edmund Campion, whose death at the hands of the 
Elizabethan state similarly confirmed the structural and authoritative integrity of the 
regime.  
 Shakespearean comedy has been discussed in this study with a particular 
emphasis on celibacy, but the discourse of renunciation registers in other ways in the 
genre. Love’s Labours Lost presents one of the most concrete examples of ascetic 
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renunciation in Shakespeare, and the King of Navarre’s belief that renouncing sex and 
marriage offers a vehicle to fame through knowledge presents an interesting case of the 
secular rewards of renunciation. As You Like It, meanwhile, presents renunciation of 
court life as politically empowering for Duke Senior and his loyal men in the forest of 
Arden.  The woods to which they have been banished are “more free” than the court 
with its litany of worldly vanities and its poisonous currents of flattery (2.1.1-18). The 
pastoral mode offers an effective framework to engage in such communal renunciation, 
building on a tradition of anti-court satire found in works such as John Skelton’s Bowge 
of Court and Spenser’s Colin Clout’s Come Home Againe.  
 King Lear, with its recurring references to divestment and nothingness, would 
likewise seem potentially relevant to a discussion of ascetic renunciation in 
Shakespeare. On the heath, stripped of all his earthly authority and material 
possessions, Lear embraces fully the buffeting winds of fortune’s storm through literal 
divestment.  His exhortation—“Pour on, I will endure”—sounds a note of ascetic 
patience in the face of suffering. Finally, his imaginative transformation of imprisonment 
with Cordelia to an ideal life of communal claustration, in which father and daughter are 
protected from worldly vanities and supported by their mutual comfort, evokes similar 
responses to imprisonment discussed above in Chapter 2: 
   Come, let’s away to prison:  
  We two alone will sing like birds I’th’cage; 
  When thou dost ask my blessing, I’ll kneel down 
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  And ask of thee forgiveness. So we’ll live,  
  And pray, and sing, and tell old tales, and laugh 
  At gilded butterflies, and hear poor rogues 
  Talk of court news, and we’ll talk with them too— 
  Who loses and who wins; who’s in, who’s out— 
  And take upon us the mystery of things 
  As if we were God’s spies; and we’ll wear out 
  In a wall’d prison, packs and sects of great ones,  
  That ebb and flow by th’moon. (5.3.8-18) 
Lear and Cordelia will “live, and pray, and sing,” and in doing so embrace the “mystery 
of things,” while forsaking the vain intrigues of public life. As with Palamon and Arcite, 
the echo of the monastic ideal is readily apparent.  
The topic of asceticism in early modern literature need not be limited to 
Shakespeare or the stage. No one has yet, to my knowledge, undertaken a study of 
asceticism in Spenser’s Faerie Queene, always fertile ground for theologically centered 
criticism. The Faerie Queene shares with the Elizabethan Settlement of 1559 (its most 
immediate doctrinal context) a statist agenda in which devotion to nation and devotion 
to the church are harmoniously aligned, and in which service to the state is extolled as 
divine “vocation” in the Calvinist sense.  Calvin rejected the notion that monasticism 
represented a higher Christian calling, averring that true holiness lay in men fulfilling the 
worldly and productive vocation to which God had assigned them in life. Calvin’s holy 
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vocation takes the form of heroic action in Spenser’s epic. In Book VI, for instance, the 
ransacking of the cloister by the Blatant Beast not only evokes England’s ruined 
monasteries that still stood as striking symbols of catholic presumption, but 
demonstrates the failure of ascetic renunciation to act as a true shield against worldly 
corruption. In Book I, meanwhile, Despair, a figure whose impoverished appearance 
exaggerates monkish penury, tempts The Redcrosse Knight to succumb to the easy 
answer of ascetic renunciation and contemptus mundi. The figure of Despair 
demonstrates the obvious danger of an ascetic theology being followed out to its logical 
extreme, for those too ready to accept the meaninglessness of the material world and 
too eager to reject the efficacy of human action would have no reason to shun suicide, 
which becomes the ultimate gesture of cleansing self-flagellation. The victories of 
Redcrosse and Sir Calidore, it could be argued, establish a new Christian paradigm in 
which service to the state and the protection of established political hierarchies are 
cardinal religious virtues 
 Despite this volume’s limitations, I believe that I have demonstrated how early 
modern representations of ascetic renunciation almost invariably intersect with the 
sphere of the political and the dynamics of power and subjugation. That there is room 
to expand the scope of this inquiry cannot be doubted, and is unsurprising given the 
complexity and variety of the early modern canon.  Pushing toward the liminal edge of 
the period, I will give to Paradise Lost the final, prospective word on the representation 
of asceticism in early modern literature. Eve, though she lives in Paradise, is also a 
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cloistered figure, for the space in which she is given license to roam is supervised both 
by God and Adam. When Adam grants her leave to venture out alone, her close 
claustration is violated by an encounter with Satan, who tempts her to disobey the 
ascetic vow to which she is sworn: abstention from the fruit of the Tree of Knowledge. 
When she finally falls, Milton describes her as lost in the sensual enjoyment of her 
transgression:  
             Greedily she engorged without restraint 
 And knew not eating death. (9.791-792, emphasis mine) 
For Milton, the idea of restraint distinguishes the sinless human being of the 
prelapsarian moment from the fallen creature she would become. It is not that Adam 
and Eve remain sinless by exercising restraint, but that restraint itself is unnecessary 
until the moment the fruit touches Eve’s lips. Adam and Eve’s failure, it could be said, 
creates the need for an ascetic impulse to begin with, putting humankind at war with 
the instinctive, bodily urges that Christianity, whether catholic or protestant, cautions us 
to control.   
The breadth and temporal scope of these potential avenues of inquiry provide 
evidence for the enduring imaginative and rhetorical power of ascetic discourse. In all 
likelihood, asceticism, whether labeled as such or not, will never cease to be a topic of 
inquiry and controversy precisely because culture, which is to say any kind of social 
living, ultimately is not possible without at least some degree of renunciation. In 
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Civilization and Its Discontents, Sigmund Freud offers a formulation that speaks to this 
universality: 
Sublimation of instinct is an especially conspicuous feature of cultural 
development; it is what makes it possible for higher psychical activities, 
scientific, artistic or ideological, to play such an important part in civilized 
life….[I]t is impossible to overlook the extent to which civilization is built up upon 
a renunciation of instinct, how much it presupposes precisely the non-
satisfaction (by suppression, repression, or some other means?) of powerful 
instinct. (84) 
This universal renunciation of instinct, which to Freud enables civilization itself, makes 
ascetics of us all.
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